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
~~CLASSICAL~~

POETICS OF ARISTOTLE, ON
STYLE BY DEMETRIUS *and*
SELECTIONS FROM ARISTOTLE'S
POETICS WITH HOBBS' DIGEST
and ARS POETICA BY HORACE
EDITED BY REV T.A. MOXON, M A

ARISTOTLE, born at Stagira in 384 B C
Studied under Plato, 364-347 B C Retired
to Mitylene, 344, in Macedonia, 343-335;
returned to Athens, 335 Died at Chalcis
in Euboea, 322

DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, born about 345
B C at Phalerum Was a pupil of Theo-
phrastus Governed the city of Athens,
317-307 Condemned to death and fled to
Egypt Died in Upper Egypt in 283 B C.

POETICS
ARISTOTLE
ON STYLE
DEMETRIUS



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INTRODUCTION

Two nations in antiquity have done more to enrich the world with the works of literature than any others. These two nations are the Hebrew and the Greek. Of the origins of the literature of both these peoples we know little. That there were definite canons of art there can be little doubt—but, for the most part, their art was unconscious. Both excelled as story-tellers, but their narrative has little of the verbosity and the irrelevance of many early story-tellers. The growth and development of the skill of both peoples seem to have been a natural and unconscious process. The Homeric *hapsodes* certainly had certain clear canons of art and metre, and the Jewish writers had definite laws of rhythm and balance, but both peoples seem to have relied, above all, on their own amazing sense of style. Take, for example, the exquisite lament of David over Absalom, in the Second Book of Samuel xviii 33: 'And the king was much moved, and went up to the chamber over the gate and wept, and as he went, thus he said, "O my son Absalom, my son, my son, Absalom! Would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!"'

Later writers on style, when literature becomes conscious and imitative, might analyse the method used to produce the sublime effect. Demetrius in his treatise *On Style* might have quoted the passage, had he known it, as an instance of *δilogyia*, but the writer of the passage wrote without such self-analysis, and

instinctively gave free play to his own wonderful power of pathos

Literary criticism and analysis of style begin with Aristotle. It is natural for a later age to take up the old masters and try to discover the secrets of their power. As aids to literary enjoyment and appreciation, it is important that the essays of such critics should be in the hands of modern students, and the present volume is an attempt to show the development of literary criticism in a later age, when the writer's art becomes conscious and imitative. 'It is not enough to know what to say, but it is necessary also to say it in the right way' (οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἀ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν)

This volume rightly begins with Aristotle. In the history of European thought, down to the time of the revival of learning, Aristotle reigned supreme. He treated of every subject which came within the scope of ancient thought. In an age when learning waxed dim, almost all secular writings but those of Aristotle had dropped out of notice in Europe. Universities and schools were founded on Aristotle, and for several centuries he reigned without a rival in all the universities of Europe. It is, therefore, quite natural for Chaucer, in the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*, to speak of the Clerk of Oxenford as devoting all his thoughts to the study of Aristotle.

For hym was lever have at his beddes heed
Twenty bookes, clad in blak or reed,
Of Aristotle and his philosophie,
Than robes riche, or fithele, or gay sautrie

Greece, at the time of Aristotle, was full of dialectic and rhetoric, and the natural bent of the Greek mind gave a prominence to the art of oratory that it has

probably seldom had elsewhere. The debates in the Ecclesia, the love of litigation, caused every citizen to be at heart a debater. No wonder that historians like Thucydides and tragedians like Euripides, by a natural instinct, loved to present discussions on public or private policy in the form of a debate. But this love of argument caused a deterioration in the art of rhetoric, which ceased to be a means of elucidating truth, and became a form of trickery by which 'the worse argument might appear the better'. It was for this reason that Plato refused to countenance the study of it, and left it to the despised class of rhetorical sophists.

Aristotle was wiser. He realized that rhetoric was a form, and an important form, of literary style, and dealt with rhetoric next in order after logic and dialectic. He repudiated the appeal to passion, which was so dear to many of his contemporaries. He developed the main points that an orator must keep in mind, and pointed out the knowledge which he must acquire if he is to attain eminence in his art. In so doing, Aristotle enunciated almost every maxim in the art of rhetoric which is required by an aspirant to the art, and left very little for later exponents to add.

Aristotle deals with his subject, not merely as a rhetorician, but as a literary critic and as a supreme exponent of language and style. This gives a special importance to his *Poetics*, which is a treatise on poetry in general and the drama in particular. Unfortunately, the work as we have it is incomplete. The first book alone is extant, of the second book, which deals with comedy, only a few fragments remain. Plato would have banished the drama from his ideal Republic, on the ground that imitation was dangerous, and emotion was to be discouraged in the body politic. Aristotle, with greater wisdom, saw that such natural instincts

could never be suppressed. He rather faced the facts and used emotion for the soul, as a physician uses a purge (*κάθαρσις*) for the body. Pent-up emotion is far more dangerous than emotion when rightly controlled. Poets were to be regarded as medical officers for the soul. (Tragedy and epic poetry imitate the nobler aspects of life,) satire and comedy imitate the lower. Tragedy excites pity and fear, and in so doing serves as a purgation of these emotions (vi, 2). Aristotle also brings out with effect the essential difference between epic and tragic poetry as one of time. Tragedy (v, 8) generally tries to limit its action to a period of twenty-four hours, or not much more than that, while epic poetry is unlimited in point of time.

Plato's outlook on the drama was rather akin to that of the English Puritans. Everything must subserve to the moral well-being of the State, and no limit should be assigned to the repression of the individual, if the needs of the State required it. Aristotle takes a broader view. He admits frankly that the object of poetry is pleasure, and that nothing else can give the same kind of pleasure. This pleasure is due to the absorption of the hearer in the poet's words, it is not due to technical or mechanical skill on the part of the composer, it is the impress of one forceful personality on the soul of another.

As an exponent of literary style, Aristotle has never really been surpassed or superseded. Subsequent ages have produced many who have tried to follow in his footsteps, but neither in ancient nor in modern times has anything of importance on Rhetoric been added to what he wrote.

The work of Demetrius *On Style* is an example of a later writer who followed in Aristotle's footsteps and added certain features of his own. It cannot be deter-

mined for certain who this Demetrius is. Traditionally, he has been identified with Demetrius of Phalerum (300 B C), but this seems too early a date. Demetrius was a common enough name in the Greek world. Dr Rhys Roberts gives reasons for thinking that the treatise was written in the first century of the Christian era, and for identifying the writer with Demetrius of Tarsus, a friend of Plutarch. He suggests that the work may have been composed, or at any rate used, during his mission in Britain under Agricola. The suggestion is interesting, but it cannot be regarded as much more than an attractive speculation.

Demetrius, who follows in the steps of Aristotle, quotes him fully and refers also to his pupil Theophrastus, but his method of treating the subject differs considerably. He deals far less with theory and method, and takes a more general view of the problems of style. One special characteristic of Demetrius is his fourfold division of style into the 'plain', the 'stately', the 'polished', and the 'powerful', each of which he describes and illustrates, while he points out the danger attached to each one of these styles, that it may, by careless handling, degenerate into a corresponding vice, a 'frigid', 'affected', 'arid', or 'disagreeable' style.

The value of Demetrius's treatise does not depend on his theories so much as on the practical test of the principle of good taste. One of the most pleasing features of his work is his constant appeal to and quotation from the great Greek authors. His frequent quotations from Homer, for example, the grim jest of Cyclops (s. 130), the dignity and beauty of Nausicaa (s. 129), make the treatise very attractive and easy to read. His illustrations of his remarks from some of the best known passages of Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristophanes, and others, give a flavour to his treatise

which saves it completely from the tedium of the mere theorist

The present volume includes another attempt at literary criticism of a very different character—the *Ars Poetica* of Horace. This is a treatise composed in Latin hexameters on the rules of dramatic art, including both tragedy and comedy. It represents a different period and outlook. Latin literature had little of the spontaneous originality of Greek literature, it was almost entirely imitative, and drew all its inspiration and ideas and even its poetic metres from the Greek masters. It had, however, its outstanding achievements. The success of Virgil's *Aeneid* in the field of epic poetry raised all kinds of expectations, and it was clearly hoped that a great tragedian might arise at Rome to contest the laurels with Sophocles and Aeschylus. It was in such an atmosphere as this that Horace wrote his *Ars Poetica*. This treatise on the *Art of Poetry*, though full of memorable maxims and sound ideas, suffers seriously from an absence of arrangement and order. It bears very much the stamp of a poem that was composed hastily and never revised or polished before its final publication. This may very well be the case with it. But the soundness of many of its statements and the beauty of much of its language give it an attraction all its own. The main theme, apart from its technical rules and comments, is based on the favourite idea of Horace, that a poet, if he is to produce work that will live, must be independent of popular opinion, must be indefatigable in studying the best models, and must be sincere in idea and thought.

Be perfect in the great originals,
Read them by day and think of them by night

Voltaire, who disparages Horace's *Satires*, speaks of his

Art of Poetry as 'admirable' Certainly it is full of kindly wit and lively wisdom, and it has supplied the world with many a quotation and epigram applied to quite different subjects from those which Horace had in mind when he wrote them

1934

T A M

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ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

*Translated by Thomas Twining, 1789, and here reprinted
from the 2nd edition (1812), issued under the supervision
of Daniel Twining.*

PART I

GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW OF POETRY AND ITS PRINCIPAL SPECIES

INTRODUCTION

My design is to treat of POETRY in general, and of its several species, to inquire what is the proper effect of each—what construction of a fable, or plan, is essential to a good poem—of what, and how many, parts each species consists, with whatever else belongs to the same subject which I shall consider in the order that most naturally presents itself

I

Epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, dithyrambics, as also, for the most part, the music of the flute and of the lyre—all these are, in the most general view of them, imitations, differing, however, from each other in three respects, according to the different means, the different objects, or the different manner of their imitation

II

For as men, some through art and some through habit, imitate various objects by means of colour and figure, and others, again, by voice, so, with respect to the arts above-mentioned, rhythm, words, and melody are the different means by which, either singly or variously combined, they all produce their imitation

For example in the imitations of the flute and the

lyre, and of any other instruments capable of producing a similar effect—as the syrinx, or pipe—melody and rhythm only are employed. In those of dance, rhythm alone, without melody, for there are dancers who, by rhythm applied to gesture, express manners, passions, and actions.

The *epopoëia* imitates by words alone, or by verse, and that verse may either be composed of various metres, or confined, according to the practice hitherto established, to a single species. For we should otherwise have no general name which would comprehend the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, and the Socratic dialogues, or poems in iambic, elegiac, or other metres, in which the epic species of imitation may be conveyed. Custom, indeed, connecting the poetry or making with the metre, has denominated some elegiac poets, i.e. makers of elegiac verse, others epic poets, i.e. makers of hexameter verse, thus distinguishing poets, not according to the nature of their imitation, but according to that of their metre only. For even they who compose treatises of medicine or natural philosophy in verse are denominated poets: yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their metre, the former, therefore, justly merits the name of poet, while the other should rather be called a physiologist than a poet.

So, also, though any one should choose to convey his imitation in every kind of metre promiscuously, as Chaeremon has done in his *Centaur*, which is a medley of all sorts of verse, it would not immediately follow that, on that account merely, he was entitled to the name of poet. But of this enough.

There are, again, other species of poetry which make use of all the means of imitation—rhythm, melody, and verse. Such are the dithyrambic, that of nomes, tragedy, and comedy, with this difference, however,

that in some of these they are employed all together, in others, separately And such are the differences of these arts with respect to the means by which they imitate

III

But as the objects of imitation are the actions of men, and these men must of necessity be either good or bad (for on this does character principally depend, the manners being, in all men, most strongly marked by virtue and vice), it follows that we can only represent men either as better than they actually are, or worse, or exactly as they are just as, in painting, the pictures of Polygnotus were above the common level of nature, those of Pauson below it, those of Dionysius faithful likenesses

Now it is evident that each of the imitations above-mentioned will admit of these differences, and become a different kind of imitation, as it imitates objects that differ in this respect This may be the case with dancing, with the music of the flute and of the lyre, and also with the poetry which employs words or verse only, without melody or rhythm thus, Homer has drawn men superior to what they are, Cleophon, as they are, Hegemon the Thasian, the inventor of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the *Deliad*, worse than they are

So again, with respect to dithyrambics and nomes in these, too, the imitation may be as different as that of the *Persians* by Timotheus, and the *Cyclops* by Philoxenus

Tragedy, also, and comedy, are distinguished in the same manner, the aim of comedy being to exhibit men worse than we find them, that of tragedy, better

IV

There remains the third difference—that of the manner in which each of these objects may be imitated. For the poet, imitating the same object, and by the same means, may do it either in narration—and that, again, either personating other characters, as Homer does, or in his own person throughout, without change—or he may imitate by representing all his characters as real, and employed in the very action itself.

These, then, are the three differences by which, as I said in the beginning, all imitation is distinguished: those of the means, the object, and the manner, so that Sophocles is, in one respect, an imitator of the same kind with Homer, as elevated characters are the objects of both, in another respect, of the same kind with Aristophanes, as both imitate in the way of action, whence, according to some, the application of the term drama (i.e. action) to such poems. Upon this it is that the Dorians ground their claim to the invention both of tragedy and comedy. For comedy is claimed by the Megarians, both by those of Greece, who contend that it took its rise in their popular government, and by those of Sicily, among whom the poet Epicharmus flourished long before Chionides and Magnes; and tragedy, also, is claimed by some of the Dorians of Peloponnesus. In support of these claims they argue from the words themselves. They allege that the Doric word for a village is *come*, the Attic, *demos*, and that comedians were so called, not from *comazein*—to revel—but from their strolling about the *comai*, or villages, before they were tolerated in the city. They say, further, that

to do, or act, they express by the word *dran*, the Athenians by *pratten*

And thus much as to the differences of imitation—how many, and what, they are

V

Poetry in general seems to have derived its origin from two causes, each of them natural

(1) To imitate is instinctive in man from his infancy. By this he is distinguished from other animals, that he is, of all, the most imitative, and through this instinct receives his earliest education. All men, likewise, naturally receive pleasure from imitation. This is evident from what we experience in viewing the works of imitative art, for in them we contemplate with pleasure, and with the more pleasure the more exactly they are imitated, such objects as, if real, we could not see without pain; as the figures of the meanest and most disgusting animals, dead bodies, and the like. And the reason of this is, that to learn is a natural pleasure, not confined to philosophers, but common to all men, with this difference only, that the multitude partake of it in a more transient and compendious manner. Hence the pleasure they receive from a picture in viewing it they learn, they infer, they discover what every object is, that this, for instance, is such a particular man, etc. For if we suppose the object represented to be something which the spectator had never seen, his pleasure, in that case, will not arise from the imitation, but from the workmanship, the colours, or some such cause. Imitation, then, being thus natural to us, and, secondly, melody and rhythm being also natural (for as to metre, it is plainly a species of rhythm), those persons in whom

originally these propensities were the strongest, were naturally led to rude and extemporaneous attempts, which, gradually improved, gave birth to Poetry

VI

But this Poetry, following the different characters of its authors, naturally divided itself into two different kinds They who were of a grave and lofty spirit chose for their imitation the actions and the adventures of elevated characters, while poets of a lighter turn represented those of the vicious and contemptible And these composed originally satires, as the former did hymns and encomia ~~satire~~ ~~prayer~~ ~~praise~~

Of the lighter kind, we have no poem anterior to the time of Homer, though many such in all probability there were, but from his time we have, as his *Margites*, and others of the same species, in which the iambic was introduced as the most proper measure, and hence, indeed, the name of iambic, because it was the measure in which they used to *iambize* (i e. to satirize) each other

And thus these old poets were divided into two classes those who used the heroic, and those who used the iambic verse

And as, in the serious kind, Homer alone may be said to deserve the name of poet, not only on account of his other excellences, but also of the dramatic spirit of his imitations, so was he likewise the first who suggested the idea of comedy, by substituting ridicule for invective, and giving that ridicule a dramatic cast, for his *Margites* bears the same analogy to comedy, as his *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to tragedy But when tragedy and comedy had once made their appearance, succeeding poets, according to the turn of their genius, attached them-

selves to the one or the other of these new species the lighter sort, instead of iambic, became comic poets; the graver, tragic, instead of heroic and that on account of the superior dignity and higher estimation of these latter forms of poetry

Whether tragedy has now, with respect to its constituent parts, received the utmost improvement of which it is capable, considered both in itself and relatively to the theatre, is a question that belongs not to this place

VII

Both tragedy, then, and comedy, having originated in a rude and unpremeditated manner—the first from the dithyrambic hymns, the other from those phallic songs which in many cities remain still in use—each advanced gradually towards perfection by such successive improvements as were most obvious

TRAGEDY, after various changes, reposed at length in the completion of its proper form. Aeschylus first added a second actor, he also abridged the chorus, and made the dialogue the principal part of tragedy. Sophocles increased the number of actors to three, and added the decoration of painted scenery. It was also late before tragedy threw aside the short and simple fable and ludicrous language of its satyric original, and attained its proper magnitude and dignity. The iambic measure was then first adopted for originally the trochaic tetrameter was made use of as better suited to the satyric and saltatorial genius of the poem at that time, but when the dialogue was formed, nature itself pointed out the proper metre. For the iambic is, of all metres, the most colloquial, as appears evidently from

this fact, that our common conversation frequently falls into iambic verse, seldom into hexameter, and only when we depart from the usual melody of speech Episodes, also, were multiplied, and every other part of the drama successively improved and polished

But of this enough to enter into a minute detail would, perhaps, be a task of some length

VIII

COMEDY, as was said before, is an imitation of bad characters, bad, not with respect to every sort of vice, but to the ridiculous only, as being a species of turpitude or deformity, since it may be defined to be a fault or deformity of such a sort as is neither painful nor destructive. A ridiculous face, for example, is something ugly and distorted, but not so as to cause pain

The successive improvements of tragedy, and the respective authors of them, have not escaped our knowledge, but those of comedy, from the little attention that was paid to it in its origin, remain in obscurity. For it was not till late that comedy was authorized by the magistrate and carried on at the public expense, it was at first a private and voluntary exhibition. From the time, indeed, when it began to acquire some degree of form, its poets have been recorded, but who first introduced masks, or prologues, or augmented the number of actors—these, and other particulars of the same kind, are unknown

Epicharmus and Phormis were the first who invented comic fables. This improvement, therefore, is of Sicilian origin. But, of Athenian poets, Crates was the first who abandoned the iambic form of comedy, and made use of invented and general stories or fables

IX

epic poetry agrees so far with tragic as it is an imitation of great characters and actions by means of words, but in this it differs, that it makes use of only one kind of metre throughout, and that it is narrative. It also differs in length, for tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine its action within the limits of a single revolution of the sun, or nearly so, but the time of epic action is indefinite. This, however, at first was equally the case with tragedy itself.

Of their constituent parts some are common to both, some peculiar to tragedy. He therefore, who is a judge of the beauties and defects of tragedy is, of course, equally a judge with respect to those of epic poetry, for all the parts of the epic poem are to be found in tragedy, not all those of tragedy in the epic poem.

PART II

OF TRAGEDY

I

Of the species of poetry which imitates in hexameters, and of comedy, we shall speak hereafter. Let us now consider TRAGEDY, collecting first, from what has been already said, its true and essential definition.

Tragedy, then, is an imitation of some action that is important, entire, and of a proper magnitude—by language, embellished and rendered pleasurable, but by different means in different parts—in the way, not of narration, but of action—effecting through pity and terror the correction and refinement of such passions.

By pleasurable language I mean a language that has the embellishments of rhythm, melody, and metre. And I add, by different means in different parts, because in some parts metre alone is employed, in others, melody

II

Now as tragedy imitates by acting, the decoration in the first place, must necessarily be one of its parts: then the *melopoeia* (or music) and the diction, for these last include the means of tragic imitation. By diction I mean the metrical composition. The meaning of *melopoeia* is obvious to every one. *Thomas F. St.*

Again, tragedy being an imitation of an action, and the persons employed in that action being neces-

sarily characterized by their manners and their sentiments, since it is from these that actions themselves derive their character, it follows that there must also be manners and sentiments as the two causes of actions, and, consequently, of the happiness or unhappiness of all men. The imitation of the action is the fable for by fable I now mean the contexture of incidents, or the plot. By manners, I mean whatever marks the characters of the persons, by sentiments, whatever they say, whether proving anything, or delivering a general sentiment, etc.

Hence all tragedy must necessarily contain six parts, which together constitute its peculiar character or quality: fable, manners, diction, sentiments, decoration, and music. Of these parts, two relate to the means, one to the manner, and three to the object of imitation. And these are all. These specific parts, if we may so call them, have been employed by most poets, and are all to be found in almost every tragedy.

III

But of all these parts the most important is the combination of incidents or the fable. Because tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of actions—of life, of happiness and unhappiness, for happiness consists in action, and the supreme good itself, the very end of life, is action of a certain kind—not quality. Now the manners of men constitute only their quality or characters, but it is by their actions that they are happy, or the contrary. Tragedy, therefore, does not imitate action for the sake of imitating manners, but in the imitation of action that of manners is of course involved. So that the action and the fable are the end

of tragedy, and in everything the end is of principal importance

Again, tragedy cannot subsist without action, without manners it may. The tragedies of most modern poets have this defect, a defect common, indeed, among poets in general. As among painters also, this is the case with Zeuxis, compared with Polygnotus the latter excels in the expression of the manners, there is no such expression in the pictures of Zeuxis.

Further, suppose any one to string together a number of speeches in which the manners are strongly marked, the language and the sentiments well turned, this will not be sufficient to produce the proper effect of tragedy that end will much rather be answered by a piece, defective in each of those particulars, but furnished with a proper fable and contexture of incidents. Just as in painting, the most brilliant colours, spread at random and without design, will give far less pleasure than the simplest outline of a figure.

Add to this, that those parts of tragedy, by means of which it becomes most interesting and affecting are parts of the fable, I mean revolutions and discoveries.

As a further proof, adventurers in tragic writing are sooner able to arrive at excellence in the language and the manners than in the construction of a plot, as appears from almost all our earlier poets. The fable, then, is the principal part—the soul, as it were—of tragedy, and the manners are next in rank, tragedy being an imitation of an action, and through that principally of the agents.

In the third place stand the sentiments. To this part it belongs to say such things as are true and proper, which, in the dialogue, depends on the political and rhetorical arts for the ancients made their characters

speaking in the style of political and popular eloquence, but now the rhetorical manner prevails

The manners are whatever manifests the disposition of the speaker. There are speeches, therefore, which are without manners or character, as not containing anything by which the propensities or aversions of the person who delivers them can be known. The sentiments comprehend whatever is said, whether proving anything affirmatively or negatively, or expressing some general reflection, etc

Fourth in order is the diction, that is, as I have already said, the expression of the sentiments by words, the power and effect of which is the same, whether in verse or prose

Of the remaining two parts the music stands next; of all the pleasurable accompaniments and embellishments of tragedy the most delightful

The decoration has also a great effect, but of all the parts is most foreign to the art. For the power of tragedy is felt without representation and actors, and the beauty of the decorations depends more on the art of the mechanic than on that of the poet

IV

These things being thus adjusted, let us go on to examine in what manner the fable should be constructed, since this is the first and most important part of tragedy

Now we have defined tragedy to be an imitation of an action that is complete and entire, and that has also a certain magnitude, for a thing may be entire and a whole, and yet not be of any magnitude

(1) By entire I mean that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does

not necessarily suppose anything before it, but which requires something to follow it. An end, on the contrary, is that which supposes something to precede it, either necessarily or probably, but which nothing is required to follow. A middle is that which both supposes something to precede and requires something to follow. The poet, therefore, who would construct his fable properly is not at liberty to begin or end where he pleases, but must conform to these definitions *prior*.

(2) Again, whatever is beautiful, whether it be an animal, or any other thing composed of different parts, must not only have those parts arranged in a certain manner, but must also be of a certain magnitude, for beauty consists in magnitude and order. Hence it is that no very minute animal can be beautiful, the eye comprehends the whole too instantaneously to distinguish and compare the parts. Neither, on the contrary, can one of a prodigious size be beautiful, because, as all its parts cannot be seen at once, the whole, the unity of object, is lost to the spectator, as it would be, for example, if he were surveying an animal of many miles in length. As, therefore, in animals and other objects, a certain magnitude is requisite, but that magnitude must be such as to present a whole easily comprehended by the eye, so in the fable a certain length is requisite, but that length must be such as to present a whole easily comprehended by the memory.

With respect to the measure of this length—if referred to actual representation in the dramatic contests, it is a matter foreign to the art itself. For if a hundred tragedies were to be exhibited in concurrence, the length of each performance must be regulated by the hour-glass, a practice of which, it is said, there have formerly been instances. But if we determine this measure by the nature of the thing itself, the more extensive the

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fable, consistently with the clear and easy comprehension of the whole, the more beautiful will it be, with respect to magnitude. In general, we may say that an action is sufficiently extended when it is long enough to admit of a change of fortune, from happy to unhappy, or the reverse, brought about by a succession, necessary or probable, of well-connected incidents.

V

A fable is not one, as some conceive it to be, merely because the hero of it is one. For numberless events happen to one man, many of which are such as cannot be connected into one event, and so, likewise, there are many actions of one man which cannot be connected into any one action. Hence appears the mistake of all those poets who have composed *Herculeids*, *Theseids*, and other poems of that kind. They conclude that because Hercules was one, so also must be the fable of which he is the subject. But Homer, among his many other excellences, seems also to have been perfectly aware of this mistake, either from art or genius. For when he composed his *Odyssey*, he did not introduce all the events of his hero's life—such, for instance, as the wound he received upon Parnassus, his feigned madness when the Grecian army was assembling, etc.—events not connected, either by necessary or probable consequence, with each other, but he comprehended those only which have relation to one action, for such we call that of the *Odyssey*. And in the same manner he composed his *Iliad*.

As, therefore, in other mimetic arts, one imitation is an imitation of one thing, so here the fable, being an imitation of an action, should be an imitation of an

action that is one and entire, the parts of it being so connected that if any one of them be either transposed or taken away, the whole will be destroyed or changed, for whatever may be either retained or omitted, without making any sensible difference, is not properly a part

VI

It appears, further, from what has been said, that it is not the poet's province to relate such things as have actually happened, but such as might have happened—such as are possible, according either to probable or necessary consequence.

For it is not by writing in verse or prose that the historian and the poet are distinguished: the work of Herodotus might be versified, but it would still be a species of history, no less with metre than without. They are distinguished by this, that the one relates what has been, the other what might be. On this account poetry is a more philosophical and a more excellent thing than history: for poetry is chiefly conversant about general truth, history about particular. In what manner, for example, any person of a certain character would speak or act, probably or necessarily—this is general, and this is the object of poetry, even while it makes use of particular names. But what Alcibiades did, or what happened to him—this is particular truth.

With respect to comedy this is now become obvious, for here the poet, when he has formed his plot of probable incidents, gives to his characters whatever names he pleases, and is not, like the iambic poets, particular and personal.

Tragedy, indeed, retains the use of real names, and

the reason is that what we are disposed to believe, we must think possible. Now, what has never actually happened we are not apt to regard as possible; but what has been is unquestionably so, or it could not have been at all. There are, however, some tragedies in which one or two of the names are historical, and the rest feigned: there are even some in which none of the names are historical, such is Agathon's tragedy called *The Flower*, for in that all is invention, both incidents and names, and yet it pleases. It is by no means, therefore, essential that a poet should confine himself to the known and established subjects of tragedy. Such a restraint would, indeed, be ridiculous, since even those subjects that are known are known comparatively but to few, and yet are interesting to all. From all this it is manifest that a poet should be a poet or maker of fables, rather than of verses, since it is imitation that constitutes the poet, and of this imitation actions are the object: nor is he the less a poet, though the incidents of his fable should chance to be such as have actually happened, for nothing hinders, but that some true events may possess that probability, the invention of which entitles him to the name of poet.

VII

Of simple fables or actions, the episodic are the worst. I call that an episodic fable, the episodes of which follow each other without any probable or necessary connection, a fault into which bad poets are betrayed by their want of skill, and good poets by the players: for in order to accommodate their pieces to the purposes of rival performers in the dramatic contests, they spin out the action beyond their powers, and are thus

frequently forced to break the connection and continuity of its parts

But tragedy is an imitation, not only of a complete action, but also of an action exciting terror and pity. Now that purpose is best answered by such events as are not only unexpected, but unexpected consequences of each other for, by this means, they will have more of the wonderful than if they appeared to be the effects of chance; since we find that, among events merely casual, those are the most wonderful and striking which seem to imply design as when, for instance, the statue of Mityas at Argos killed the very man who had murdered Mityas, by falling down upon him as he was surveying it, events of this kind not having the appearance of accident. It follows, then, that such fables as are formed on these principles must be the best.

VIII

Fables are of two sorts, simple and complicated, for so also are the actions themselves of which they are imitations. An action (having the continuity and unity prescribed) I call simple, when its catastrophe is produced without either revolution or discovery, complicated when with one or both. And these should arise from the structure of the fable itself, so as to be the natural consequences, necessary or probable, of what has preceded in the action. For there is a wide difference between incidents that follow from, and incidents that follow only after, each other.

IX

A revolution is a change (such as has already been mentioned) into the reverse of what is expected from

the circumstances of the action, and that produced, as we have said, by probable or necessary consequence

Thus, in the *Oedipus*, the messenger, meaning to make Oedipus happy, and to relieve him from the dread he was under with respect to his mother, by making known to him his real birth, produces an effect directly contrary to his intention. Thus also in the tragedy of *Lynceus*, Lynceus is led to suffer death, Danaus follows to inflict it, but the event, resulting from the course of the incidents, is that Danaus is killed and Lynceus saved

Discovery—as, indeed, the word implies—is a change from unknown to known, happening between those characters whose happiness or unhappiness forms the catastrophe of the drama, and terminating in friendship or enmity

The best sort of *discovery* is that which is accompanied by a revolution as in the *Oedipus*

There are also other discoveries, for inanimate things of any kind may be recognized in the same manner, and we may discover whether such a particular thing was, or was not, done by such a person. But the discovery most appropriated to the fable and the action is that above defined, because such discoveries and revolutions must excite either pity or terror, and tragedy we have defined to be an imitation of pitiable and terrible actions and because, also, by them the event, happy or unhappy, is produced

Now discoveries, being relative things, are sometimes of one of the persons only, the other being already known, and sometimes they are reciprocal thus, Iphigenia is discovered to Orestes by the letter which she charges him to deliver, and Orestes is obliged, by other means, to make himself known to her

These, then, are two parts of the fable—*revolution* and *discovery*. There is a third, which we denominate

disasters The two former have been explained. Disasters comprehend all painful or destructive actions the exhibition of death, bodily anguish, wounds, and everything of that kind

X

(The parts of tragedy which are necessary to constitute its quality have been already enumerated. Its parts of quantity—the distinct parts into which it is divided—are these: prologue, episode, exode, and chorus, which last is also divided into the parode and the *stasimon*. These are common to all tragedies. The *commos* are found in some only.)

The prologue is all that part of a tragedy which precedes the parode of the chorus, the episode, all that part which is included between entire choral odes, the exode, that part which has no choral ode after it.

Of the choral part, the parode is the first speech of the whole chorus, the *stasimon* includes all those choral odes that are without anapaests and trochees.

The *commos* is a general lamentation of the chorus and the actors together.

Such are the separate parts into which tragedy is divided. Its parts of quality were before explained.

XI

The order of the subject leads us to consider, in the next place, what the poet should aim at and what avoid in the construction of his fable, and by what means the purpose of tragedy may be best effected.

Now since it is requisite to the perfection of a tragedy that its plot should be of the complicated, not of the

simple kind, and that it should imitate such actions as excite terror and pity (thus being the peculiar property of the tragic imitation), it follows evidently, in the first place, that the change from prosperity to adversity should not be represented as happening to a virtuous character, for this raises disgust rather than terror or compassion. Neither should the contrary change, from adversity to prosperity, be exhibited in a vicious character: this, of all plans, is the most opposite to the genius of tragedy, having no one property that it ought to have, for it is neither gratifying in a moral view, nor affecting, nor terrible. Nor, again, should the fall of a very bad man from prosperous to adverse fortune be represented: because, though such a subject may be pleasing from its moral tendency, it will produce neither pity nor terror. For our pity is excited by misfortunes undeservedly suffered, and our terror by some resemblance between the sufferer and ourselves. Neither of these effects will, therefore, be produced by such an event.

There remains, then, for our choice, the character between these extremes: that of a person neither eminently virtuous or just, nor yet involved in misfortune by deliberate vice or villainy, but by some error of human frailty, and this person should also be someone of high fame and flourishing prosperity. For example, Oedipus, Thyestes, or other illustrious men of such families.

XII

Hence it appears that, to be well constructed, a fable, contrary to the opinion of some, should be single rather than double, that the change of fortune should not be

from adverse to prosperous, but the reverse, and that it should be the consequence, not of vice, but of some great frailty, in a character such as has been described, or better rather than worse

These principles are confirmed by experience, for poets formerly admitted almost any story into the number of tragic subjects, but now, the subjects of the best tragedies are confined to a few families—to Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and others, the sufferers or the authors of some terrible calamity

The most perfect tragedy, then, according to the principles of the art, is of this construction. Whence appears the mistake of those critics who censure Euripides for this practice in his tragedies, many of which terminate unhappily, for this, as we have shown, is right. And as the strongest proof of it we find that upon the stage, and in the dramatic contests, such tragedies, if they succeed, have always the most tragic effect, and Euripides, though in other respects faulty in the conduct of his subjects, seems clearly to be the most tragic of all poets

I place in the second rank that kind of fable to which some assign the first that which is of a double construction like the *Odyssey*, and also ends in two opposite events, to the good and to the bad characters. That this passes for the best is owing to the weakness of the spectators, to whose wishes the poets accommodate their productions. This kind of pleasure, however, is not the proper pleasure of tragedy, but belongs rather to comedy, for there, if even the bitterest enemies, like Orestes and Aegisthus, are introduced, they quit the scene at last in perfect friendship, and no blood is shed on either side

XIII

Terror and pity may be raised by the decoration of the mere spectacle, but they may also arise from the circumstances of the action itself, which is far preferable and shows a superior poet. For the fable should be so constructed that, without the assistance of the sight, its incidents may excite horror and commiseration in those who hear them only an effect which every one who hears the fable of the *Oedipus* must experience. But to produce this effect by means of the decoration discovers want of art in the poet, who must also be supplied by the public with an expensive apparatus.

As to those poets who make use of the decoration in order to produce, not the terrible, but the marvellous only, their purpose has nothing in common with that of tragedy. For we are not to seek for every sort of pleasure from tragedy, but for that only which is proper to the species.

Since, therefore, it is the business of the tragic poet to give that pleasure which arises from pity and terror, through imitation, it is evident that he ought to produce that effect by the circumstances of the action itself.

XIV

Let us, then, see of what kind those incidents are which appear most terrible or piteous.

Now such actions must, of necessity, happen between persons who are either friends, or enemies, or indifferent to each other. If an enemy kills, or purposes to kill, an enemy, in neither case is any commiseration raised in us, beyond what necessarily arises from the nature of the action itself.

The case is the same when the persons are neither friends nor enemies. But when such disasters happen between friends—when, for instance, the brother kills, or is going to kill, his brother, the son his father, the mother her son, or the reverse—these, and others of a similar kind, are the proper incidents for the poet's choice. The received tragic subjects, therefore, he is not at liberty essentially to alter, Clytaemnestra must die by the hand of Orestes, and Eriphyle by that of Alcmaeon, but it is his province to invent other subjects, and to make a skilful use of those which he finds already established. What I mean by a skilful use I proceed to explain.

The atrocious action may be perpetrated knowingly and intentionally, as was usual with the earlier poets, and as Euripides, also, has represented Medea destroying her children.

It may, likewise, be perpetrated by those who are ignorant at the time of the connection between them and the injured person, which they afterwards discover, like Oedipus, in Sophocles. There, indeed, the action itself does not make a part of the drama: the *Alcmaeon* of Astydamas, and Telegonus in the *Ulysses Wounded*, furnish instances within the tragedy.

There is yet a third way, where a person upon the point of perpetrating, through ignorance, some dreadful deed, is prevented by a sudden discovery.

Beside these, there is no other proper way. For the action must of necessity be either done or not done, and that either with knowledge or without; but of all these ways, that of being ready to execute knowingly, and yet not executing, is the worst, for this is, at the same time, shocking and yet not tragic, because it exhibits no disastrous event. It is, therefore, never, or very rarely, made use of. The attempt of Haemon to kill Creon in the *Antigone* is an example.

Next to this is the actual execution of the purpose.

To execute through ignorance, and afterwards to discover, is better for thus the shocking atrociousness is avoided, and, at the same time, the discovery is striking.

But the best of all these ways is the last. Thus, in the tragedy of *Cresphontes*, Merope, in the very act of putting her son to death, discovers him, and is prevented. In the *Iphigema*, the sister in the same manner discovers her brother, and in the *Helle*, the son discovers his mother at the instant when he was going to betray her.

On this account it is that the subjects of tragedy, as before remarked, are confined to a small number of families. For it was not to art, but to fortune, that poets applied themselves to find incidents of this nature. Hence the necessity of having recourse to those families in which such calamities have happened.

Of the plot or fable and its requisites enough has now been said.

XV

With respect to the manners, four things are to be attended to by the poet.

First, and principally, they should be good. Now manners, or character, belong, as we have said before, to any speech or action that manifests a certain disposition, and they are bad or good as the disposition manifested is bad or good. This goodness of manners may be found in persons of every description: the manners of a woman or of a slave may be good, though, in general, women are, perhaps, rather bad than good, and slaves altogether bad.

The second requisite of the manners is propriety.

There is a manly character of bravery and fierceness which cannot, with propriety, be given to a woman

The third requisite is resemblance, for this is a different thing from their being good and proper, as above described

The fourth is uniformity; for even though the model of the poet's imitation be some person of ununiform manners, still that person must be represented as uniformly ununiform

We have an example of manners unnecessarily bad in the character of Menelaus in the tragedy of *Orestes* of improper and unbecoming manners in the lamentation of Ulysses in *Scylla*, and in the speech of Menalippe of ununiform manners in the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, for there the Iphigenia who supplicates for life has no resemblance to the Iphigenia of the conclusion

In the manners, as in the fable, the poet should always aim either at what is necessary or what is probable, so that such a character shall appear to speak or act, necessarily or probably, in such a manner, and this event to be the necessary or probable consequence of that Hence it is evident that the development also of a fable should arise out of the fable itself, and not depend upon machinery as in the *Medea*, or in the incidents relative to the return of the Greeks in the *Iliad* The proper application of machinery is to such circumstances as are extraneous to the drama, such as either happened before the time of the action, and could not by human means be known, or are to happen after, and require to be foretold for to the Gods we attribute the knowledge of all things But nothing improbable should be admitted in the incidents of the fable, or, if it cannot be avoided, it should, at least, be confined to such as are without the tragedy itself, as in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles

Since tragedy is an imitation of what is best, we should follow the example of skilful portrait-painters, who, while they express the peculiar lineaments, and produce a likeness, at the same time improve upon the original. And thus, too, the poet, when he imitates the manners of passionate men (or of indolent, or any other similar kind), should draw an example approaching rather to a good than to a hard and ferocious character as Achilles is drawn by Agathon and by Homer. These things the poet should keep in view, and besides these, whatever relates to those senses which have a necessary connection with poetry. For here, also, he may often err. But of this enough has been said in the treatises already published.

XVI

What is meant by a discovery has already been explained. Its kinds are the following.

First, the most artificial of all, and to which, from poverty of invention, the generality of poets have recourse—the discovery by visible signs. Of these signs, some are natural, as the lance with which the family of earth-born Thebans were marked, or the stars which Carcinus has made use of in his *Thyestes*; others are adventitious, and of these some are corporal, as scars, some external, as necklaces, bracelets, etc., or the little boat by which the discovery is made in the tragedy of *Tyro*. Even these, however, may be employed with more or less skill. The discovery of Ulysses, for example, to his nurse by means of his scar, is very different from his discovery by the same means to the herdsmen. For all those discoveries, in which the sign is produced by way of proof, are artificial. Those which, like that in

the 'Washing of Ulysses', happen suddenly and casually are better

Secondly, discoveries invented at pleasure by the poet, and on that account still inartificial. For example, in the *Iphigeneia*, Orestes, after having discovered his sister, discovers himself to her. She, indeed, is discovered by the letter, but Orestes by verbal proofs, and these are such as the poet chooses to make him produce, not such as arise from the circumstances of the fable. This kind of discovery, therefore, borders upon the fault of that first mentioned; for some of the things from which those proofs are drawn are even such as might have been actually produced as visible signs.

Another instance is the discovery by the sound of the shuttle in the *Tereus* of Sophocles.

Thirdly, the discovery occasioned by memory; as when some recollection is excited by the view of a particular object. Thus, in the *Cyprians* of Dicaeogenes, a discovery is produced by tears shed at the sight of a picture. and thus, in the 'Tale of Alcinous', Ulysses, listening to the bard, recollects, weeps, and is discovered.

Fourthly, the discovery occasioned by reasoning or inference, such as that in the *Choephorae*. 'The person who is arrived resembles me—no one resembles me but Orestes—it must be he!' And that of Polyides the Sophist, in his *Iphigeneia*, for the conclusion of Orestes was natural. 'It had been his sister's lot to be sacrificed, and it was now his own!' That also, in the *Tydeus* of Theodectes. 'He came to find his son and he himself must perish!' And thus, the daughters of Phineus, in the tragedy denominated from them, viewing the place to which they were led, infer their fate 'there they were to die, for there they were exposed!' There is also a compound sort of discovery arising from false inference in the audience, as in *Ulysses the False Mes-*

senger he asserts that he shall know the bow which he had not seen, the audience falsely infer that a discovery by that means will follow

But of all discoveries the best is that which arises from the action itself, and in which a striking effect is produced by probable incidents. Such is that in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles and that in the *Iphigenia*, for nothing more natural than her desire of conveying the letter. Such discoveries are the best, because they alone are effected without the help of invented proofs or bracelets, etc

Next to these are the discoveries by inference

XVII

The poet, both when he plans and when he writes his tragedy, should put himself as much as possible in the place of a spectator, for by this means, seeing everything distinctly as if present at the action, he will discern what is proper, and no inconsistencies will escape him. The fault objected to Carcinus is a proof of this. Amphiaras had left the temple this the poet, for want of conceiving the action to pass before his eyes, overlooked, but in the representation the audience were disgusted, and the piece condemned

In composing, the poet should even, as much as possible, be an actor for, by natural sympathy, they are most persuasive and affecting who are under the influence of actual passion. We share the agitation of those who appear to be truly agitated—the anger of those who appear to be truly angry

Hence it is that poetry demands either great natural quickness of parts, or an enthusiasm allied to madness. By the first of these we mould ourselves with facility

to the imitation of every form, by the other, transported out of ourselves, we become what we imagine

When the poet invents a subject, he should first draw a general sketch of it, and afterwards give it the detail of its episodes and extend it. The general argument, for instance, of the *Iphigenia* should be considered in this way. 'A virgin on the point of being sacrificed is imperceptibly conveyed away from the altar, and transported to another country where it was the custom to sacrifice all strangers to Diana. Of these rites she is appointed priestess. It happens, some time after, that her brother arrives there.' But why?—because an oracle had commanded him, for some reason exterior to the general plan. For what purpose? This also is exterior to the plan. 'He arrives, is seized, and at the instant that he is going to be sacrificed the discovery is made.' And this may be, either in the way of Euripides, or, like that of Polyides, by the natural reflection of Orestes that 'it was his fate also as it had been his sister's to be sacrificed', by which exclamation he is saved.

After this, the poet, when he has given names to his characters, should proceed to the episodes of his action, and he must take care that these belong properly to the subject; like that of the madness of Orestes, which occasions his being taken, and his escape by means of the ablution. In dramatic poetry the episodes are short, but in the epic they are the means of drawing out the poem to its proper length. The general story of the *Odyssey*, for example, lies in a small compass. 'A certain man is supposed to be absent from his own country for many years, he is persecuted by Neptune, deprived of all his companions, and left alone. At home his affairs are in disorder—the suitors of his wife dissipating his wealth and plotting the destruction of his son. Tossed

by many tempests, he at length arrives, and making himself known to some of his family attacks his enemies, destroys them, and remains himself in safety' This is essential, the rest is episode

XVIII

Every tragedy consists of two parts—the complication and the development. The complication is often formed by incidents supposed prior to the action, and by a part, also, of those that are within the action, the rest form the development. I call complication all that is between the beginning of the piece and the last part, where the change of fortune commences, development all between the beginning of that change and the conclusion. Thus, in the *Lynceus* of Theodectes, the events antecedent to the action and the seizure of the child constitute the complication, the development is from the accusation of murder to the end

XIX

There are four kinds of tragedy, deducible from so many parts, which have been mentioned. One kind is the complicated, where all depends on revolution and discovery, another is the disastrous, such as those on the subject of Ajax or Ixion, another, the moral, as the *Philoctetes* and the *Peleus*, and fourthly, the simple, such as the *Phorcides*, the *Prometheus*, and all those tragedies the scene of which is laid in the infernal regions. It should be the poet's aim to make himself master of all these manners, or as many of them, at least, as possible, and those the best especially considering the captious criticism to which in these days he is exposed. For the public, having now seen different poets excel in

each of these different kinds, expect every single poet to unite in himself, and to surpass, the peculiar excellences of them all.

One tragedy may justly be considered as the same with another or different, not according as the subjects, but rather according as the complication and development are the same or different. Many poets, when they have complicated well, develop badly. They should endeavour to deserve equal applause in both.

XX

We must also be attentive to what has been often mentioned, and not construct a tragedy upon an epic plan. By an epic plan I mean a fable composed of many fables; as if any one, for instance, should take the entire fable of the *Iliad* for the subject of a tragedy. In the epic poem, the length of the whole admits of a proper magnitude in the parts, but in the drama the effect of such a plan is far different from what is expected. As a proof of this, those poets who have formed the whole of the destruction of Troy into a tragedy, instead of confining themselves (as Euripides, but not Aeschylus, has done in the story of Niobe) to a part, have either been condemned in the representation or have contended without success. Even Agathon has failed on this account and on this only, for in revolutions, and in actions also of the simple kind, these poets succeed wonderfully in what they aim at, and that is the union of tragic effect with moral tendency, as when, for example, a character of great wisdom, but without integrity, is deceived, like Sisyphus, or a brave but unjust man conquered. Such events, as Agathon says, are probable, 'as it is probable, in general, that many things should happen contrary to probability.'

XXI

The chorus should be considered as one of the persons in the drama, should be a part of the whole, and a sharer in the action not as in Euripides, but as in Sophocles. As for other poets, their choral songs have no more connection with their subject than with that of any other tragedy, and hence they are now become detached pieces inserted at leisure—a practice first introduced by Agathon. Yet where is the difference between this arbitrary insertion of an ode and the transposition of a speech, or even of a whole episode, from one tragedy to another?

XXII

Of the other parts of tragedy enough has now been said. We are next to consider the diction and the sentiments.

For what concerns the sentiments we refer to the principles laid down in the books on rhetoric, for to that subject they more properly belong. The sentiments include whatever is the object of speech, as, for instance, to prove, to confute, to move the passions—pity, terror, anger, and the like, to amplify or to diminish. But it is evident that, with respect to the things themselves also, when the poet would make them appear pitiable, or terrible, or great, or probable, he must draw from the same sources, with this difference only, that in the drama these things must appear to be such, without being shown to be such, whereas in oratory they must be made to appear so by the speaker, and in consequence of what he says otherwise what need of an orator if they already appear so in themselves, and not through his eloquence?

XXIII

With respect to diction, one part of its theory is that which treats of the figures of speech, such as commanding, entreating, relating, menacing, interrogating, answering, and the like. But this belongs, properly, to the art of acting, and to the professed masters of that kind. The poet's knowledge, or ignorance, of these things cannot any way materially affect the credit of his art. For who will suppose there is any justice in the cavil of Protagoras—that in the words, 'The wrath, O goddess, sing', the poet, where he intended a prayer, had expressed a command? For he insists that to say 'Do this' or 'Do it not' is to command. This subject, therefore, we pass over as belonging to an art distinct from that of poetry.

XXIV

To all diction belong the following parts: the letter, the syllable, the conjunction, the noun, the verb, the article, the case, the discourse or speech.

(1) A letter is an indivisible sound, yet not all such sounds are letters, but those only that are capable of forming an intelligible sound. For there are indivisible sounds of brute creatures, but no such sounds are called letters. Letters are of three kinds: vowels, semi-vowels, and mutes. The vowel is that which has a distinct sound without articulation, as *a* or *o*. The semi-vowel, that which has a distinct sound with articulation, as *s* and *r*. The mute, that which, with articulation, has yet no sound by itself, but joined with one of those letters that have some sound, becomes audible, as *g* and *d*. These all differ from each other, as they

are produced by different configurations, and in different parts, of the mouth, as they are aspirated or smooth, long or short, as their tone is acute, grave, or intermediate, the detail of all which is the business of the metrical treatises

(2) A syllable is a sound without signification, composed of a mute and a vowel For *gr* without *a* is not a syllable, with *a*, as *gra*, it is But these differences, also, are the subject of the metrical art

(3) A conjunction is a sound without signification, of such a nature as, out of several sounds, each of them significant, to form one significant sound

(4) An article is a sound without signification which marks the beginning or the end of a sentence, or distinguishes, as when we say *the* [word] *φημι*, *the* [word] *περί*, etc

(5) A noun is a sound composed of other sounds, significant without expression of time, and of which no part is by itself significant For even in double words the parts are not taken in the sense that separately belongs to them Thus, in the word 'Theodorus', 'dorus' is not significant

(6) A verb is a sound composed of other sounds, significant, with expression of time, and of which, as of the noun, no part is by itself significant Thus, in the words 'man', 'white', indication of time is not included In the words 'he walks', 'he walked', etc, it is included, the one expressing the present time, the other the past

(7) Cases belong to nouns and verbs Some cases express relation, as 'of', 'to', and the like Others number, as 'man' or 'men', etc Others relate to action or pronunciation, as those of interrogation, of command, etc For *ἐβάδισε*, [did he go?] and *βάδιζε* [go] are verbal cases of that kind.

the sun's light, what sowing is with respect to seed
Hence the poet's expression of the sun
'sowing abroad'

His heaven-created flame'

There is also another way of using this kind of metaphor, by adding to the borrowed word a negation of some of those qualities which belong to it in its proper sense, as if instead of calling a shield the 'cup of Mars', we should call it the 'wineless cup' *Πρην*

An invented word is a word never before used by any one but coined by the poet himself, for such it appears there are, as *ἔρυνγες* for *κέρατα*, horns, or *ἀρητήρ* for *ἱερεύς*, a priest

A word is extended when, for the proper vowel, a longer is substituted, or a syllable is inserted. A word is contracted when some part of it is retrenched. Thus, *πόλῃος* for *πόλεως*, and *Πηληϊάδεω* for *Πηλείδου*, are extended words, contracted, such as *κρῖ* and *δῶ*, and *ὄψ*, e g *μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ*

An altered word is a word of which part remains in its usual state, and part is of the poet's making, as in *δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν*, *δεξιτερός* is for *δεξιός*

Further, *nouns* are divided into masculine, feminine, and neuter. The masculine are those which end in *ν*, *ρ*, *σ*, or in some letter compounded of *σ* and a mute, these are two, *ψ* and *ξ*. The feminine are those which end in the vowels always long, as *η*, or *ω*, or in *α* of the doubtful vowels, so that the masculine and the feminine terminations are equal in number, for as to *ψ* and *ξ*, they are the same with terminations in *σ*. No noun ends in a mute or a short vowel. There are but three ending in *ι* *μέλι*, *κόμμι*, *πέπερι*, five ending in *υ* *πῶν*, *νᾶπυ*, *γόνυ*, *δόρυ*, *ἄστυ*

The neuter terminate in these two last-mentioned vowels and in *ν* and *σ*

XXVI

The excellence of diction consists in being perspicuous without being mean. The most perspicuous is that which is composed of common words, but at the same time it is mean. Such is the poetry of Cleophon and that of Sthenelus. That language, on the contrary, is elevated and remote from the vulgar idiom which employs unusual words. By unusual I mean foreign, metaphorical, extended—all, in short, that are not common words. Yet should a poet compose his diction entirely of such words, the result would be either an enigma or a barbarous jargon, an enigma, if composed of metaphors, a barbarous jargon, if composed of foreign words. For the essence of an enigma consists in putting together things apparently inconsistent and impossible, and at the same time saying nothing but what is true. Now this cannot be effected by the mere arrangement of the words, by the metaphorical use of them it may, as in this enigma

‘A man I once beheld, [and wondering viewed,]
Who, on another, brass with fire had glued’

With respect to barbarism, it arises from the use of foreign words. A judicious intermixture is, therefore, requisite.

Thus, the foreign word, the metaphorical, the ornamental, and the other species before mentioned, will raise the language above the vulgar idiom, and common words will give it perspicuity. But nothing contributes more considerably to produce clearness, without vulgarity of diction, than extensions, contractions, and alterations of words, for here the variation from the proper form, being unusual, will give elevation to the

expression, and at the same time, what is retained of usual speech will give it clearness. It is without reason, therefore, that some critics have censured these modes of speech, and ridiculed the poet for the use of them, as old Euclid did, objecting that 'versification would be an easy business if it were permitted to lengthen words at pleasure'—and then giving a burlesque example of that sort of diction.

Undoubtedly, when these licences appear to be thus purposely used, the thing becomes ridiculous. In the employment of all the species of unusual words moderation is necessary, for metaphors, foreign words, or any of the others, improperly used, and with a design to be ridiculous, would produce the same effect. But how great a difference is made by a proper and temperate use of such words, may be seen in heroic verse. Let any one only substitute common words in the place of the metaphorical, the foreign, and others of the same kind, and he will be convinced of the truth of what I say. For example, the same iambic verse occurs in Aeschylus and in Euripides, but, by means of a single alteration—the substitution of a foreign for a common and usual word—one of these verses appears beautiful, the other ordinary. For Aeschylus, in his *Philoctetes*, says

Φαγέδαινα, ἣ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός

'The cankerous wound that eats my flesh'

But Euripides, instead of ἐσθίει [eats] uses θοινᾶται [feasts on]

The same difference will appear, if in this verse,

Νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκις,

we substitute common words, and say

Νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικός καὶ ἀειδής

So again, should we for the following,

Δίφρον αεικέλιον καταβείς, ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν,

substitute this

Δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταβείς, μικράν τε τράπεζαν

Or change *ἡϊόνες βοόωσιν* ('the cliffs *rebellow*') to *ἡϊόνες κράζουσιν* ('the cliffs *resound*')

Arifhrades also endeavoured to throw ridicule upon the tragic poets, for making use of such expressions as no one would think of using in common speech as *δωμάτων ἄπο*, instead of *ἀπὸ δωμάτων*, and *σέθεν*, and *ἐγὼ δέ νιν*, and *Ἀχιλλέως πέρι*, instead of *περὶ Ἀχιλλέως*, etc. Now it is precisely owing to their being *not* in common use that such expressions have the effect of giving elevation to the diction. But this he did not know.

To employ with propriety any of these modes of speech—the double words, the foreign, etc.—is a great excellence, but the greatest of all is to be happy in the use of metaphor, for it is this alone which cannot be acquired, and which, consisting in a quick discernment of resemblances, is a certain mark of genius.

Of the different kinds of words, the double are best suited to dithyrambic poetry, the foreign to heroic, the metaphorical to iambic. In heroic poetry, indeed, they have all their place, but to iambic verse, which is, as much as may be, an imitation of common speech, those words which are used in common speech are best adapted, and such are the common, the metaphorical, and the ornamental.

Concerning tragedy, and the imitation by action, enough has now been said.

PART III

OF THE EPIC POEM

I

WITH respect to that species of poetry which imitates by narration, and in hexameter verse, it is obvious that the fable ought to be dramatically constructed like that of tragedy, and that it should have for its subject one entire and perfect action, having a beginning, a middle, and an end, so that, forming like an animal a complete whole, it may afford its proper pleasure, widely differing in its construction from history, which necessarily treats, not of one action, but of one time, and of all the events that happened to one person or to many during that time, events the relation of which to each other is merely casual. For, as the naval action at Salamis, and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, were events of the same time, unconnected by any relation to a common end or purpose, so also in successive events, we sometimes see one thing follow another without being connected to it by such relation. And this is the practice of the generality of poets. Even in this, therefore, as we have observed, the superiority of Homer's genius is apparent, that he did not attempt to bring the whole war, though an entire action with beginning and end, into his poem. It would have been too vast an object, and not easily comprehended in one view, or had he forced it into a moderate compass it would have been perplexed by its variety. Instead of this, selecting one

part only of the war, he has from the rest introduced many episodes—such as the catalogue of the ships and others—by which he has diversified his poem. Other poets take for their subject the actions of one person, or of one period of time, or an action which, though one, is composed of too many parts. Thus, the author of the *Cypriacs* and of the *Little Iliad*. Hence it is that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, each of them furnish matter for one tragedy, or two at most, but from the *Cypriacs* many may be taken, and from the *Little Iliad* more than eight, as *The Contest for the Armour*, *Philoctetes*, *Neoptolemus*, *Eurypylus*, *The Vagrant*, *The Spartan Women*, *The Fall of Troy*, *The Return of the Fleet*, *Simon*, and *The Trojan Women*.

Again, the epic poem must also agree with the tragic, as to its two kinds: it must be simple or complicated, moral or disastrous. Its parts also, setting aside music and decoration, are the same, for it requires revolutions, discoveries, and disasters, and it must be furnished with proper sentiments and diction, of all which Homer gave both the first and the most perfect example. Thus, of his two poems the *Iliad* is of the simple and disastrous kind, the *Odyssey* complicated (for it abounds throughout with discoveries) and moral. Add to this, that in language and sentiments he has surpassed all poets.

II

The epic poem differs from tragedy in the length of its plan and in its metre.

With respect to length a sufficient measure has already been assigned. It should be such as to admit of our comprehending at one view the beginning and the end, and this would be the case if the epic poem were reduced

from its ancient length, so as not to exceed that of such a number of tragedies as are performed successively at one hearing. But there is a circumstance in the nature of epic poetry which affords it peculiar latitude in the extension of its plan. It is not in the power of tragedy to imitate several different actions performed at the same time, it can imitate only that one which occupies the stage, and in which the actors are employed. But the epic imitation, being narrative, admits of many such simultaneous incidents, properly related to the subject, which swell the poem to a considerable size.

And this gives it a great advantage, both in point of magnificence, and also as it enables the poet to relieve his hearer and diversify his work by a variety of dissimilar episodes, for it is to the satiety naturally arising from similarity that tragedies frequently owe their ill success.

With respect to metre, the heroic is established by experience as the most proper, so that, should any one compose a narrative poem in any other, or in a variety of metres, he would be thought guilty of a great impropriety. For the heroic is the gravest and most majestic of all measures, and hence it is that it peculiarly admits the use of foreign and metaphorical expressions, for in this respect also, the narrative imitation is abundant and various beyond the rest. But the iambic and trochaic have more motion, the latter being adapted to dance, the other to action and business. To mix these different metres, as Chaeremon has done, would be still more absurd. No one, therefore, has ever attempted to compose a poem of an extended plan in any other than heroic verse, nature itself, as we before observed, pointing out the proper choice.

III

Among the many just claims of Homer to our praise, this is one—that he is the only poet who seems to have understood what part in his poem it was proper for him to take himself. The poet, in his own person, should speak as little as possible, for he is not then the imitator. But other poets, ambitious to figure throughout themselves, imitate but little and seldom. Homer, after a few preparatory lines, immediately introduces a man, a woman, or some other character, for all have their character—nowhere are the manners neglected.

IV

The surprising is necessary in tragedy, but the epic poem goes further and admits even the improbable and incredible, from which the highest degree of the surprising results, because there the action is not seen. The circumstances, for example, of the pursuit of Hector by Achilles, are such as, upon the stage, would appear ridiculous—the Grecian army standing still and taking no part in the pursuit, and Achilles making signs to them by the motion of his head not to interfere. But in the epic poem this escapes our notice. Now the wonderful always pleases, as is evident from the additions which men always make in relating anything in order to gratify the hearers.

V

It is from Homer principally that other poets have learned the art of feigning well. It consists in a sort of sophism. When one thing is observed to be constantly accompanied or followed by another, men are apt to

conclude that if the latter is, or has happened, the former must also be, or must have happened. But this is an error. For knowing the latter to be true, the mind is betrayed into the false inference that the first is true also.

VI

The poet should prefer impossibilities which appear probable to such things as, though possible, appear improbable. Far from producing a plan made up of improbable incidents, he should, if possible, admit no one circumstance of that kind, or, if he does, it should be exterior to the action itself, like the ignorance of Oedipus concerning the manner in which Laius died, not within the drama, like the narrative of what happened at the Pythian games in the *Electra*, or in the *Mysians*, the man who travels from Tegea to Mysia without speaking. To say that without these circumstances the fable would have been destroyed is a ridiculous excuse. The poet should take care, from the first, not to construct his fable in that manner. If, however, anything of this kind has been admitted, and yet is made to pass under some colour of probability, it may be allowed, though even in itself absurd. Thus in the *Odyssey*, the improbable account of the manner in which Ulysses was landed upon the shore of Ithaca is, such as in the hands of an ordinary poet would evidently have been intolerable, but here the absurdity is concealed under the various beauties of other kinds with which the poet has embellished it.

The diction should be most laboured in the idle parts of the poem—those in which neither manners nor sentiments prevail, for the manners and the sentiments are only obscured by too splendid a diction.

PART IV

OF CRITICAL OBJECTIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THEY ARE TO BE ANSWERED

I

WITH respect to critical objections and the answers to them, the number and nature of the different sources from which they may be drawn will be clearly understood, if we consider them in the following manner

(1) The poet, being an imitator, like the painter or any other artist of that kind, must necessarily, when he imitates, have in view one of these three objects he must represent things such as they were or are, or such as they are said to be and believed to be, or such as they should be

(2) Again, all this he is to express in words, either common, or foreign and metaphorical, or varied by some of those many modifications and peculiarities of language which are the privilege of poets

(3) To this we must add that what is right in the poetic art is a distinct consideration from what is right in the political or any other art The faults of poetry are of two kinds, essential and accidental If the poet has undertaken to imitate without talents for imitation, his poetry will be essentially faulty But if he is right in applying himself to poetic imitation, yet in imitating is occasionally wrong, as if a horse, for example, were represented moving both his right legs at once, or if he has committed mistakes, or described things impossible,

with respect to other arts, that of physic, for instance, or any other—all such faults, whatever they may be, are not essential, but accidental, faults in the poetry

II

To the foregoing considerations, then, we must have recourse in order to obviate the doubts and objections of the critics

For, in the first place, suppose the poet to have represented things impossible with respect to some other art. This is certainly a fault. Yet it may be an excusable fault, provided the end of the poet's art be more effectually obtained by it, that is, according to what has already been said of that end, if by this means that, or any other part, of the poem is made to produce a more striking effect. The pursuit of Hector is an instance. If, indeed, this end might as well, or nearly as well, have been attained without departing from the principles of the particular art in question, the fault, in that case, could not be justified, since faults of every kind should, if possible, be avoided.

Still, we are to consider further whether a fault be in things essential to the poetic art, or foreign and incidental to it, for it is a far more pardonable fault to be ignorant, for instance, that a hind has no horns, than to paint one badly

III

Further, if it be objected to the poet that he has not represented things conformably to truth, he may answer that he has represented them as they should be. This was the answer of Sophocles, that 'he drew mankind

such as they should be, Euripides, such as they are'
And this is the proper answer

But if the poet has represented things in neither of these ways, he may answer that he has represented them as they are said and believed to be. Of this kind are the poetical descriptions of the Gods. It cannot, perhaps, be said that they are either what is best or what is true, but, as Xenophanes says, opinions 'taken up at random', these are things, however, not 'clearly known'

Again, what the poet has exhibited is, perhaps, not what is best, but it is the fact, as in the passage about the arms of the sleeping soldiers

' fixed upright in the earth
Their spears stood by '

For such was the custom at that time, as it is now among the Illyrians

IV

In order to judge whether what is said or done by any character be well or ill, we are not to consider that speech or action alone, whether in itself it be good or bad, but also by whom it is spoken or done, to whom, at what time, in what manner, or for what end—whether, for instance, in order to obtain some greater good or to avoid some greater evil

V

For the solution of some objections we must have recourse to the diction. For example

οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον

'On mules and dogs the infection first began'

This may be defended by saying that the poet has,

perhaps, used the word *οὐρηάς* in its foreign acceptation of sentinels, not in its proper sense, of mules

So also in the passage where it is said of Dolon

εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός

'of form unhappy'

The meaning is, not that his person was deformed, but that his face was ugly, for the Cretans use the word *εὐειδής*—'well-formed'—to express a beautiful face

Again

ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε

Here the meaning is not 'mix it strong', as for intemperate drinkers, but 'mix it quickly'

(2) The following passages may be defended by metaphor

'Now pleasing sleep had seal'd each mortal eye,
Stretch'd in the tents the Grecian leaders lie,
The immortals slumber'd on their thrones above'

Again

'When on the Trojan plain his anxious eye
Watchful he fix'd'

And,

αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὁμαδόν

For 'all' is put metaphorically instead of 'many', all being a species of many

Here also

'The bear alone,
Still shines exalted in th' aethereal plain,
Nor bathes his flaming forehead in the main'

Alone is metaphorical the most remarkable thing in any kind, we speak of as the *only* one

We may have recourse also

(3) To accent, as the following passage

δίδομεν δέ οἱ ἔγχος ἀρέσθαι,

and this τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ—were solved by Hippias of Thasos

(4) To punctuation, as in this passage of Empedocles

αἴψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι,
ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο

1 e

'Things, before immortal,
Mortal became, and mix'd before unmix'd,
[Their courses changed]'

(5) To ambiguity, as in παρώχην δὲ πλέων νύξ, where the word πλέων is ambiguous

(6) To customary speech thus, wine mixed with water is called οἶνος, wine, hence, Ganymede is said
Διὶ οἶνοχοεῖν, to 'pour the wine to Jove', though wine is not the liquor of the gods This, however, may also be defended by metaphor

Thus, again, artificers in iron are called χαλκεῖς, literally, braziers Of this kind is the expression of the poet, κνημῖς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο, 'Greaves of new-wrought tin'

(7) When a word in any passage appears to express a contradiction, we must consider, in how many different senses it may there be taken Here, for instance

τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος

'There stuck the lance'

the meaning is, was 'stopped' only, or 'repelled'

Of how many different senses a word is capable may best be discovered by considering the different senses that are opposed to it

We may also say, with Glaucon, that some critics

first take things for granted without foundation, and then argue from these previous decisions of their own, and, having once pronounced their judgment, condemn, as an inconsistency, whatever is contrary to their preconceived opinion. Of this kind is the cavil of the critics concerning Icarius. Taking it for granted that he was a Lacedemonian, they thence infer the absurdity of supposing Telemachus not to have seen him when he went to Lacedemon. But perhaps what the Cephallenians say may be the truth. They assert that the wife of Ulysses was of their country, and that the name of her father was not Icarius, but Icadius. The objection itself, therefore, is probably founded on a mistake.

VI

The impossible, in general, is to be justified by referring either to the end of poetry itself, or to what is best, or to opinion.

For with respect to poetry, impossibilities, rendered probable, are preferable to things improbable, though possible.

With respect also to what is best, the imitations of poetry should resemble the paintings of Zeuxis, the example should be more perfect than nature.

To opinion, or what is commonly said to be, may be referred even such things as are improbable and absurd, and it may also be said that events of that kind are, sometimes, not really improbable, since 'it is probable that many things should happen contrary to probability.'

VII

When things are said which appear to be contradictory, we must examine them as we do in logical confutation whether the same thing be spoken of, whether in the same respect, and in the same sense.

VIII

Improbability and vicious manners, when excused by no necessity, are just objects of critical censure. Such is the improbability in the *Ægeus* of Euripides, and the vicious character of Menelaus in his *Orestes*.

Thus, the sources from which the critics draw their objections are five: they object to things as impossible, or improbable, or of immoral tendency, or contradictory, or contrary to technical accuracy. The answers, which are twelve in number, may be deduced from what has been said.

PART V

OF THE SUPERIORITY OF TRAGIC TO EPIC POETRY

I

It may be inquired, further, which of the two imitations, the epic or the tragic, deserves the preference

If that which is the least vulgar or popular of the two be the best, and that be such which is calculated for the better sort of spectators—the imitation which extends to every circumstance must evidently be the most vulgar or popular, for there the imitators have recourse to every kind of motion and gesticulation, as if the audience, without the aid of action, were incapable of understanding them like bad flute-players, who whirl themselves round when they would imitate the motion of the discus, and pull the coryphaeus when Scylla is the subject. Such is tragedy. It may also be compared to what the modern actors are in the estimation of their predecessors, for Myniscus used to call Callipides, on account of his intemperate action, the ape, and Tyndarus was censured on the same account. What these performers are with respect to their predecessors, the tragic imitation, when entire, is to the epic. The latter, then, it is urged, addresses itself to hearers of the better sort, to whom the addition of gesture is superfluous, but tragedy is for the people, and being, therefore, the most vulgar kind of imitation, is evidently the inferior.

II

But now, in the first place, this censure falls, not upon the poet's art, but upon that of the actor, for the gesticulation may be equally laboured in the recitation of an epic poem, as it was by Sosistratus, and in singing, as by Mnasiheus, the Opuntian

Again, all gesticulation is not to be condemned, since even all dancing is not, but such only as is unbecoming—such as was objected to Callipides, and is now objected to others whose gestures resemble those of immodest women

Further, tragedy, as well as the epic, is capable of producing its effect even without action, we can judge of it perfectly by reading. If, then, in other respects, tragedy be superior, it is sufficient that the fault here objected is not essential to it

III

Tragedy has the advantage in the following respects. It possesses all that is possessed by the epic, it might even adopt its metre and to this it makes no inconsiderable addition, in the music and the decoration, by the latter of which the illusion is heightened, and the pleasure arising from the action is rendered more sensible and striking

It has the advantage of greater clearness and distinctness of impression, as well in reading as in representation

It has also that of attaining the end of its imitation in a shorter compass for the effect is more pleasurable when produced by a short and close series of impressions, than when weakened by diffusion through a long extent of time, as the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, for example, would be if it were drawn out to the length of the *Iliad*

Further there is less unity in all epic imitation, as appears from this—that any epic poem will furnish matter for several tragedies. For, supposing the poet to choose a fable strictly one, the consequence must be either that his poem, if proportionably contracted, will appear curtailed and defective, or, if extended to the usual length, will become weak and, as it were, diluted. If, on the other hand, we suppose him to employ several fables—that is, a fable composed of several actions—his imitation is no longer strictly one. The *Iliad*, for example, and the *Odyssey* contain many such subordinate parts, each of which has a certain magnitude and unity of its own, yet is the construction of those poems as perfect, and as nearly approaching to the imitation of a single action, as possible.

IV

If, then, tragedy be superior to the epic in all these respects, and also in the peculiar end at which it aims (for each species ought to afford, not any sort of pleasure indiscriminately, but such only as has been pointed out), it evidently follows that tragedy, as it attains more effectually the end of the art itself, must deserve the preference.

And thus much concerning tragic and epic poetry in general and their several species, the number and the differences of their parts, the causes of their beauties and their defects, the censures of critics, and the principles on which they are to be answered.

THE ART OF POETRY

BY HORACE

TRANSLATED BY T A MOXON

IF a painter should try to unite a horse's neck to a human head, and to add varied feathers to limbs collected from every kind of animal, so that a woman's fair form above should end in a foul and ugly fish beneath—tell me, my friends, could you control your laughter if admitted to a private view?

Believe me, my friends of the Piso family, a picture such as that will be no worse than a poem in which images are conceived as empty as the dreams of a sick man, so that neither foot nor head can be assigned to a single form

'Painters', you say, 'and poets have always had a reasonable licence to venture on what they will' I know, and I both claim and grant this indulgence, but never so as to permit the wild to mate with the tame, serpents to be paired with birds, and lambs with tigers. It happens too often that a work opens with dignity and great promise, then one or two purple patches are stitched on to gleam far and wide, with a description of Diana's grove and shrine, and the winding course of a rushing brook through pleasant fields, or of the river Rhine or of a rainbow. Such themes are out of place. You have, it may be, the skill to paint a cypress, what of it, if as a painter you are paid to depict a ruined mariner swimming from a wreck? A wine jar is your design, why from the potter's wheel does a small

pitcher emerge? In short, let your theme be what it may, provided it be simple and uniform

Most of us poets (I address a father and youths worthy of their father) are misled by the semblance of what is right. I strive to be brief and become obscure, a poet aims at smoothness and lacks vigour and spirit, he claims grandeur and grows bombastic, or he crawls on the ground through excessive caution and dread of the storm, he who would fain lend variety to a single object in marvellous wise, paints a dolphin among woods, a wild boar amid the waves The avoidance of error, without the help of art, leads men astray The poorest smith living hard by the school of Aemilius will depict nails, and imitate waving hair in bronze, but will fail in the entire work, not knowing how to represent the whole For my part, should I wish to compose, I would no more desire to be such as he, than to live with a crooked nose, but admired for my black eyes and black hair

Choose a theme suited to your powers, ye authors, and ponder long what weight your shoulders refuse to bear and what they can support He who chooses his subject wisely, will find that neither words nor lucid arrangement fail him Herein lies the beauty and charm of arrangement, if I mistake not, that what should be said now is said now, that many points are postponed and omitted for the moment

Let the author of the proposed poem show taste and care in linking up his words, let him embrace one word and reject another Your diction will be excellent if a clever combination renders a familiar word original If by chance there is need to expound hidden mysteries by new terms, you will be allowed to coin words unheard of by the Cetheguses of old, and the licence will be granted if used modestly, and words new and

lately coined will win credit if they descend from a Greek source, slightly modified Why, indeed, shall the Roman public grant a licence to Caecilius and Plautus which they refuse to Virgil and Varius? Why am I frowned on if I can add a few words to my stock, when the language of Cato and Ennius has enriched our native tongue, and invented new names for things? The licence has been granted, and always will be granted, to coin a new word stamped with the current die As the woods change their leaves at the year's decline, and the first leaves fall first, so words perish with old age, and others, newly-born, thrive and flourish like youths We and our works are doomed to die, whether Neptune, welcomed as a guest on land, defends our fleets from the northern gales—a royal work—or the marsh, long unfertile and fit only for boats, now feeds the neighbouring towns and feels the weight of the plough, or whether the river has changed the course that brought ruin to the crops, and has learnt to follow a better channel—all mortal works shall perish, much less shall the fashion and favour of words remain long-lived Many words which have become disused shall revive, and those now high-esteemed shall fail, if custom so wills it—custom, the lord and ruler and standard of speech

The rightful metre for the exploits of princes and leaders and the sad story of war has been shown us by Homer

Verses yoked unequally (as elegiacs) included first laments, and later the joyful feeling of one who has gained his prayer Scholars dispute who it was who invented these slender elegiacs, and the question is still unsettled Archilochus was armed by rage with his own iambic metre, the 'shoe' of comedy and the tragic 'buskin' adopted this metre, as suited for dialogue and able to silence the people's din, and as adapted to

the stage The lyre was granted by the Muse to sing of gods and the sons of gods, and the victorious boxer and the horse that wins the race, and the sorrows of swains and the wine-cups of freedom

If I lack the power and skill to observe the settled forms and shades of style in poetry, why am I greeted as 'poet'? Why, through false shame, do I prefer ignorance to instruction? A comic theme refuses to be unfolded in tragic verses, thus, too, the 'banquet of Thyestes' scorns to be related in language of everyday life, language well suited to the 'shoe' of comedy Let each style maintain the fitting place which belongs to it Yet at times, even comedy exalts her voice, and angry Chremes rails in swelling tones, while Telephus and Peleus, in tragedy, often mourn in the language of prose, both these heroes, in beggarly exile, cast aside their bombast and ponderous words, if they desire to move the heart of the hearer by their pitiful tale

✓ It is not enough for poems to have beauty, they must also be pleasing and lead the listener's soul whither they will Men's faces smile with those who smile and mourn with those who weep If you would have me weep, you must first express grief yourself, then, and then only, shall I be moved by your misfortunes, Telephus or Peleus, if you utter words ill suited to your part, I shall either doze or smile Sad words suit a gloomy face, threats suit an angry face, sportive words suit a playful, and serious words a stern brow Nature shapes our inner thoughts in advance to every state of fortune, she cheers us or impels us to wrath, or brings us to the ground and tortures us with grievous sorrow, later, she expresses our emotions, interpreting them with the tongue If the speaker's words fail to express his mental state, a Roman audience, high and low, will roar with laughter It will make all the difference if the speaker

be a god or demi-god, an aged man or one heated with youth, a lady of high degree or an officious nurse, a wandering merchant or the tiller of a fruitful farm, a Colchian or Assyrian, a native of Thebes or Argos

Either follow tradition or invent a consistent story. If in your tale you represent the renowned Achilles, let him appear restless, passionate, inexorable, and dauntless, let him claim to be beyond the control of law, let him assert his demands by the sword. Let Medea be haughty and untamed, let Ino be flooded with tears, let Ixion be perjured, Io a wanderer, and Orestes mournful. If you commit an untried theme to the stage and venture to create a new character, let the first impression be preserved to the end, and let his nature be consistent. It is not easy to treat familiar themes in a distinctive manner, you are wiser to divide the *Iliad* into acts of a play than to be the first to bring forward an unknown and unsung story. Subjects already handled will become your own if you do not linger on the cheap and easy round, nor must it be your care to render them, word for word, in literal translation, nor cramp your style by close imitation, so that very shame and the rules of writing forbid free movement. Begin not, like the cyclic writer of old 'The fate of Priam and the far-famed war shall be my song'. What shall this braggart produce worthy of a boast like this? The mountains are in labour, there will come forth a silly mouse. How much better is the opening of that poet whose every effort is in perfect taste 'Sing to me, Muse of the man who, after the time of Troy's capture, saw the customs and cities of many men'. His plan is not to bring forth smoke from flame, but light from smoke, and later to produce many striking marvels, such as Antiphates and Scylla, and Charybdis and

Cyclops He is not like the writer who traces the return of Diomedes to the death of Meleager, and the Trojan war to Leda's twins He always moves on quickly to the action, and hurries the reader to the midst of the story, assuming it as known, he drops what he cannot hope to handle brilliantly, he uses fiction and mingles facts with fancy, while all the time he makes the middle to harmonize with the opening, and the end with the middle

Hear now what I demand, and the people with me
If you desire your hearers to stay to the end and cheer
and keep their seats until the actor chant the words,
'Please, sirs, to applaud', you must mark the character
of every age, and assign a seemly manner to men's
shifting dispositions and years The child who has just
learnt how to reply in words, and prints firm steps upon
the ground, longs to play with his mates, he is swift to
anger and swift to be appeased, and changes from hour
to hour The beardless youth, now free from control,
delights in horses and hounds and the grass of the
sunny plain, he is moulded like wax to vice, impatient
of admonition, slow to provide for future needs, reckless
of money, high-spirited, passionate, quick to vary his
fancies Middle age changes its desires, seeks wealth
and influence, is ambitious of honour, dreads to do deeds
which it must labour later to amend Many discom-
forts crowd round old age, either because the old man
stores wealth, and timidly spares and fears to use his
store, or because he performs all his acts in a fearful and
frigid manner, and is dilatory, slow to hope, sluggish,
craving to live longer, cross-grained, plaintive, ever
praising the past days of his boyhood, chiding and
censoring the young The flowing tide of years brings
many blessings, the ebbing tide robs us of many Re-
member this, lest you assign the role of old age to youth

or that of men to childhood, you must dwell on themes that suit and are akin to each age

Events are either acted on the stage, or their action is described. Stories which pass into the mind by the ear stir our thoughts less vividly than those brought before the faithful test of sight, which the spectator submits to himself yet you must be sure not to bring on the stage scenes fit only to be acted behind, much, too, must be withdrawn from the eyes to be described later by the eloquence of one on the stage, lest Medea murder her children in front of the audience or impious Atreus cook human flesh in public, or Procne be changed into a bird, and Cadmus to a snake. Scenes brought before me thus excite my disbelief and disgust

Let a play be neither shorter nor longer than five acts, or it will never win favour and be asked for again. Let no god intervene unless some problem arise that demands to be solved. Let no fourth character demand to be heard. Let the chorus maintain the character and duties of a single actor, and let it sing no song between the acts, but such as advances and rightly serves the plot. Let it support the good and give them kindly counsel, restrain the wrathful, and favour those who fear to sin, let it praise the fare of a simple table, salutary justice and laws and Peace with her open gates. Let it keep secrets, and pray and beseech the gods that fortune may be restored to the unhappy, and be removed from the proud.

The flute was not in days gone by bound as now with brass, nor rivalled the trumpet in power, but was weak and simple with few holes. It was useful to accompany the chorus, and to give the note and to flood with music benches not yet crowded. Thither was wont to flock an audience easily counted, for it

was scanty—a thrifty, chaste, and modest folk When in the days of conquest the people began to extend their fields, and a wider wall enclosed the cities, and on holy days men freely indulged their appetites with wine in broad daylight, then greater licence was extended to rhythm and measure What wit would be expected from the untutored crowd when, freed from toil, rustic sat next to townsman, and the vulgar beside the highborn? Thus the flautist added dancing and wanton gestures to the simple art of old, and trailed his long robe over the stage, thus two new strings were added to the simple lyre and daring eloquence brought with it unheard-of language, and sayings filled with useful maxims, with prophetic foresight, rivalled the pronouncements of the oracle of Delphi

He who contended in tragic verse for the prize of a common goat, soon also introduced half-clad forms of wild satyrs, and with no loss of dignity essayed coarse jests, he wished to keep the audience in their seats by the allurements of a pleasing novelty, since they had assisted at the sacrifices, and had drunk deep and were lost to all restraint But it will be right to introduce these witty and bantering satyrs, and to pass from grave to gay, provided that no god and no hero who comes on the stage shall at one moment gleam in royal gold and purple, and then descend to dingy hovels amid vulgar talk, or while avoiding bathos shall affect high-flown bombast Tragedy disdains to babble trifling verses, like a matron bidden to dance on a holy day she will modestly enter for a brief space the throng of wanton satyrs If I write satyric dramas, I will not choose inelegant and vulgar terms, nor will I strive to depart as far from the style of tragedy as to make no difference, whether the speaker be Davus the slave, and Pythias the bold serving-maid who cheated her

master Simo of a talent, or Silenus, guardian and tutor of a divine ward I will construct my plot from familiar material, so that any one may hope to produce the same, but on trial may toil and sweat in vain, so great is the power of order and connection, so much grace may be imparted to a common theme

If the fauns are brought in from the woods, they must, I think, avoid both the language of the streets and of loungers in the forum, and the affected talk of elegant youths, and must not indulge in coarse and vulgar jests. These faults cause disgust to the knights, the freeborn, and the rich. They will withhold their approval and the crown of reward, however much the buyers of roasted peas and nuts may shout applause.

A short syllable followed by a long one is called an 'iambic foot', a rapid foot, hence it bade the name 'trimeter' to be added to iambic lines, although it yielded six beats of time, each one from first to last the same. Yet, not so long ago, with obliging good nature it admitted the steady spondee into its ancestral rights, that the verse might fall on the ear with a slower and statelier cadence, but it refused to yield its claim to hold the second and fourth places itself in social union. The iambic foot appears but seldom in the famous trimeters of Accius. Through its absence, the verses of Ennius, which are put on the stage laden with spondees, are condemned on the serious charge of too hasty and careless composition or of ignorance of poetic art. Not every one can judge and discern where verse is unmusical, and an undue licence has been granted to the poets of Rome. Am I then to wander at will and write loosely? Or shall I assume that all will see my faults, and therefore avoid them, and cautiously keep within those limits where I shall be forgiven? Why, I have then but avoided blame and deserved no praise. But you, my

friends, study the great originals of Greece, dream of them by night and ponder them by day But, you say, your ancestors praised the rhythm and wit of Plautus Ah! but their admiration of both was given too easily—I would even say too foolishly This is so, at least, if you and I can distinguish between rough humour and polished wit, and know how to mark the rightful rhythm with true beat and trained ear

The style of the tragic muse was unknown till Thespis, as is said, invented it and carried his poems round on wagons for singers to chant and act, with their faces smeared with lees of wine Next came Aeschylus, who invented the mask and comely robe and built a stage with planks of moderate size and taught his actors high-sounding diction and the buskin's stately gait Next came the old comedy, which won high praise, but its liberty descended to licence and violence which required control Control was admitted, and the chorus, to its shame, was silenced and the power to offend was removed Our poets have left no style untried, and they gained high fame when they dared to abandon the Greek models and sing of national exploits, tragic and comic writers alike Nor would the name of Latium be more famous for the valour of its arms than for its literature, were not the toil and delay of correction a stumbling block to all our poets Do you, O sons of Numa, reject that poem which has not been pruned by length of time and many an erasure, and has not been amended ten times over to a perfect polish

Democritus believes that genius is more successful than wretched art, and would fain exclude from Helicon all sane poets Therefore a large number of would-be poets refuse to pare their nails and trim their beards, seek solitude, and shun the baths He, think they, will win a poet's reward and name, who entrusts his

head to the care of the barber Licinius, a head which the hellebore of three Anticyrae could never restore to sanity. How stupid I am, in that I purge myself of bile as spring draws on, otherwise no one would write better verse. However, nothing is worth so high a price. I will, therefore, perform the office of a whetstone, which makes steel sharp but itself cannot cut. Though I write nothing I will myself teach the poet's task and duty, whence he draws his stores, what frames and moulds a bard, what becomes him well and what becomes him ill, what is the path of excellence and what the path of error.

Sound judgment is the basis and source of good writing. The dialogues of Socrates will supply you with matter, and words will quickly follow when the matter is ready. The author who has learnt his duty to his country and friends, the love we owe to a father, brother, and guest, the function of a senator and judge, the role of a general sent out on service, knows beyond doubt how to assign his proper part to each character. I would advise the well-instructed imitator to take his model from life and customs, and from this derive language faithful to life. Sometimes a play, vivid in its sentiments and true to its characters, is lacking in grace and wanting in force and art, and yet it pleases the audience and keeps their attention better than lines devoid of sense and mere melodious trifles.

The Greeks received a ready wit and rounded phrase as a gift from the Muse. They coveted nothing but renown. At Rome, boys learn how to divide the *as* by long calculation into a hundred parts. 'Tell me, son of Albinus, if you take an ounce from five ounces, what is left? Quick, tell me.' 'The third of an *as*.' 'Good! You will be able to keep your property. If you add an ounce, how much does it make?' 'Half

an *as* ' When the canker of avarice and love of wealth has once infected the mind, do we hope to see poems composed which deserved to be preserved with the oil of cedar and kept in cases of cypress?

Poets desire either to improve or to please, or to unite the agreeable and the profitable. Any moral maxim must be brief that so the mind may readily perceive and faithfully retain a pithy sentence, redundant words overflow from a sated mind. Fiction composed to please should be very near the truth, so that the play may not demand unlimited belief, and when the ogress Lamia has dined, it should not extract a living child from her stomach. The centuries of the elders reject plays without a moral, the haughty knights dislike dull poems. You will win every vote if you blend what is improving with what pleases, and at once delight and instruct the reader. A poem like this earns money for the publisher, it is sent across the sea and makes its famous author immortal.

However, there are faults which we would gladly pardon, the lyre-string does not always give the note which hand and mind desire, and when we expect the flat it often gives a sharp, the arrow will not always reach its destined mark. In truth, when a poem is mostly brilliant, I will not take offence at a few blemishes due to carelessness or human nature's lack of foresight. What is our verdict? If a copyist, though warned, repeats his error, he is refused pardon, a harper who always comes to grief on the same string wins ridicule, so a writer who often neglects his duty becomes a second Choerilus in my eyes. I laugh at him while I admire his rare virtues, though at the same time I am indignant if ever the good Homer nods. However, in a long work, sleep may well steal over the writer's mind.

A poem is like a picture one will please you more if

you stand near, and another if you stand afar. One loves a dim light, another will prefer to be seen in a strong light, and dreads not the critic's keen judgment. One poem pleases but once, another will win your favour when heard ten times over.

O elder youth, although you are trained by your father's advice and your innate taste is good, yet take thus to heart and remember that there are certain subjects to which a moderate and fair attainment is rightly granted. A lawyer and pleader of fair ability lacks the skill of the eloquent Messalla, and his knowledge falls short of Cascellius Aulus's, but still he has his value. Mediocrity is forbidden to poets alike by gods and men and booksellers. Amid pleasant banquets discordant music, thick perfume, and poppy-seeds mingled with bitter honey cause disgust, so, too, a poem, whose nature and property is to charm the mind, if it fall short of the highest, reaches the lowest. He who knows not the game refrains from competing in the Plain; he who is unskilled with the ball or quoit or hoop remains inactive lest the dense crowds should rightly roar with laughter. Yet he, who knows not how, dares to compose verse. Why should he not? He is free and well-born, he is rated at the full income of a knight, and is clear of moral blame. But you, my friend, will do and say nothing when your mental powers protest. Such is your judgment and such your mind. Still, if you do write some day, let it come first to the ears of the critic Maecius and of your father and myself, then put the parchment away in your desk and store it up for nine years. You can always destroy what you have never published, the word sent forth can never be recalled.

Men lived once in the woods, and holy Orpheus, Heaven's prophet, restrained them from slaughter and foul deeds, hence it was said, too, that Amphion, the

founder of Thebes, moved the rocks with the sound of his shell, and led them whither he would with winning persuasion. In days of old the task of wisdom was to distinguish between public and private property, between things sacred and profane, to restrain men from unlicensed love, to lay down laws for the wedded, to build cities and carve laws on tables of wood. Thus came honour and fame to inspired bards and poems. After these, Homer gained fame and Tyrtæus roused manly hearts to martial deeds by verse, oracles were recited in poetry and life's path made plain, the favour of princes was won by the strains of the Muses; festivals were appointed to end long toils. You need not, then, feel shame for the Muse skilled in the lyre and Apollo who leads the song.

Men have asked whether verse wins renown through nature or through art. I cannot see how study profits without a vein of genius, or skill without training. Thus each gift needs the other's aid and joins in friendly union. He who strives in running to reach the desired goal has endured privation and efforts as a boy, he has grown hot and cold, he has forgone love and wine. The flautist who plays at the Pythian games has first learnt much and quailed before a master. Nowadays it seems enough to say 'I write marvellous poems, plague take the hindmost! In my eyes it is a disgrace to be left behind, and to own to ignorance of what I never learnt.'

An auctioneer collects a crowd to buy his wares, so a poet bids flatterers flock to the call of gain, if he be rich in land and rich in money placed at interest. If however, he be one who can offer a lavish and well appointed dinner, if he can go bail for a poor man without credit and rescue one entangled in a gloomy lawsuit, I shall be surprised if, for all his fancied happi-

ness, he can distinguish between a false and a true friend. If you have made a present or intend to make a present to any one, do not bring your friend, who is overwhelmed with gratitude, to hear your verses. He will be sure to cry out 'Oh, bravo! good! splendid!' He will grow pale with terror at one passage, then he will let drops of tears trickle from loving eyes, he will spring up and beat the ground with his foot. As hired mourners at a funeral outdo in word and deed those whose grief is feigned, so a sneerer shows more emotion than a true admirer. Rich men, it is said, ply with many a bowl, and test with strong wine him whom they would fain prove, to see whether he is worthy of friendship. If you set about composing poems, look out for the artful fox lurking beneath your critic's praises. If you read a passage to Quintilius, he would say 'Please correct this and that.' Should you say that you could not improve it after two or three attempts, he would bid you rub it out and return the misshapen verses to the anvil. If you preferred defending a fault to amending it, he wasted no word more and no more fruitless pains, but suffered you to love yourself and your writings, with no rival to compete with you. A good and wise man will censure dull verses, will blame harsh lines, will obelize the ugly with a black mark, will prune pretentious ornaments, will force you to throw light on obscure phrases, will point out the ambiguous, will mark what should be altered, will become a second Aristarchus, he will not say 'Why offend a friend for trifling faults?' These trifling faults will bring serious trouble on him who has been flattered and treated insincerely.

As when a man suffers from the plague of an itch, or jaundice or frantic madness and Diana's wrath, so wise men fear to touch the frantic poet and flee afar, but boys tease him and heedlessly pursue him. He goes

belching verses and rambling with his head in the air, and then, if, like a bird-snarer gazing on blackbirds, he falls into a well or a pit, though he cry aloud 'Hol citizens—come and help me', no one would care to rescue him. Should any one trouble to bring help and lower a rope, then I will say 'How do you know, but what he flung himself there on purpose, and does not want to be saved?' and I will tell you the story of the Sicilian poet's death. Empedocles wished to be considered a God, and in cold blood leapt into burning Etna. Let poets have full licence to slay themselves. To save a man against his will is as bad as to kill him. The poet has done this more than once, and if rescued he will not become a man all at once, and lay aside his yearning for a notorious death. No one can tell why he composes verses—whether it be that he has defiled his father's grave or impiously profaned some solemn holy ground. Beyond doubt, he is mad and, like a bear that has succeeded in breaking through the barriers of his cage, your poet, with his wearisome readings, puts all to flight, unlearned and learned alike, but if he catches any one, he clings to him, and bores him to death by his recitals and adheres to his skin till gorged with blood, a veritable leech.

ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC

A DIGEST
BY
THOMAS HOBBS

BOOK I CHAPTER I

THAT RHETORIC IS AN ART CONSISTING NOT ONLY IN
MOVING THE PASSIONS OF THE JUDGE, BUT CHIEFLY
IN PROOFS, AND THAT THIS ART IS PROFITABLE)

WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse some by chance, but some by method This method may be discovered, and to discover method is all one with teaching an art If this art consisted in criminations only, and the skill to stir up the judge's anger, envy, fear, pity, or other affections, a rhetorician in well-ordered commonwealths and states, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say For all these perversions of the judge are beside the question And that which the pleader is to show, and the judge to give sentence on, is thus only 'Tis so, or not so The rest hath been decided already by the law-maker, who, judging of universals and future things, could not be corrupted Besides, 'tis an absurd thing for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to use

It consisteth therefore chiefly in proofs, which are inferences and all inferences being syllogisms, a logician, if he would observe the difference between a plain syllogism and an enthymeme (which is a rhetorical syllogism), would make the best rhetorician For all syllogisms and inferences belong properly to logic, whether they infer truth or probability, and because without this art it would often come to pass that evil men, by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good, it brings with it at least

this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause Besides, ordinarily those that are judges are neither patient nor capable of long scientific proofs, drawn from the principles through many syllogisms, and therefore had need to be instructed by the rhetorical and shorter way Lastly, it were ridiculous to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the virtue of well expressing the mind

CHAPTER II

THE DEFINITION OF RHETORIC

RHETORIC is that faculty by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer

Of those things that beget belief, some require not the help of art, as witnesses, evidences, and the like, which we invent not but make use of, and some require art, and are invented by us

The belief that proceeds from our invention comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker, partly from the passions of the hearer, but especially from the proofs of what we allege

Proofs are, in rhetoric, either examples or enthymemes, as in logic, inductions or syllogisms) For an example is a short induction, and an enthymeme a short syllogism, out of which that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer is left as superfluous, to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of public business needlessly

CHAPTER III

OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF ORATIONS AND OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC

IN all orations, the hearer does either hear only, or judge also

If he hear only, that 's one kind of oration, and is called Demonstrative

If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come, or of that which is past

If of that which is to come, there 's another kind of oration, and is called Deliberative

If of that which is past, then 'tis a third kind of oration, called Judicial

So there are three kinds of orations Demonstrative, Judicial, Deliberative

To which belong their proper times To the Demonstrative, the present, to the Judicial, the past, and to the Demonstrative, the time to come

And their proper offices To the Deliberative, exhortation and dehortation, to the Judicial, accusation and defence, and to the Demonstrative, praising and dispraising

And their proper ends To the Deliberative, to prove a thing profitable or unprofitable, to the Judicial, just or unjust, to the Demonstrative, honourable or dishonourable

The principles of rhetoric out of which enthymemes are to be drawn are the common opinions that men have concerning profitable and unprofitable, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, which are the points in the several kinds of orations questionable) For as in logic, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope

of our proof, the principles must be all infallible truths so in rhetoric the principles must be common opinions, such as the judge is already possessed with because \the end of rhetoric is victory, which consists in having gotten belief)

And because nothing is profitable, unprofitable, just, unjust, honourable, or dishonourable, but what has been done, or is to be done, and nothing is to be done that is not possible and because there be degrees of profitable, unprofitable, just, unjust, honourable, and dishonourable, an orator must be ready in other principles, namely of what is done and not done, possible and not possible, to come and not to come, and what is greater and what is lesser, both in general and particularly applied to the thing in question, as what is more or less, generally, and what is more profitable and less profitable, etc , particularly

CHAPTER IV

OF THE SUBJECT OF DELIBERATIVES, AND THE ABILITIES
THAT ARE REQUIRED OF HIM THAT WILL DELIBERATE
OF BUSINESS OF STATE

IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject wherein, and the ends whereto, the orator exhorteth, or from which he dehortheth

The subject is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to rhetoric, but for the most part to the *Politics*, and may be referred ~~in~~ a manner to these five heads

(1) *Of levyng of money* To which point he, that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know beforehand the

revenue of the State, how much it is, and wherein it consisteth, and also how great are the necessary charges and expenses of the same This knowledge is gotten partly by a man's own experience, partly by relations, and accounts in writing

(2) *Of peace and war* Concerning which the counsellor or deliberator ought to know the strength of the commonwealth, how much it both now is, and hereafter may be, and wherein that power consisteth Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and relations at home, and partly by the sight of wars, and of their events abroad

(3) *Of the safeguard of the country* Wherein he only is able to give counsel, that knows the forms and number and places of the garrisons

(4) *Of provisions* Wherein to speak well it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State, what commodities they have at home growing, what they must fetch in through need, and what they may carry out through abundance

(5) *Of making laws* To which is necessary so much political or civil philosophy as to know what are the several kinds of governments, and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved or destroyed And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several governments in times past, by history, and partly by observing the government of the times present in several nations, by travel

So that to him that will speak in a council of state, there is necessary this history, sight of wars, travel, knowledge of the revenue, expenses, forces, havens, garrisons, wares, and provisions in the state he lives in, and what is needful for that state, either to export or to import

CHAPTER V

OF THE ENDS WHICH THE ORATOR IN DELIBERATIVES
PROPOUNDETH, WHEREBY TO EXHORT OR DEHORT

AN orator in exhorting always propoundeth felicity, or some part of felicity, to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto, and in dehortation the contrary

By felicity is meant commonly, prosperity with virtue, or a continual content of the life with surety And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune, such as these that follow

(1) *Nobility* Which to a state or nation is, to have been ancient inhabitants, and to have had most anciently, and in most number, famous generals in the wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a family which hath yielded most anciently, and in most number, men known to the world for virtue, riches, or anything in general estimation

(2) *Many and good children* Which is also public and private Public, when there is much youth in the state endued with virtue (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity, of the mind, valour and temperance) Private, when a man hath many such children, both male and female The virtues commonly respected in women are of the body, beauty and stature, of the mind, temperance and housewifery, without sordidness

(3) *Riches* Which is money, cattle, lands, household stuff, with the power to dispose of them

(4) *Glory* Which is the reputation of virtue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire

(5) *Honour* Which is the glory of benefiting, or being able to benefit others To benefit others is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another man's safety or riches The parts of honour are sacrifices, monuments, rewards, dedication of places, precedence, sepulchres, statues, public pensions, adorations, presents

(6) *Health* Which is the being free from diseases, with strength to use the body

(7) *Beauty* Which is to different ages different To youth, strength of body and sweetness of aspect To full men, strength of body fit for the wars, and countenance sweet, with a mixture of terror To old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a countenance not displeasing

(8) *Strength* Which is the ability to move anything at pleasure of the mover To move is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together

(9) *Stature* Which is then just, when a man in height, breadth, and thickness of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion

(10) *Good old age* Which is that which comes late and with the least trouble

(11) *Many and good friends* Which is to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good

(12) *Prosperity* Which is to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to fortune

(13) *Virtue* Which is then to be defined when we speak of praise

These are the grounds from whence we exhort
Dehortation is from the contraries of these

CHAPTER VI

OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD
AND EVIL

IN Deliberatives, the principles or elements from whence we draw our proofs are common opinions concerning good and evil And these principles are either absolute or comparative And those that are absolute are either Disputable or Indisputable

The Indisputable Principles are such as these

Good is that which we love for itself

And that for which we love somewhat else

And that which all things desire

And that to every man which his reason dictates

And that which when we have we are well, or satisfied

And that which satisfies

And the cause or effect of any of these

And that which preserves any of these

And that which keeps off or destroys the contrary of any of these

Also to take the good, and reject the evil, is good

And to take the greater good, rather than the less, and the lesser evil, rather than the greater

Further, all virtues are good

And pleasure

And all things beautiful

And justice, valour, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence; and other like habits

And health, beauty, strength, etc

And riches.

And friends

And honour, and glory

And ability to say or do, also towardliness, will, and
the like

And whatsoever art, or science

And life

And whatsoever is just

The Disputable Principles are such as follow

That is good whose contrary is evil

And whose contrary is good for our enemies

And whose contrary our enemies are glad of

And of which there cannot be too much

And upon which much labour and cost hath been
bestowed

And that which many desire

And that which is praised

And that which even our enemies and evil men praise

And what good we prefer

And what we do advise

And that which is possible is good (to undertake)

And that which is easy

And that which depends on our own will

And that which is proper for us to do

And what no man else can do

And whatsoever is extraordinary

And what is suitable

And that which wants a little of being at an end

And what we hope to master

And what we are fit for

And what evil men do not

And what we love to do

CHAPTER VII

OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING
GOOD AND EVIL, COMPARATIVELY

THE colours of good comparatively depend partly upon the following definitions of comparatives

- (1) More is so much and somewhat besides
- (2) Less is that which and somewhat else is so much
- (3) Greater and more in number are laid only comparatively to less and fewer in number

(4) Great and little, many and few, are taken comparatively to the most of the same kind So that great and many, is that which exceeds, little and few, is that which is exceeded by the most of the same kind

Partly from the precedent definitions of good absolutely.

Common opinions concerning good comparatively, then, are these

Greater good is many than fewer, or one of those many

And greater is the kind in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind And greater is that good than another good, whose kind is greater than another's kind

And greater is that from which another good follows, than the good which follows

And of two which exceed a third, greater is that which exceeds it most

And that which causes the greater good

And that which proceeds from a greater good

And greater is that which is chosen for itself, than that which is chosen from somewhat else

And the end greater than that which is not the end.
And that which less needs other things than that
which more

And that which is independent than that which is
dependent of another

And the beginning than not the beginning

[Seeing the beginning is a greater good, or evil, than
that which is not the beginning, and the end than
that which is not the end, one may argue from this
colour both ways as Leodamas against Chabrias,
would have the actor more to blame than the
adviser, and against Callistratus, the adviser more
than the actor]

And the cause than not the cause

And that which hath a greater beginning or cause

And the beginning or cause of a greater good or evil

And that which is scarce, greater than that which is
plentiful, because harder to get

And that which is plentiful than that which is
scarce, because oftener in use

And that which is easy than that which is hard

And that whose contrary is greater

And that whose want is greater

And virtue than not virtue, a greater good Vice
than not vice, a greater evil

And greater good or evil is that the effects whereof
are more honourable or more shameful

And the effects of greater virtues, or vices

And the excess whereof is more tolerable, a greater
good

And those things which may with more honour be
desired

And the desire of better things

And those things whereof the knowledge is better

And the knowledge of better things

And that which wise men prefer

And that which is in better men

And that which better men choose

And that which is more, than that which is less
delightful

And that which is more, than that which is less
honourable

And that which we would have for ourselves and
friends a greater good; and the contrary a greater evil

And that which is lasting than that which is not
lasting

And that which is firm than that which is not firm

And what many desire than what few

And what the adversary or judge confesseth to be
greater is greater

And common than not common

And not common than common

And what is more laudable

And that which is more honoured, a greater good

And that which is more punished, a greater evil

And both good and evil divided than undivided
appear greater

And compounded than simple appear greater

And that which is done with opportunity, age, place,
time, means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise

And that which is natural than that which is attained
unto

And the same part of that which is great than of that
which is less

And that which is nearest to the end designed

And that which is good or evil to oneself than that
which is simply so

And possible than not possible

And that which comes toward the end of our life

And that which we do really than that which we do for show

And that which we would be rather than what we would seem to be

And that which is good for more purposes is the greater good

And that which serves us in great necessity

And that which is joined with less trouble

And that which is joined with more delight

And of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater

And that which having we are more sensible of

And in everything that which we most esteem

CHAPTER VIII

OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENT

BECAUSE hortation and dehoration concern the commonwealth, and are drawn from the elements of good and evil, as we have spoken of them already in the abstract, so we must speak of them also in the concrete, that is, of what is good or evil to each sort of commonwealth in special

The government of a commonwealth is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oligarchy, or Monarchy

Democracy is that wherein all men with equal right are preferred to the highest magistracy by lot

Aristocracy is that wherein the highest magistrate is chosen out of those that had the best education, according to what the laws prescribe for best

Oligarchy is that where the highest magistrate is chosen for wealth

Monarchy is that wherein one man hath the govern-

And those things are honourable which, good of themselves, are not so to the owner

And those things which happen to the dead rather than to the living

And what we do for other men, especially for benefactors

And bestowing of benefits

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of adversary

And of the more honourable and better men, the virtues are more honourable

And more honourable are the virtues that tend to other men's benefit than those which tend to one's own

And honourable are those things which are just

And revenge is honourable

And victory

And honour

And monuments

And those things which happen not to the living

And things that excel

And what none can do but we

And possessions we reap no profit by

And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places

And the signs of praise

And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or mechanic

And that which seems honourable, namely such as follow

Vices confining upon virtue

And the extremes of virtues

And what the auditors think honourable

And that which is in estimation

And that which is done according to custom

Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the orator must show that he whom he praiseth did what he praiseth unconstrainedly and willingly

And he does so who does the same often

Praise is speech declaring the magnitude of a virtue, action, or work

But to praise the work from the virtue of the worker is a circular proof

To magnify and to praise differ in themselves, as felicity and virtue For praise declares a man's virtue, and magnifying declares his felicity

Praise is a kind of inverted precept For to say, 'Do it because 'tis good', is a precept But to say, 'He is good because he did it', is praise

An orator in praising must also use the forms of amplification, such as these

He was the first that did it

The only man that did it

The special man that did it

He did it with disadvantage of time

He did it with little help

He was the cause that the law ordained rewards and honours for such actions

Further, he that will praise a man must compare him with others, and his actions with the actions of others, especially with such as are renowned

And amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration than to any other For here the actions are confessed, and the orator's part is only this, to contribute unto them magnitude and lustre

CHAPTER X

OF ACCUSATION AND DEFENCE, WITH THE DEFINITION
OF INJURY

IN a Judicial Oration, which consists in accusation and defence, the thing to be proved is that injury has been done and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn are these three

- (1) The causes that move to injury
- (2) The persons apt to do injury
- (3) The persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer injury

An injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the law

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion

The causes of voluntary actions are intemperance, and a vicious disposition concerning things desirable As the covetous man does against the law out of an intemperate desire of money

All actions proceed either from the doer's disposition or not

Those that proceed not from the doer's disposition are such as he does by chance, by compulsion, or by natural necessity

Those that proceed from the doer's disposition are such as he does by custom, or upon premeditation, or in anger, or out of intemperance

By chance are said to be done those things whereof neither the cause nor the scope is evident, and which are done neither orderly nor always, nor, most commonly, after the same manner

By nature are said to be done those things the

causes whereof are in the doer, and are done orderly and always, or for the most part after the same manner

By compulsion are done those things which are against the appetite and ordination of the doer

By custom those actions are said to be done, the cause whereof is this, that the doer has done them often

Upon premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the end, or the way to the end

In anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose to revenge

Out of intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful

In sum, every voluntary action tends either to profit or pleasure

The colours of profitable are already set down

The colours of that which is pleasing follow next

CHAPTER XI

OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING PLEASURE

PLEASURE is a sudden and sensible motion of the soul towards that which is natural

Grief is the contrary.

Pleasant therefore is that which is the cause of such motion

And to return to one's own nature

And customs

And those things that are not violent

Unpleasant are those things which proceed from necessity, as cares, study, contentions The contrary

whereof, ease, remission from labour and care, also play, rest, sleep, are pleasant

Pleasant also is that to which we have an appetite

Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensual, as thirst, hunger, and lust

Also those things to which we have an appetite upon persuasion and reason

And those things we remember, whether they pleased or displeased, then when they were present

And the things we hope for

And anger

And to be in love

And revenge

And victory Therefore

also contentious games, as tables, chess, dice, tennis, etc

And hunting

And suits in law

And honour and reputation amongst men in honour and reputation

And to love

And to be beloved and respected

And to be admired.

And to be flattered

And a flatterer (for he seems both to love and admire)

And the same thing often

And change or variety

And what we return to afresh.

And to learn

And to admire

And to do good

And to receive good

And to help up again one that 's fallen.

And to finish that which is imperfect

And imitation

And therefore the art of painting
And the art of carving images
And the art of poetry
And pictures and statues
And other men's dangers, so they be near
And to have escaped hardly
And things of a kind please one another
And every one himself
And one's own pleases him
And to bear sway
And to be thought wise
And to dwell upon that which he is good at
And ridiculous actions, sayings, and persons

CHAPTER XII

PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS
THAT DO IT OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING THE
APTITUDE OF PERSONS TO DO INJURY

OF the causes which move to injury, namely profit
and pleasure, has been already spoken, chaps vi, vii, xi

It follows next to speak of the persons that are apt
to do injury

The doers of injury are

Such as think they can do it

And such as think to be undiscovered when they
have done it

And such as think, though they be discovered, they
shall not be called in question for it

And such as think, though they be called in question
for it, that their mulct will be less than their gain, which
either themselves or their friends receive by the injury

Able to do injury are:

Such as are eloquent

And such as are practised in business

And such as have skill in process

And such as have many friends

And rich men

And such as have rich friends, or rich servants, or rich partners

Undiscovered when they have done it, are

Such as are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused as feeble men—slaughter; poor, and not beautiful men—adultery

And such as one would think could not choose but be discovered

And such as do injuries, whereof there hath been no example

And such as have none, or many enemies

And such as can easily conceal what they do

And such as have somebody to transfer the fault upon

They that do injury openly, are

Such whose friends have been injured

And such as have the judges for friends

And such as can escape their trial at law

And such as can put off their trial

And such as can corrupt the judges

And such as can avoid the payment of their fine

And such as can defer the payment

And such as cannot pay at all

And such as by the injury get manifestly, much, and presently, when the fine is uncertain, little, and to come

And such as get, by the injury, money, by the penalty, shame only

And such, on the contrary, as get honour by the

injury, and suffer mulct of money only, or banishment, or the like

And such as have often escaped, or been undiscovered

And such as have often attempted in vain

And such as consider present pleasure more than pain to come, and so intemperate men are apt to do injury

And such as consider pleasure to come more than present pain, and so temperate men are apt to do injury

And such as may seem to have done it by fortune, nature, or custom, and by error, rather than by injustice

And such as have means to get pardon

And such as want necessities, as poor men, or unnecessaries, as rich men

And such as are of very good or very bad reputation

CHAPTER XIII

PRESUMPTIONS OF INJURY DRAWN FROM THE PERSONS THAT SUFFER, AND FROM THE MATTER OF THE INJURY

OF those that do injury, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken

Now of the persons that suffer, and of the matter wherein they suffer, the common opinions are these

Persons obnoxious to injury are

Such as have the things that we want, either as necessary, or as delightful

And such as are far from us

And such as are at hand

And such as are unwary and credulous

And such

Data 1

And such as are modest

And such as have swallowed many injuries

And such as have been injured often before

And such as never before

And such as are in danger

And such as are ill beloved generally

And such as are envied

And our friends

And our enemies

And such as, wanting friends, have no great ability
either in speech or action

And such as shall be losers by going to law as
strangers and workmen

And such as have done the injuries they suffer

And such as have committed a crime, or would have
done, or are about to do

And such as by doing them an injury we shall gratify
our friends or superiors

And such, whose friendship we have newly left, and
accuse

And such as another would do the injury to, if we
should not

And such as by injuring we get greater means of
doing good

The matters wherein men are obnoxious to injury
are

Those things wherein all or most men use to deal
unjustly

And those things which are easily hid, and put off into
other hands or altered

And those things which a man is ashamed to have
suffered

And those things wherein prosecution of injury may
be thought a love of contention

CHAPTER XIV

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO BE KNOWN
FOR THE DEFINITION OF JUST AND UNJUST

WHEN the fact is evident, the next inquiry is, whether it be just or unjust

For the definition of just and unjust we must know what law is that is, what the law of nature, what the law of nations, what the law civil, what written law, and what unwritten law is, and what persons, that is, what a public person, or the city is, and what a private person or citizen is

Unjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the law of nature

Unjust in the opinion of all men of those nations which traffic and come together, is that which is contrary to the law common to those nations

Unjust only in one commonwealth, is that which is contrary to the law civil, or law of the commonwealth

He that is accused to have done anything against the public, or a private person, is accused to do it either ignorantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation

And because the defendant does many times confess the fact, but deny the injustice, as that he took, but did not steal and did, but not adultery, it is necessary to know the definitions of theft, adultery, and all other crimes

What facts are contrary to the written laws may be known by the laws themselves

Besides written laws, whatsoever is just proceeds from equity or goodness

From goodness proceeds that which we are praised or honoured for

From equity proceed those actions, which though the written law command not, yet being interpreted reasonably, and supplied, seems to require at our hands.

Actions of equity are such as these

Not too rigorously to punish errors, mischances, or injuries

To pardon the faults that adhere to mankind

And not to consider the law so much as the law-maker's mind, and not the words so much as the meaning of the law

And not to regard so much the fact as the intention of the doer, nor part of the fact, but the whole, nor what the doer is, but what he has been always, or for the most part

And to remember better the good received than the ill

And to endure injuries patiently

And to submit rather to the sentence of a judge than of the sword

And to the sentence of an arbitrator rather than of a judge

CHAPTER XV

OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING INJURIES COMPARATIVELY

COMMON opinions concerning injuries comparatively, are such as these

Greater is the injury which proceeds from greater iniquity

And from which proceedeth greater damage

And of which there is no revenge

And for which there is no remedy

And by occasion of which he that hath received the injury hath done some mischief to himself

He does the greater injury, that does it first, or alone,
or with few

And he that does it often

Greater injury is that against which laws and penalties
were first made

And that which is more brutal, or more approaching
to the actions of beasts

And that which is done upon more premeditation

And by which more laws are broken

And which is done in the place of execution

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives
the injury

And which is committed against well deservers

And which is committed against the unwritten law,
because good men should observe the law for justice,
and not for fear of punishment

And which is committed against the written law,
because he that will do injury, neglecting the penalty
set down in the written law, is much more likely to
transgress the unwritten law, where there is no penalty
at all

CHAPTER XVI

OF PROOFS INARTIFICIAL

OF artificial proofs we have already spoken

Inartificial proofs, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts

(1) *Laws* And those are civil or written law, the law or custom of nations, and the universal law of nature

(2) *Witness* And those are such as concern matter, and such as concern manners Also, they be ancient, or present

(3) *Evidences, or Writings*

(4) *Question, or Torture*

(5) *Oaths* And those be either given or taken, or both, or neither.

For *Laws*, we use them thus

When the written law makes against us, we appeal to the law of nature, alleging

That to be greatest justice which is greatest equity

That the law of nature is immutable, the written law mutable

That the written law is but seeming justice, the law of nature very justice And justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be

That the judge ought to discern between true and adulterate justice

That they are better men that obey unwritten than written laws

That the law against us does contradict some other law And when the law has a double interpretation, that is the true one which makes for us

And that the cause of the law being abolished, the law is no more of validity

But when the written law makes for us, and equity for the adversary, we must allege

That a man may use equity, not as a liberty to judge against the law, but only as a security against being orsworn, when he knows not the law

That men seek not equity because 'tis good simply, but because good for them

That it is the same thing not to make and not to use the law

That as in other arts, and namely in physic, fallacies are pernicious, so in a commonwealth 'tis pernicious to use pretexts against the law

And that in Commonwealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the laws is prohibited

For *Witnesses*, we must use them thus

When we have them not, we must stand for presumptions, and say

That in equity sentence ought to be given according to the most probability

That presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves and cannot be bribed

That they cannot lie

When we have witnesses, against him that has them not, we must say

That presumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished

That if presumptions were enough, witnesses were superfluous

For *Writings*, when they favour us, we must say

That writings are private and particular laws, and he that takes away the use of evidences, abolisheth the law

That since contracts and negotiations pass by writings, he that bars their use, dissolves humane society

Against them if they favour the adversary, we may say

That since laws do not bind, that are fraudulently made to pass, much less writings

And that the judge, being to dispense justice, ought rather to consider what is just than what is in the writing

That writings may be gotten by fraud or force, but justice by neither

That the writing is repugnant to some law, civil or natural; or to justice; or to honesty

That 'tis repugnant to some other writing before or after

That it crosses some commodity of the judge (which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly)

For the *Torture*, if the giving of it make for us, we must say

That 'tis the only testimony that is certain

But if it make for the adversary, we may say

That men enforced by torture, speak as well that which is false as that which is true

That they who can endure, conceal the truth, and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain

For *Oaths*, he that will not put his adversary to his oath, may allege

That he makes no scruple to be forsworn

That by swearing, he will carry the cause, which not swearing, he must lose

That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the judge than of the adversary

He that refuseth to take the oath may say.

That the matter is not worth so much

That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carried his cause

That to try it by swearing for a religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match as to set a weak man against a strong in combat

He that is willing to take the oath, may pretend

That he had rather trust himself than his adversary, and that 'tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the oath

That 'tis his duty to take the oath, since he has required to have sworn judges

He that offers the oath may pretend·

That he does piously commit his cause to the gods

That he makes his adversary himself judge

That 'twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the judges to be sworn

And of these are to be compounded the forms we are to use, when we would give, and not take the oath, or take, and not give, or both give and take, or neither give nor take

But if one have sworn contrary to a former oath, he may pretend·

That he was forced

That he was deceived, and that neither of these is perjury, since perjury is voluntary

But if the adversary do so, he may say

That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth humane society

And (turning to the judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judge our cause, when we will not stand to that we swear ourselves?

And so much for proofs inartificial

BOOK II CHAPTER I

THE INTRODUCTION

OF belief proceeding from our invention, that part which consisteth in proof is already spoken of

The other two parts follow: whereof one ariseth from the manners of the speaker, the other from the passions of the hearer.

The principles, colours, or common opinions upon which a man's belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning virtue, Book I, chap ix, partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the passions For a man is believed either for his prudence, or for his probity, which are virtues, or for good will of which among the passions

The principles concerning belief, arising from the passion of the hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several passions in order

In every one of which three things are to be considered

- (1) First, how men are affected
- (2) Secondly, towards whom
- (3) Thirdly, for what

CHAPTER II

OF ANGER

ANGER is desire of revenge, joined with grief for that he, or some of his is, or seems to be, neglected

The object of anger is always some particular or individual thing

In anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come

To neglect, is to esteem little or nothing and of three kinds

- (1) *Contempt*
- (2) *Crossing*
- (3) *Contumely*

Contempt is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself

Crossing is the hindrance of another man's will without design to profit himself

Contumely is the disgracing of another for his own pastime

The common opinions concerning anger are therefore such as follow

They are easily angry that think they are neglected

That think they excel others, as the rich with the poor, the noble with the obscure, etc

And such as think they deserve well

And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted And therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and generally all that desire and attain not, are angry with those that, standing by, are not moved with their wants

And such as having expected good, find evil

Those that men are angry with, are

Such as mock, deride, or jest at them

And such as show any kind of contumely towards them

And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon, and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein

And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends

And such as have honoured us, if they continue not
And such as requite not our courtesy.

And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiors

And our friends, if they have said or done us evil, or not good

And such as give not ear to our entreaty

And such as are joyful or calm in our distress

And such as, troubling us, are not themselves troubled

And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.

And such as neglect us in the presence of our competitors; of those we admire; of those we would have admire us, of those we reverence; and of those that reverence us

And such as should help us, and neglect it.

And such as are in jest when we are in earnest.

And such as forget us or our names

An orator therefore must so frame his judge or auditor by his oration as to make him apt to anger; and then make his adversary appear such as men use to be angry withal

CHAPTER III

OF RECONCILING OR PACIFYING ANGER

RECONCILIATION is the appeasing of anger.

Those to whom men are easily reconciled, are:

Such as have not offended out of neglect

And such as have done it against their will

And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done

And such as have done as much to themselves

And such as confess and repent

And such as are humbled

And such as do seriously the same things that they
do seriously

And such as have done them more good heretofore,
than now hurt

And such as sue to them for anything

And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor
sighters of others in their own disposition

And generally such as are of a contrary disposition
to those whom men are usually angry withal

And such as they fear or reverence

And such as reverence them

And such as have offended their anger

Reconcilable are

Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we
have said before to be easily angry

And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live
in plenty, and in sum, all that have no cause of
grief

And such as have given their anger time

Men lay down their anger for these causes

Because they have gotten the victory

Because the offender has suffered more than they
meant to inflict

Because they have been revenged of another

Because they think they suffer justly

And because they think the revenge will not be felt,
or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such
an injury

And because the offender is dead

Whosoever therefore would assuage the anger of his

auditor, must make himself appear such as men use to be reconciled unto, and beget in his auditor such opinions as make him reconcilable.

CHAPTER IV

OF LOVE OF FRIENDS

To love, is to will well to another, and that for other's, not for our own sake.

A friend is he that loves and he that is beloved

Friends one to another, are they that naturally love one another

A friend therefore is he

That rejoiceth at another's good

And that grieves at his hurt

And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good or hurt

And that is enemy or friend to the same man

We love them:

That have done good to us or ours, especially if much, readily, or in season

That are our friends' friends

That are our enemies' enemies

That are liberal

That are valiant

That are just.

And that we would have love us

And good companions

And such as can abide jests

And such as break jests

And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in ourselves

And such as are neat

And such as upbraid us not with our vices or with their own benefits

And such as quickly forget injuries

And such as least observe our errors

And such as are not of ill tongue

And those that are ignorant of our vices

And such as cross us not when we are busy or angry

And such as are officious towards us

And those that are like us

And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another

And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied

And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such as the world, rather than their own consciences, condemns

And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults

And such as we would have honour us and not envy, but imitate us

And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to ourselves

And such as continue their friendship to the dead

And such as speak their mind

And such as are not terrible

And such as we may rely on

The several kinds of friendship are society, familiarity, consanguinity, affinity, etc

The things that beget love are

The bestowing of benefits	{ gratis unasked privately.
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CHAPTER V

OF ENMITY AND HATRED

THE colours or common opinions concerning hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those which concern love and friendship

Hatred differs from anger in this

That anger regards only what is done to oneself; but hatred not

And in this, that anger regards particulars only, the other universals also

And in this, that anger is curable, hatred not

And in this, that anger seeks the vexation, hatred the damage of one's adversary

That with anger there is always joined grief, with hatred not always

That anger may at length be satiated, but hatred never

Hence it appears how the judge or auditor may be made friend or enemy to us; and how our adversary may be made appear friend or enemy to the judge, and how we may answer to our adversary, that would make us appear enemies to him

CHAPTER VI

OF FEAR

FEAR is a trouble or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy

Danger is the nearness of the evil feared

The things to be feared are

Such as have power to hurt

And the signs of will to do us hurt, as anger and hatred of powerful men
 And injustice joined with power
 And valour provoked, joined with power
 And the fear of powerful men

The men that are to be feared are
 Such as know our faults
 And such as can do us injury
 And such as think they are injured by us
 And such as have done us injury
 And our competitors in such things as cannot satisfy both

And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are
 And such as have destroyed greater men than we are
 And such as use to invade their inferiors
 And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be feared than those that are hasty and free

The things especially to be feared are
 Such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired, at least, not according to ours, but our adversary's pleasure

And such as admit either none, or not easy help
 And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them

They that fear not are
 Such as expect not evil, or not now, or not this, or not from these

And therefore men fear little in prosperity
 And men fear little that think they have suffered already

An orator therefore that would put fear into the

auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious, and that greater than he do suffer and have suffered from those, and at those times, they least thought.

CHAPTER VII

OF ASSURANCE

ASSURANCE is hope arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off

The things therefore that beget assurance are

The remoteness of those things that are to be feared,
and the nearness of their contraries

And the facility of great or many helps or remedies

And neither to have done nor received injury

And to have no competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends, such as we have obliged, or are obliged to

And that the danger is extended to more or greater than us

Assured or confident, are

They have that oft escaped danger

And they to whom most things have succeeded well

And they that see their equals or inferiors not afraid

And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, etc

And such as have done others no wrong

And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty

And such as think they will speed well that are gone before

CHAPTER VIII

OF SHAME

SHAME is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a man's own, or his friends' reputation

The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those actions which proceed from vice, as

To throw away one's arms, to run away, signs of cowardliness

To deny that which is committed to one's trust, a sign of injustice

To have lain with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of intemperance

To make gain of small and base things, not to help with money whom and how much we ought, to receive help from meaner men, to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him, to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent, and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more, and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask, signs of wretchedness

To praise one to his face, to praise his virtues too much and colour his vices, signs of flattery

To be unable to endure such labours as men endure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than he, signs of effeminacy

To be beholden often to another, and to upbraid those that are beholding to him, signs of pusillanimity

To speak and promise much of oneself, more than is due, signs of arrogance

To want those things which one's equals, all or most of them, have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of

And to suffer things ignominious, as to serve about another's person, or to be employed in his base actions

In actions of intemperance, whether willingly or unwillingly committed, there is shame in actions of force, only when they are done unwillingly

The men before whom we are ashamed are such as we respect, namely

Those that admire us

And those whom we desire should admire us

And those whom we admire

Those that contend with us for honour

Those whose opinion we condemn not

And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence

Of old and well-bred men

Of those we are always to live with

Of those that are not guilty of the same fault

Of those that do not easily pardon

And of those that are apt to reveal our faults, such as are men injured, backbiters, scoffers, comic poets

And of those before whom we have had always good success

And of those who never asked anything of us before

And of such as desire our friendship

And of our familiars, that know none of our crimes

And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before

But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are not ashamed

Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence.

Of those whom we reverence

And of those who are concerned in our own or ancestors' or kinsfolk's actions or misfortunes if they be shameful

And of their rivals

And of those that are to live with them that know
their disgrace

The common opinions concerning impudence are taken
from the contrary of these

CHAPTER IX

OF GRACE OR FAVOUR

GRACE is that virtue by which a man is said to do a
good turn, or to do service to a man in need, not for his
own but for his cause to whom he does it

Great grace is when the need is great, or when they
are hard or difficult things that are conferred, or when
(the time is seasonable, or when he that confers the
favour is the only, or the first man that did it

Need is a desire joined with grief for the absence of
the thing desired

Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one
that needs

Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a
grace or favour, must show that he needeth it to whom
it was done

Grace it is not

Which is done by chance

Nor which is done by necessity

Nor which has been requited

✱ Nor that which is done to one's enemy

Nor that which is a trifle

Nor that which is naught, if the giver know the fault

And in this manner a man may go over the

predicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a grace for being this, or for being so much, or for being such, or for being now, etc.

CHAPTER X

OF PITY OR COMPASSION

PITY is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself or his

And because it appertains to pity, to think that he or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it follows that they be most compassionate

Who have passed through misery

And old men.

And weak men

And timorous men

And learned men

And such as have parents, wife, and children

And such as think there be honest men

And that they are less compassionate

Who are in great despair

Who are in great prosperity

And they that are angry, for they consider not.

And they that are very confident, for they also consider not

And they that are in the act of contumely, for neither do these consider

And they that are astonished with fear

And they that think no man honest

The things to be pitied are
Such as grieve and withal hurt
Such as destroy
And calamities of fortune, if they be great, as none
or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, etc
And evil that arrives where good is expected
And after extreme evil, a little good
And through a man's life to have no good offer itself,
or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it

Men to be pitied are
Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us
as their hurt be our own
And such as be of our own years
Such as are like us in manners
Such as are of the same, or like stock
And our equals in dignity
(Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer,
injury and those that have the marks of injury past
And those that have the words or actions of them in
the present misery

CHAPTER XI

OF INDIGNATION

OPPOSITE in a manner to pity in good men is indignation,
which is grief for the prosperity of a man unworthy

With indignation there is always joined a joy for the
prosperity of a man worthy, as pity is always with
contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it

In wicked men the opposite of pity is
Envy, as also the companions thereof delight in the

harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* But of these in the next chapter

Men conceive indignation against others, not for their virtues, as justice, etc

For these make men worthy, and in indignation we think men unworthy

But for those goods which men endued with virtue, and noble men, and handsome men are worthy of

And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for ancient, and especially if by these he has gotten other good, as by riches, command The reason why we conceive greater indignation against new than ancient riches, is that the former seem to possess that which is *none of theirs* But the ancient seem to have but their own For with common people, to have been so long is to be so by right

And for the bestowing of goods incongruously as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Ulysses

And for the comparison of the inferior is the same thing, as when one valiant is compared with a more valiant, or whether absolutely superior, as when a good scholar is compared with a good man

Apt to indignation are

They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them

And they that are good

And they that are ambitious

And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth than he that hath it

Least apt to indignation are

Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious nature

Who they are that rejoyce, or grieve not, at the

adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said

Whosoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the judge, he must make him apt to indignation, and show that his adversary is unworthy of the good, and worthy of the evil which happens to him

CHAPTER XII

OF ENVY

ENVY is grief for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they, receive

Such as ourselves I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means

They are apt to envy

That are within a little of the highest

And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially wisdom or good fortune

And such as would be thought wise

And such as catch at glory in every action

And men of poor spirits for everything appears great to them

The things which men envy in others are

Such as bring glory

And goods of fortune

And such things as we desire for ourselves

And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us, a little

Obnoxious to envy are

Men of our own time, of our own country, of our own age, and competitors of our glory

And therefore

Those whom we strive with for honour

And those that covet the same things that we do

And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all

And those that attain unto, or do, the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us

And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore So old and decayed men envy the young and lusty

And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be envied by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing

From the contraries of these may be derived the principles concerning joy for other men's hurt

He therefore that would not have his enemy prevail, when he craves pity, or other favour, must dispose the judge to envy, and make his adversary appear such, as above described, to be subject to the envy of others

CHAPTER XIII

OF EMULATION

EMULATION is grief arising from that our equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not, not because they have them, but because not we also

No man therefore emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable

Apt to emulate are

Such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have

And young and magnanimous men

And such as already possess the goods for which men are honoured, for they measure their worth by their having

And those that are esteemed worthy by others

And those whose ancestors, kindred, familiars, nation, city have been eminent for some good, do emulate others for that good

Objects of emulation are for things virtues

And things whereby we may profit others.

And things whereby we may please others

For persons

They that possess such things

And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with or like unto

And they whose praises fly abroad

The contrary of emulation is contempt

And they that emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, contemn such as have them not, and thence it is that men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which men honour, are nevertheless contemned

CHAPTER XIV

OF THE MANNERS OF YOUTH

OF passions we have already spoken

We are next to speak of manners

Manners are distinguished by passions, habits, ages and fortunes

What kind of manners proceed from passions, and from virtues and vices (which are habits), hath been already showed.

There remains to be spoken of the manners that are peculiar to several ages and fortunes

The ages are youth, middle age, old age

And first of youth

Young men are

Violent in their desires

Prompt to execute their desires

Incontinent

Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before

Longing mightily, and soon satisfied

Apt to anger, and in their anger violent and ready to execute their anger with their hands

Lovers of honour and of victory more than money, as having not been yet in want

Well natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice

Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other ages have by wine, youth being a kind of natural drunkenness Besides, hope is of the time to come, whereof youth hath much, but of the time past little

Credulous, because not yet often deceived.

Easily deceived, because full of hope

Valiant, because apt to anger and full of hope, whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off fear

Bashful, because they estimate the honour of action by the precepts of the law

Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life

And lovers of honour more than profit, because they live more by custom than by reason, and by reason we acquire profit, but virtue by custom

Lovers of their friends and companions

Apt to err in the excess, rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, *Ne quid nimis*, for they overdo everything they love too much and hate too much, because thinking themselves wise they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered

Doers of injury rather for contumely than for damage

✓ Merciful, because measuring others by their own innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer, which is a cause of pity

And lovers of mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others

Jesting is witty contumely

CHAPTER XV

OF THE MANNERS OF OLD MEN

THE manners of old men are in a manner the contraries of those of youth

They determine nothing they do everything less vehemently than is fit they never say they know, but to everything they say, perhaps, and peradventure,

which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived

They are peevish because they interpret everything to the worst

And suspicious through incredulity, and incredulous by reason of their experience

They love and hate, as if they meant to continue in neither

Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life

And covetous, as knowing how easy 'tis to lose and hard to get

And timorous, as having been cooled by years

And greedy of life, for good things seem greater by the want of them

And lovers of themselves out of pusillanimity

And seek profit more than honour, because they love themselves, and profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for oneself

And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming

And hope little, knowing by experience that many times good counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous

And live by memory rather than hope, for memory is of the time past, whereof old men have good store

And are full of talk, because they delight in their memory

And vehement in their anger, but not stout enough to execute it

They have weak, or no desires, and thence seem temperate

They are slaves to gain

And live more by reason than custom, because reason leads to profit, as custom to that which is honourable

And do injury to endamage and not in contumely

And are merciful by compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves, which is a kind of infirmity, and not humanity, as in young men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer evil

And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil, because of their infirmity.

Seeing then that every man loves such men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their own manners, 'tis not hard to collect, how the orator and his oration may be made acceptable to the hearer, whether young or old

CHAPTER XVI

OF THE MANNERS OF MIDDLE-AGED MEN

THE manners of middle-aged men are between those of youth, and old men, and therefore

They neither dare nor fear too much, but both as is fit

They neither believe all, nor reject all, but judge

They seek not only what is honourable, nor only what is profitable, but both

They are neither covetous nor prodigal, but in the mean

They are neither easily angry, nor yet stupid, but between both

They are valiant, and withal temperate

And in general, whatsoever is divided in youth and old men is compounded in middle age

And whereof the excess or defect is in youth or old men, the mediocrity is in those of the middle age

Middle age for the body I call the time from thirty to five-and-thirty years, for the mind, the nine-and-fortieth or thereabouts

CHAPTER XVII

OF THE MANNERS OF THE NOBILITY

OF manners that proceed from the several ages we have, already spoken

We are next to speak of those that rise from several fortunes

The manners of the nobility are

To be ambitious

To undervalue their ancestors' equals For the goods of fortune seem the more precious for their antiquity

Nobility is the virtue of a stock

And generosity is not to degenerate from the virtue of his stock

For as in plants, so in the races of men, there is a certain progress, and they grow better and better to a certain point, and change, viz subtle wits into madness, and staid wits into stupidity and blockishness

CHAPTER XVIII

OF THE MANNERS OF THE RICH

RICH men are contumelious and proud This they have from their riches For seeing everything may be had for money, having money they think they have all that is good

And effeminate, because they have wherewithal to subminister to their lust

And boasters of their wealth, and speak in high terms foolishly For men willingly talk of what they love and admire, and think others affect the same that they do, and the truth is, all sorts of men submit to the rich

And think themselves worthy to command, having that by which men attain command

And in general they have the manners of fortunate fools

They do injury with intentions not to hurt, but to disgrace, and partly also through incontinence

There is a difference between new and ancient riches, or they that are newly come to wealth have the same faults in a greater degree, for new riches are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of riches

CHAPTER XIX

OF THE MANNERS OF MEN IN POWER, AND OF SUCH AS PROSPER

THE manners of men in power are the same or better than those of the rich

They have a greater sense of honour than the rich, and their manners are more manly

They are more industrious than the rich, for power is sustained by industry

They are grave, but without austerity, for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly, and have a kind of gentle and comely gravity, which the Greeks call *σεμνότης*

When they do injuries, they do great ones

The manners of men that prosper are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains

Prosperity in children, and goods of the body, make men desire to exceed others in the goods of fortune

Men that prosper have this ill, to be more proud and inconsiderate than others

And this good, that they worship God, trusting in Him, for that they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their industry

The manners of poor men, obscure men, men without power, and men in adversity, may be collected from the contrary of what has been said

CHAPTER XX

COMMON PLACES OR PRINCIPLES CONCERNING WHAT MAY
BE DONE, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, AND WHAT SHALL
BE DONE, OR OF FACT POSSIBLE, PAST, AND FUTURE
ALSO OF GREAT AND LITTLE

We have hitherto set down such principles as are peculiar to several kinds of orations

Now we are to speak of such places as are common to them all, as these, possible, done, or past, future, great, small

Possible is that

The contrary whereof is possible

And the like whereof is possible

And than which some harder thing is possible

And the beginning whereof is possible

And the end whereof is possible

And the usual consequent whereof is possible

And whatsoever we desire

And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compel or persuade

And part whereof is possible

And part of the whole that is possible

And the general if a particular

And a particular if the general

And of relatives, if one, the other

And that which without art and industry is possible,
is much more so with art and industry

And that which is possible to worse, weaker, and
unskilfuller men, is much more so to better, stronger,
and more skilful

The principles concerning impossibles are the contraries
of these

That has been done,

Than which a harder thing has been done

And the consequent whereof has been done

And that which being possible, he had a will to, and
nothing hindered

And that which was possible to him in his anger

And that which he longed to do

And that which was before upon the point of doing

And whose antecedent has been done, or that, for
which it uses to be done.

And if that for whose cause we do this, then this

The principles concerning not done are the contraries
of these

That shall be done,

Which some man can, and means to do

And which some man can, and desires to do

And which is in the way, and upon the point to be
done

And the antecedents whereof are past

And the motive whereof is past

Of great and small, more and less, see Book I, chap vii

CHAPTER XXI

OF EXAMPLE, SIMILITUDE, AND FABLES

OF the principles both general and special from whence proofs are to be drawn, has been already spoken

Now follow the proofs themselves which are examples or enthymemes

An example is either an example properly so called (as some action past), or a similitude (which is called a parable), or a fable (which contains some action feigned)

An example properly so called is this Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued Egypt Xerxes also conquered Egypt first, then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Egypt

A similitude, or parable, is such as followeth. They who choose their magistrates by lot are like them that choose for their champions those on whom the lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength, and for their pilot, not him that hath skill, but him whose name is drawn out of the urn

A fable is in this manner The horse, desiring to drive out the stag from his common pasture, took a man to assist him, and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the man So you of Himera, having (in hope to be revenged of your enemies) given unto Phalaris sovereign authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouths, if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery

To find out examples, that is, actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard because not in our power

But to find fables and similitudes is easier, because by conversing in philosophy, a man may feign somewhat in nature like to the case in hand

Examples, similitudes, and fables, where enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an oration or inductions, otherwise are to be alleged after enthymemes for testimonies

CHAPTER XXII

OF A SENTENCE

A SENTENCE is an universal proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided in the actions or passions of the common life As

A wise man will not suffer his children to be over-learned

And is to an enthymeme in rhetoric as any proposition is to a syllogism in logic

And therefore a sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a conclusion, and both together make an enthymeme

As for example

To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy, procures envy Therefore he that's wise will not suffer his children to be over-learned

Of sentences there be four sorts

For they either require proofs or not, that is, are manifest or not

Such as are manifest, are either so as soon as they are uttered as

Health is a great good

Or as soon as they are considered, as.

Men used to hate whom they have hurt

Such as are not manifest are either conclusions of enthymemes, as

He that 's wise will not suffer his children, etc

Or else are enthymematical, that is, have in themselves the force of an enthymeme, as

Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger

A sentence not manifest ought to be either inferred or confirmed

Inferred thus.

'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by one's fellow citizens A wise man therefore will not have his children over-learned

Confirmed thus

A wise man will not have his children over-learned, seeing too much learning both softens a man's mind and procures him envy among his fellow citizens

If a reason be added to a manifest sentence let it be short

Sentences become not every man, but only old men and such as be well versed in business For to hear a young man speak sentences is ridiculous, and to hear an ignorant man speak sentences is absurd

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected because they pass for truths And yet they may be denied when any laudable custom or humour may thereby be made appear in the denier

The commodities of sentences are two

One proceeding from the vanity of the hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular, and therefore a

man ought to consider in everything what opinion the hearer holds

Another is that sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker, so that if they be esteemed good sentences, he shall be esteemed a good man, and if evil an evil man

Thus much of sentences, what they be, of how many sorts, how to be used, whom they become, and what is their profit

CHAPTER XXIII

OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES

SEEING an enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism in that it neither concludes out of everything nor out of remote principles, the places of it, from whence a man may argue, ought to be certain and determinate

And because whosoever makes a syllogism rhetorical or other should know all or the most part of that which is in question, as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question whether they are to make war or no, must know what their revenues be, what, and what kind of power they have and he that will praise them must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, etc It will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of

He that is to speak *ex tempore*, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand

Proper I call those things which are least common to others, as he that will praise Achilles is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Diomedes,

as that he was a prince and warred against the Trojans, but such things as are proper only to Achilles, as that he killed Hector and Cygnus, went to the war young and voluntary

Let this therefore be one general place from that which is proper

CHAPTER XXIV

OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES OSTENSIVE

FORASMUCH as enthymemes either infer truly or seem only so to do, and they which do infer indeed be either ostensive or such as bring a man to some impossibility, we will first set down the places of enthymemes ostensive

An ostensive enthymeme is wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted

That enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility, is an enthymeme wherein from that which the adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible

All places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent propositions of good, evil, just, unjust, honourable, and dishonourable, namely, they have been set down as applied to particular subjects or in concrete

Here they are to be set down in another manner, namely, in the abstract or universal

The first place then let be from contraries, which in the concrete or particulars is exemplified thus. If intemperance be hurtful, temperance is profitable, and, if intemperance be not hurtful, neither is temperance profitable

Another place may be from cognomination or affinity of words, as in this particular If what is just be good,

then what is justly is well, but justly to die is not well, therefore not all that is just is good

A third from relatives, as This man has justly done, herefore the other has justly suffered But this place sometimes deceives, for a man may suffer justly, yet not from him

A fourth from comparison, three ways

From the great to the less, as He has stricken his father, and therefore this man

From the less to the greater, as The Gods know not all things, much less man

From equality, as If captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a victory, why should sophisters?

Another from the time, as Philip to the Thebans. If I had required to pass through your country with my army before I had aided you against the Phocaeans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me 'It is absurd therefore to deny it me now after I have trusted you

A sixth from what the adversary says of himself, as Iphicrates asked Aristophon whether he would take a bribe to betray the army, and he answering no, What (says he), is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the army and Aristophon not?

This place would be ridiculous, where the defendant were not in much more estimation than the accuser

A seventh from the definition, as that of Socrates A spirit is either God, or the creature of God, and therefore he denies not that there is a god, that confesses there are spirits

8. An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word

A ninth from division, as If all men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible, and the accuser charge not the defendant with the third, it follows that he has not done it

A tenth from induction, as. At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, etc., and therefore everywhere.

An eleventh from authority or precedent sentence, as that of Sappho, that death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so in exempting themselves from mortality.

A twelfth from the consequence, as 'Tis not good to be envied, therefore neither to be learned 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed

A thirteenth from two contrary consequences, as 'Tis not good to be an orator, because if he speak the truth he shall displease man, if he speak falsely, he shall displease God

Here is to be noted that sometimes this argument may be retorted, as thus *If you speak truth you shall please God, if you speak untruth you shall please men, therefore by all means be an orator*

A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing and approve another, as *We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury, for all men discommend injustice Again We ought to war against the Athenians, for otherwise our liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty, but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve*

A fifteenth from proportion, as *Seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?*

A sixteenth from the similitude of consequence, as *He that denies the immortality of the Gods is no worse than he that has written the generation of the Gods For the same consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none*

A seventeenth from that, that men change their mind, as *If when we were in banishment we fought to recover our country, why should we not fight now to retain it?*

An eighteenth from a feigned end, as *That Diomedes*

chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another, but as one that would partake less of the glory

A nineteenth from the cause, as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had cause to do it

A twentieth from that which is incredible, but true, as that laws may need a law to mend them, as well as fish bred in the salt water may need salting

CHAPTER XXV

OF THE PLACES OF ENTHYMEMES THAT LEAD TO IMPOSSIBILITY

LET the first place be from inspection of times, actions, or words, either of the adversary, or of the speaker, or both Of the adversary, as He says he loves the people, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty Of the speaker, as He says I am contentious and yet I never began suit Of both, as He never conferred anything to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers citizens with mine own money

A second from showing the cause of that which seemed amiss, and serves for men of good reputation that are accused, as The mother that was accused of incest for being seen embracing her son, was absolved as soon as she made appear that she embraced him upon his arrival from afar by way of salutation

A third from rendering of the cause, as. Leodamas, to whom it was objected that he had, under the Thirty Tyrants, defaced the inscription (which the people had set up in a pillar) of his ignominy, answered He had not done it, because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand, thereby to endear himself to the tyrants by the testimony of the people's hatred

A fourth from better counsel, as He might have done better for himself, therefore he did not this. But this place deceives, when the better counsel comes to mind after the fact.

A fifth from incompatibility of the things to be done, as They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the funeral of Leucothea, were told that if they thought her a Goddess they ought not to mourn, and if they thought her a mortal they ought not to sacrifice

A sixth (which is proper to judicial orations) from an inference of error, as If he did it not he was not wise, therefore he did it

Enthymemes that lead to impossibility, please more than ostensive, for they compare and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off and more conspicuous to the auditor

Of all enthymemes they be best which we assent to as soon as hear For such consent pleaseth us, and makes us favourable to the speaker

CHAPTER XXVI

OF THE PLACES OF SEEMING ENTHYMEMES

OF seeming enthymemes one place may be from the form of speaking, as when a man has repeated divers sentences he brings in his conclusion as if it followed necessarily, though it do not

A second from an ambiguous word

A third from that which is true divided to that which is false joined, as that of Orestes It was justice that I should revenge my father's death, and it was justice

my mother should die for killing my father, therefore I justly killed my mother Or from that which is true joined to that which is false divided, as One cup of wine and one cup of wine are hurtful, therefore one cup of wine is hurtful

A fourth from amplification of the crime For neither the defendant likely to have committed the crime he amplifies, nor does the accuser seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his accusation

A fifth from signs, as when a man concludes the doing of the fact from the manner of his life

A sixth from that which comes by chance, as if from this, that the tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a man should conclude that in a free commonwealth loving of boys were profitable

A seventh from the consequence, as Banishment is to be desired because a banished man has choice of places to dwell in

An eighth from making that the cause which is not, as In Demosthenes his government the war began, therefore Demosthenes governed well With the Peloponnesian war began the plague, therefore Pericles, that persuaded that war, did ill

A ninth from the omission of some circumstance, as Helen did what was lawful when she ran away with Paris, because she had her father's consent to choose her own husband, which was true only during the time that she had not chosen

A tenth from that which is probable in some case to that which is probable simply, as 'Tis probable he foresaw that if he did it, he should be suspected, therefore 'tis probable he did it not

From this place one may infer both ways that he did it not For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought

he did it not, again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this that he knew he should be suspected

Upon this place was grounded the art, which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse, and the worse the better

CHAPTER XXVII

OF THE WAYS TO ANSWER THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ADVERSARY

AN argument is answered by an opposite syllogism or by an objection

The places of opposite syllogisms are the same with the places of syllogisms or enthymemes, for a rhetorical syllogism is an enthymeme

The places of objections are four

First from the same, as To the adversary that proves love to be good by an enthymeme may be objected, that no want is good and yet love is want, or particularly thus The love of Myrrha to her father was not good

The second from contraries, as, if the adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends

The third from similitude, as thus if the adversary say, All men that are injured do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected that then all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful

The fourth from the authority of famous men, as when a man shall say that drunken men ought to be

pardoned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do, the objection may be that Pittacus was of another mind that appointed for such acts a double punishment, one for the act, another for the drunkenness

And forasmuch as all enthymemes are drawn from probability or example, or from a sign fallible, or from a sign infallible, an enthymeme from probability may be confuted really, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise, but apparently or sophistically, by showing only that it does not fall out so always, whereupon the judge thinks the probability not sufficient to ground his sentence upon

[The reason whereof is this That the judge, while he hears the fact proved probable, conceives it as true For the understanding has no object but truth And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an instance to the contrary, and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as probable For he cannot at one time think the same thing both probable and false, and he that says a thing is probable, the meaning is he thinks it true, but finds not arguments enough to prove it]

An enthymeme from a fallible sign is answered by showing the sign to be fallible

An enthymeme from an example is answered as an enthymeme from probability, really, by showing more examples to the contrary, apparently, if he bring examples enough to make it seem not necessary

If the adversary have more examples than we, we must make appear that they are not applicable to the case

An enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the proposition be true, is unanswerable

CHAPTER XXVIII

AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON
PLACES ENTHYMEMES BY WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE
ANSWERED ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH
THE MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED
OBJECTIONS ARE NOT ENTHYMEMES

THE first, that amplification and extenuation are not common places, appears by this, that amplification and extenuation do prove a fact to be great or little, and are therefore enthymemes to be drawn from common places, and therefore are not the places themselves

THE second, that enthymemes, by which arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other

THE third, that an objection is no enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an objection is no more but an opinion, example, or other instance produced to make appear that the adversary's argument does not conclude

Thus much of examples, sentences, enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to argumentation, from what places they may be drawn or answered

There remains elocution and disposition to be spoken of in the next book

BOOK III CHAPTER I

OF THE ORIGINAL OF ELOCUTION AND PRONUNCIATION

THREE things being necessary to an oration, namely, proof, elocution, and disposition, we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows

As for action or pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an orator may be fetched out of the book of the *Art of Poetry*, in which we have treated of the action of the stage

For tragedians were the first that invented such action and that but of late, and it consisteth in governing well the magnitude, tone, and measure of the voice, a thing less subject to art than is either proof or elocution

And yet there have been rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for poetry

But oratorical action has not been hitherto reduced to art

And orators in the beginning, when they saw that the poets in barren and feigned arguments nevertheless attained great reputation, supposing it had proceeded from the choice or connection of words, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to verse, and made choice of words

But when the poets changed their style and laid by all words that were not in common use, the orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the voice and measures proper to themselves

Seeing therefore pronunciation or action are in some

degree necessary also for an orator, the precepts thereof are to be fetched from the *Art of Poetry*

[In the meantime, this may be one general rule If the words, tone, greatness of the voice, gesture of the body and countenance, seem to proceed all from one passion, then 'tis well pronounced Otherwise not

For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the speaker appears unnatural and distracted Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the hearer always]

CHAPTER II

OF THE CHOICE OF WORDS AND EPITHETS

THE virtues of a word are two. the first, that it be perspicuous, the second, that it be decent, that is neither above nor below the thing signified, or, neither too humble nor too fine

Perspicuous are all words that be proper

Fine words are those that are borrowed or translated from other significations, of which in the *Art of Poetry*

The reason why borrowed words please is this Men are affected with words as they are with men, admiring in both that which is foreign and new

To make a poem graceful many things help, but few an oration

For to a poet it sufficeth with what words he can see out his poem, but an orator must not only do that, but also seem not to do it, for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally and not as he thinks, and thereby be

the less believed, whereas belief is the scope of his oration

The words that an orator ought to use are of three sorts proper, such as are received, and metaphors

Words taken from foreign languages, words compounded, and words new coined are seldom to be used

Synonyms belong to poets and equivocal words to sophists

An orator, if he use proper words, and received, and good metaphors, shall both make his oration beautiful and not seem to intend it, and shall speak perspicuously. For in a metaphor alone there is perspicuity, novelty, and sweetness

Concerning metaphors the rules are these

(1) He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat that is better. As, for example, let him call a crime an error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat worse, as, calling error, crime

(2) A metaphor ought not to be so far-fetched as that the similitude may not easily appear

(3) A metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things, as the poets do that choose rather to say 'rosy-fingered' than 'red-fingered Aurora'

In like manner the rule of epithets is

That he that will adorn should use those of the better sort, and he that will disgrace, should use those of the worse. As Simonides being to write an ode in honour of the victory gotten in a course by certain mules, being not well paid, called them by their name [*ῥιμίωνους*] that signifies their propinquity to asses, but having received a greater reward, styles them 'the sons of swift-footed coursers'

CHAPTER III

OF THE THINGS THAT MAKE AN ORATION FLAT

THE things that make an oration flat or insipid are four

(1) *Words compounded* [and yet a man may compound a word when the composition is necessary, for want of a simple word]

(2) *Foreign words* As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latin, which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are foreign in another language, and yet these may be used, so it be moderately

(3) *Long, impertinent, and often epithets*

(4) *Metaphors, indecent and obscure* Obscure they are when they are far-fetched Indecent when they are ridiculous, as in comedies, or too grave, as in tragedies

CHAPTER IV

OF A SIMILITUDE

A SIMILITUDE differs from a metaphor only by such particles of comparison as these *As, even as, so, even so, etc*

A similitude, therefore, is a metaphor dilated, and a metaphor is a similitude contracted into one word

A similitude does well in an oration, so it be not too frequent, for 'tis poetical

An example of a similitude is this of Pericles, that said in his oration, that the Boeotians were like to so many oaks in a wood, that did nothing but beat one another

CHAPTER V

OF THE PURITY OF LANGUAGE

FOUR things are necessary to make language pure

(1) The right rendering of those particles which some antecedent particle does require, as to a 'not only', a 'not also', and then they are rendered right when they are not suspended too long

(2) The use of proper words rather than circumlocutions, unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose

(3) That there be nothing of double construction unless there be cause to do it of purpose As the prophets (of the heathen) who speak in general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of their prophecies, which is easier maintained in generals than in particulars For 'tis easier to divine whether a number be even or odd than how many, and that a thing will be than what it will be

(4) Concordance of gender, number, and person, as not to say him for her, man for men, hath for have

In sum a man's language ought to be easy for another to read, pronounce, and point

Besides, to divers antecedents, let divers relatives, or one common to them all, be correspondent, as He saw the colour, he heard the sound, or, He perceived both colour and sound But by no means, He heard or saw both

Lastly, that which is to be interposed by parenthesis let it be done quickly, as I purposed, having spoken to him (to this and this purpose), afterward to be gone For to put it off thus I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone, but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose, is vicious

CHAPTER VI

OF THE AMPLITUDE AND TENUITY OF LANGUAGE

A MAN shall add amplitude or dignity to his language, but by such means as these.

(1) By changing the name with the definition as occasion shall serve As when the name shall be indecent by using the definition or contrary

(2) By metaphors

(3) By using the plural number for the singular

(4) By privative epithets

CHAPTER VII

OF THE CONVENIENCE OR DECENCY OF ELOCUTION

ELOCUTIONS are made decent

(1) By speaking feelingly, that is with such passion as is fit for the matter he is in, as angrily in matter of injury

(2) By speaking as becomes the person of the speaker, as for a gentleman to speak eruditely

(3) By speaking proportionably to the matter, as of great affairs to speak in a high, and of mean in a low style

(4) By abstaining from compounded, and from outlandish words, unless a man speak passionately, and have already moved and, as it were, inebriated his hearers Or ironically

It confers also to persuasion very much to use these

ordinary forms of speaking All men know, 'Tis confessed by all, No man will deny, and the like For the hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be esteemed 'he only ignorant man

'Tis good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the pronunciation and countenance that to such a word belongs, that the disproportion between it and the matter may the less appear And when a man has said too much, it will show well to correct himself, for he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says

[But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in showing of this consideration For the ostentation of carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying, as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth than is required]

CHAPTER VIII

OF TWO SORTS OF STYLES

THERE be two sorts of styles

The one continued or to be comprehended at once, the other divided, or distinguished by periods

The first sort was in use with ancient writers, but is now out of date

An example of this style is in the history of Herodotus, wherein there is no period till the end of the whole history

In the other kind of style, that is distinguished by periods, a period is such a part as is perfect in itself, and has such length as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.

This latter kind is pleasant, the former unpleasant; because this appears finite, the other infinite. In this the hearer has always somewhat set out and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no end, and has nothing finished to him; this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence (which is the cause that verses be easily remembered); the other not.

Every sentence ought to end with the period and nothing to be interposed.

Period is either simple or divided into parts

Simple is that which is indivisible, as: I wonder you fear not their ends whose actions you imitate.

A period divided is that which only only has perfection and length convenient for respiration, but also parts. As: 'I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imitate their actions' where in these words, 'I wonder you are not afraid of their ends', is one colon or part; and in these, 'Seeing you imitate their actions', another, and both together make the period

The parts, or members, and periods of speech ought neither to be too long nor too short

Too long are they which are produced beyond the expectation of the hearer

Too short are they that end before he expects it

Those that be too long leave the hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usual end of the walk and thereby outgoes him that walks with him.

They that be too short make the hearer stumble, for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be aware.

A period that is divided into parts is either divided only, or has also an opposition of the parts one to another

Divided only is such as this This the senate knows, the consul sees, and yet the man lives

A period with opposition of parts, called also antithesis, and the parts antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together, or also joined by a third

Contrary parts are put together as here The one has obtained glory, the other riches, both by my benefit

Antitheta are therefore acceptable, because not only the parts appear the better for the opposition, but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of enthymeme which leads to impossibility

Parts or members of a period are said to be equal, when they have altogether or almost equal number of syllables

Parts or members of a period are said to be like, when they begin or end alike, and the more similitudes, and the greater equality there is of syllables, the more graceful is the period

CHAPTER IX

OF THOSE THINGS THAT GRACE AN ORATION AND MAKE IT DELIGHTFUL

FORASMUCH as there is nothing more delightful to a man than to find that he apprehends and learns easily, it necessarily follows that those words are most grateful to the ear that make a man seem to see before his eyes the things signified

And therefore foreign words are unpleasant because obscure, and plain words because too manifest, making

us learn nothing new, but metaphors please, for they beget in us by the genus, or some common thing to that with another, a kind of science as when an old man is called stubble, a man suddenly learns that he grows up, flourisheth, and withers like grass, being put in mind of it by qualities common to stubble and to old men

That which a metaphor does, a similitude does the same, but with less grace because with more prolixity

Such enthymemes are the most graceful, which neither are presently very manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood,¹ but are comprehended while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before

The things that make a speech graceful are these antitheta, metaphors, and animation

Of antitheta and antithesis hath been spoken in the precedent chapter

Of metaphors the most graceful is that which is drawn from proportion

[Aristotle (in the twelfth chapter of his *Poetry*) defines a metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another, whereof he makes four kinds (1) From the general to the particular (2) From the particular to the general (3) From one particular to another (4) From proportion]

A metaphor from proportion is such as this A state without youth is a year without a spring

Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes, as he that said The Athenians poured out their city into Sicily, meaning, they sent thither the greatest army they could make, and this is the greatest grace of an oration

If therefore in the same sentence there concur both

¹ ἐπιπόλαια and ἀγνοούμενα

metaphor and this animation, and also antithesis, it cannot choose but be very graceful

That an oration is graced by metaphor, animation, and antithesis hath been said, but how 'tis graced is to be said in the next chapter

CHAPTER X

IN WHAT MANNER AN ORATION IS GRACED BY THE THINGS AFORESAID

'Tis graced by animation, when the actions of living creatures are attributed to things without life, as when the sword is said to devour

Such metaphors as these come into a man's mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another And the more unlike and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the metaphor

A metaphor without animation adds grace then, when the hearer find he learns somewhat by such use of the word

Also paradoxes are graceful, so men inwardly do believe them, for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another, and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a man's expectation

And paragrams, that is, allusions of words, are graceful if they be well placed, and in periods not too long, and with antithesis, for by these means the ambiguity is taken away

And the more of these, namely, metaphor, animation, antithesis, equality of members, a period hath, the more graceful it is

Similitudes grace an oration when they contain also a metaphor.

And proverbs are graceful because they are metaphors, or translations of words from one species to another

And hyperboles because they also are metaphors, but they are youthful, and bewray vehemence, and are used with most grace by them that are angry, and for that cause are not comely in old men

CHAPTER XI

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STYLE TO BE USED IN
WRITING AND THE STYLE TO BE USED IN PLEADING

THE style that should be read ought to be more exact and accurate

But the style of a pleader ought to be suited to action and pronounciation

Orations of them that plead pass away with the hearing

But those that are written men carry about them and they are considered at leisure and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined

Written orations appear flat in pleading

And orations made for the bar, when the action is away, appear in reading insipid ★

In written orations repetition is justly condemned

But in pleadings, by the help of action, and by some change in the pleader, repetition becomes amplification

In written orations disjunctives do ill, as I came, I found him, I asked him For they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by action

▶ But in pleadings 'tis amplification, because that which is but one thing is made to seem many

Of pleadings, that which is judicial ought to be more accurate than that which is before the people

And an oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to action than a judicial

And of judicial orations that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to few judges, and that ought to be more accommodate to action, which is uttered to many As in a picture, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be fine, so in orations, the farther the hearer stands off, the less need there is for his oration to be elegant

✦ Therefore demonstrative orations are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to read

CHAPTER XII

OF THE PARTS OF AN ORATION AND THEIR ORDER

THE necessary parts of an oration are but two propositions and proof, which are, as it were, the problem and demonstration

▶ The proposition is the explication or opening of the matter to be proved

And proof is the demonstration of the matter propounded

To these necessary parts are sometimes added two

other, the proem and the epilogue, neither of which are any proof

So that in some there be four parts of an oration the proem, the proposition, or (as the others call it) the narration, the proofs (which contain confirmation, confutation, amplification, and diminution), and the epilogue

CHAPTER XIII

OF THE PROEM

THE proem is the beginning of an oration and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it

In some kinds of orations it resembles the prelude of musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the tune they intended

In other kinds it resembles the prologue of a play that contains the argument

Proems of the first sort are most proper for demonstrative orations, in which a man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist upon, and for the most part 'tis better not, because when a man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, digression will seem variety, but if he had engaged himself, variety will be accounted digression

In demonstratives the matter of the proem consisteth in the praise or dispraise of some law or custom, or in exhortation, or dehortation, or something that serves to incline the hearer to the purpose

Proems of the second kind are most proper for judicial orations For as the prologue in a dramatic, and the exordium in an epic, poem, setteth first in few

words the argument of the poem, so in a judicial oration the orator ought to exhibit a model of his oration, that the mind of the hearer may not be suspended and, for want of foresight, err or wander

► Whatsoever else belongs to a proem is drawn from one of these four from the speaker, from the adversary, from the hearer, or from the matter

From the speaker and adversary are drawn into proems such criminations and purgations as belong not to the cause

To the defendant 'tis necessary in the proem to answer to the accusations of his adversary, that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his oration

But to the plaintiff 'tis better to cast his criminations all into the epilogue, that the judge may the more easily remember them

✦ From the hearer and from the matter are drawn into the proem such things as serve to make the hearer favourable or angry, attentive or not attentive, as need shall require

And hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good, to things that are of great consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight

But to make the hearer attentive is not the part of the proem only, but of any other part of the oration, and rather of any other part than of the proem For the hearer is everywhere more remiss than in the beginning And therefore wheresoever there is need, the orator must make appear both the probity of his own person and that the matter in hand is of great consequence, or that it concerns the hearer, or that it is new, or that it is delightful

He that will have the hearer attentive to him, but not

to the cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle without relation to the hearer, common and tedious

That the hearer may be favourable to the speaker, one of two things is required that he love him or that he pity him

In demonstrative orations, he that praises shall have the hearer favourable if he think himself, or his own manners, or course of life, or anything he loves, comprehended in the same praise

On the contrary, he that dispraises shall be heard favourably, if the hearer find his enemies or their courses, or anything he hates, involved in the same dispraise

The proem of a deliberative oration is taken from the same things from which are taken the proems of judicial orations For the matter of a deliberative oration needeth not that natural proem, by which is shown what we are to speak of, for that is already known the proem in these being made only for the speaker's or adversary's sake, or to make the matter appear great or little, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the plaintiff or defendant, or from the hearer, or from the matter, as in orations judicial

CHAPTER XIV

PLACES OF CRIMINATION AND PURGATION

(1) One is from the removal of ill opinion in the hearer, imprinted in him by the adversary or otherwise

(2) Another from this, that the thing done is not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable

(3) A third from the recompense, as I did him harm, but withal I did him honour

(4) A fourth from the excuse, as It was error, mischance, or constraint

(5) A fifth from the intention, as One thing was done, another meant

(6) A sixth from the comprehension of the accuser, as What I have done, the accuser has done the same, or his father, kinsman, or friend

(7) From the comprehension of those that are in reputation, as What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good men

(8) From comparison with such as have been falsely accused, or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright

(9) From recrimination, as The accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed

(10) From that the judgment belongs to another place or time, as I have already answered, or am to answer, elsewhere to this matter

(11) From crimination of the crimination, as It serves only to pervert judgment

(12) A twelfth, which is common both to crimination and purgation, and is taken from some sign, as Teucer is not to be believed, because his mother was Priam's

sister On the other side Teucer is to be believed, because his father was Priam's enemy.

(13) A thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixed, as to praise small things and blame great ones; or to praise in many words and blame with effectual ones, or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one

(14) A fourteenth, common both to crimination and purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact for he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense, and he that criminates, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said Diomedes chose him for his companion as the most able of the Grecians to aid him in his exploit but his adversary said he chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the honour.

CHAPTER XV

OF THE NARRATION

THE narration is not always continued and of one piece, but sometimes, as in demonstratives, interrupted and dispersed through the whole oration

For there being in a narration something that falls not under art, as namely, the actions themselves which the orator inventeth not, he must therefore bring in the narration of them where he best may As, for example, if, being to praise a man, you would make a narration of all his acts immediately from the beginning and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same acts again, while from

some of them you praise his valour and from others his wisdom, whereby your oration shall have less variety and shall less please

'Tis not necessary always that the narration be short
The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open

In the narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in oneself, and blameable in one's adversary, as I advised him, but he would take no counsel

In narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the hearer beside the purpose, as Ulysses in Homer, relating his travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers books, but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty verses, leaving out what might make her sad

The narration ought also to be in such words as argue the manners, that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not expressed, as Setting his arm a-kenbold, he answered, etc, by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered

In an oration a man does better to show his affection than his judgment that is, 'tis better to say, 'I like this', than to say, 'This is better' For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good But favour follows goodness, whereas wisdom procures envy

But if this affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did Antigone For when she had said she loved her brother better than her husband or children, she added 'For husband and children I may have more, but another brother I cannot, my parents being both dead' Or else a man must use this form of speaking 'I know this affection of mine

seems strange to you, but nevertheless it is such ' For 'tis not easily believed that any man has a mind to do anything that is not for his own good

Besides, in a narration, not only the actions themselves, but the passions, and signs that accompany them are to be discovered

And in his narration a man should make himself and his adversary be considered for such and such, as soon and as covertly as he can

A narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning

In deliberative orations, that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come, a narration, which is always of things past, has no place, and yet things past may be recounted that men may deliberate better of the future. But that is not as narration, but proof, for 'tis example

There may also be narration in deliberatives in that part where crimination and praise come in, but that part is not deliberative, but demonstrative

CHAPTER XVI

OF PROOF OR CONFIRMATION, AND REFUTATION

PROOFS are to be applied to something controverted

The controversy in judicial oration is Whether it has been done, whether it has been hurtful, whether the matter be so great, and whether it be just or no

In a question of fact, one of the parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the fact is no excuse), and therefore the fact is chiefly to be insisted on

In demonstratives, the fact for the most part is supposed, but the honour and profit of the fact are to be proved

In deliberatives, the question is Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so great, or whether it be just, or whether it be profitable

Besides the application of the proof to the question, a man ought to observe whether his adversary have lied in any point without the cause For 'tis a sign he does the same in the cause

The proofs themselves are either examples or enthymemes

A deliberative oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather examples than enthymemes

But a judicial oration, being of things past which have a necessity in them and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather enthymemes

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together, for they hinder one another's force by confounding the hearer

Nor ought a man to endeavour to prove everything by enthymeme, lest, like some philosophers, he collect what is known from what is less known

Nor ought a man to use enthymemes, when he would move the hearer to some affection For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the enthymeme or the affection that he would move

For the same reason, a man ought not to use enthymemes when he would express manners

But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his manners, he may withal use sentences

A deliberative oration is more difficult than a judicial, because 'tis of the future, whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known,

and because it has principles, namely the law, and it is easier to prove from principles than without

Besides, a deliberative oration wants those helps of turning to the adversary, of speaking of himself, of raising passion

He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise

And in demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his father, or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves

He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his manners, but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his manners For a good man is as acceptable as an exact oration

Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity please better than those that are direct or ostensive, because from the comparison of contraries, namely truth and falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear

Confutation is also a part of proof

And he that speaks first puts it after his own proofs, unless the controversy contain many and different matters And he that speaks last puts it before

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own oration by removing the objections of him that spake before For the mind abhors both the man and his oration that is damned beforehand

If a man desire his manners should appear well (lest speaking of himself he become odious or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtreaction, or speaking of another, he seem contumelious or scurrilous), let him introduce another person

Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with sentences, but such as have the same force As here is an enthymeme If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our fortune is entire And this is a sentence of equal force to it Wise men make peace while their fortune is entire

CHAPTER XVII

OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS

THE times wherein 'tis fit to ask one's adversary a question are chiefly four

(1) The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity he has already uttered one, and we would by interrogation draw him to confess the other

(2) The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question, then the interrogation will be seasonable, and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred without adding that proposition which is manifest

(3) The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself

(4) The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these In some sort 'tis so, In some sort 'tis not so

↑ Out of these cases 'tis not fit to interrogate For he whose question succeeds not is thought vanquished

To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief

To interrogations which we foresee tend to draw from us an answer contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our answer, presently give an answer to the objection which is implied in the question

And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we must, together with our answer, presently distinguish

Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse, and grave discourse is deluded by jests

The several kinds of jests are set down in the *Art of Poetry*

Whereof one kind is *ironia* and tends to please oneself

The other is *scurrility*, and tends to please others

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness, the former may become a man of good breeding

CHAPTER XVIII

OF THE PERORATION

THE peroration must consist of one of these four things

Inclining the judge to favour yourself or to disfavour your adversary For then, when all has been said respecting the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties

Of amplification or diminution For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion For when it is manifest of what kind and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said

Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his orations, and how, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken

CHAPTERS FROM THE RHETORIC

TRANSLATED BY T A MOXON

BOOK I CHAPTER I

- RHETORIC IS A COUNTERPART OF DIALECTIC BOTH ARE GENERAL IN THEIR APPLICATION THE TASK OF RHETORIC IS NOT TO PERSUADE BUT TO RECOGNIZE TOPICS FITTED TO PERSUADE

RHETORIC is a counterpart of Dialectic Both deal with such subjects as fall, in a sense, within the scope of all men's knowledge and belong to no distinct science Therefore all men have a share in both, for all men, up to a certain point, attempt to criticize and support an argument, and to conduct a defence and an accusation Most do this either without method or by a familiarity which is bred by habit Since, however, both these methods are possible, we can clearly reduce the processes to a system, for it is possible to investigate the causes of success in those who practise them with familiar knowledge, and those who practise them at random, and all men will admit that such an investigation is the function of an art

Hitherto, those who have compiled handbooks on Rhetoric have supplied but a trifling fragment of an art, for, whereas the proofs alone come properly within the sphere of an art, and everything else is a mere accessory, yet they omit all reference to enthymemes, which form the real substance of proof, and they concern themselves almost entirely with matters that are

outside the scope of the subject For prejudice, pity, and anger, and such emotions of the soul, have no relation to the subject, but only affect the mind of the jury Hence our rhetoricians would not have a word to say if the process of all trials were the same as exists to-day in some few states, and especially in those that are well-ordered All men either think that the laws ought to make such provision, or actually possess laws which make it illegal to introduce irrelevant matter, as for example in the Court of Areopagus And they are quite right in this view, for it is wrong to bias the juror by exciting him to anger or jealousy or pity To do so is like making the rule, which one is about to use, crooked It is clear, too, that the sole object of a pleader is to prove that the alleged fact either is, or is not, or that it has, or has not, taken place, and that its seriousness or triviality, its justice or injustice, except when the legislator has made a definition, must be determined by the juror himself, and not learnt from the disputing parties

It is best, then, for laws which are rightly framed, when possible, to define every detail and to leave as little as may be to the discretion of the jurors, for, in the first place, it is easier to find a single person or a few than to find many who are prudent and capable of enacting laws and passing judgment, in the second place, legislation is the fruit of long consideration, but decisions are given on the spur of the moment, so that it is hard for jurors to deliver a decision which is both just and expedient The most important point is this whereas the legislator's judgment is not particular, but refers to the future and to general matters, yet the member of the Assembly and the juror actually decide on matters of present and particular interest Hence motives of personal partiality and interests are often involved in

their judgment, so that they can no longer adequately examine the truth, but their judgment is clouded by their own pleasure or pain

To speak generally, then, we must limit the power of the judge as far as possible, but we are bound to leave him to decide whether an event has occurred or has not occurred, whether it will take place or not, whether a thing exists or does not exist, for no legislator can foresee these points. Since this is so, it is clear that those who lay down further rules embrace in their systems matters foreign to the issue, e.g. the proper contents of the exordium, the narration, and the other divisions of the speech, in so doing, their sole object is to produce a certain disposition in the judge, but they give no account of technical proofs, by which an orator may become a master of the enthymeme. Hence, although the same principles apply to political oratory and to that of the law courts, and although the subject of politics is nobler and more statesmanlike than the disputes of individuals, yet they ignore political oratory, and with one accord try to make an art of judicial pleading, because it is less worth their while to introduce irrelevant matter in political speeches, and politics, which involve wider interests than the law courts, offer fewer opportunities for deliberate deception. In politics, the judge decides questions which concern himself, so that the advocate has nothing to do except to prove that the facts are as he states, but in judicial cases this is not enough, and it is worth while to conciliate the audience; for, since they have no personal interest in the decision, the judges consider their own gratification and amusement, or surrender themselves to the pleaders instead of pronouncing judgment. Therefore, in many places, as I remarked before, the law forbids speakers to introduce irrelevant matter. But in political

speeches, the judges themselves keep a close watch on this

It is clear, then, that a technical system concerns itself with proofs. Now a proof is a kind of demonstration, for we are most ready to believe when we suppose that a fact has been demonstrated. And demonstration in rhetoric takes the form of an enthymeme, which is, generally speaking, the most convincing kind of proof. An enthymeme, again, is a form of syllogism, and it is a part of Dialectic, either taken as a whole, or in some of its branches, to deal with syllogism. It is therefore evident that the most competent judge of the materials and character of a syllogism is also likely to be the most perfect master of enthymemes, if he is acquainted with the proper subjects of enthymemes and the differences between them and logical syllogisms. For it belongs to the same faculty to distinguish between truth and the semblance of truth, and men have a natural aptitude for truth and generally attain it. It therefore follows that he who is apt in judging truth will also be apt in conjecturing what is probable.

It is evident, then, that all other writers on Rhetoric embrace in their system matters irrelevant to the issue, and it is also evident why they have an inclination towards forensic oratory. But Rhetoric is useful, first, because truth and justice are by nature better than their opposites, and therefore if decisions are made wrongly, it must be the speakers who are to blame for the defeat, and this result is reprehensible, secondly, there are some audiences whom it is not easy to persuade, even if you possess the most accurate scientific knowledge. For scientific argument requires instruction, but this cannot always be had, and then you are compelled to make your proofs and your arguments by the medium of everyday language, as I stated in the *Topics* on the method of

approaching the masses. Again, you must be able to argue on both sides of a case in Rhetoric as well as in syllogistic reasoning, not for the sake of doing both, for you must not convince men of what is wrong, but that the true state of the case may not escape us, and that if someone else argues wrongfully, you may be able to refute him. Of all the arts, Dialectic and Rhetoric alone are able to draw opposite logical conclusions. Both of them alike are able to take opposite sides. However, the underlying subject matter is not a question of indifference to them, but what is true and what is naturally good is, to speak simply, a more proper subject of logic and more convincing. Besides, it would be paradoxical if it were disgraceful to be unable to defend oneself by bodily strength, and not disgraceful to be unable to do so by argument, for argument is more characteristic of man than bodily force. If it be urged that an unjust use of such a mastery of argument would be hurtful, the same objection applies to all good things except virtue, and most of all to the most useful, as, for example, strength, health, wealth, and military skill. A just use of these advantages will be found to be highly advantageous, and an unjust one to be detrimental.

It is clear that Rhetoric does not belong exclusively to any particular kind of subject, but like Dialectic belongs to all, and that it is useful, and that its function is not to persuade but to examine the possible means of persuasion on each subject, in which respect it resembles all the other arts. It is not the function of medicine to bring the patient to perfect health, but to restore him to health so far as is possible. It is quite possible to treat properly such as are incapable of attaining perfect health. Further, it is clear that it is an attribute of the same art to discover the real means

of persuasion, and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and the apparent syllogism. The character of the sophist is determined, not by the mere faculty, but by the moral purpose. However, in the case of Rhetoric, the rhetorician will derive his title partly in reference to his knowledge, and partly in reference to his moral purpose, but in the case of Dialectic, the professor is called a sophist in reference to the moral purpose, and a dialectician in reference to his skill and not to his moral purpose.

BOOK I CHAPTER XI

PLEASURE IS DEFINED AS A CERTAIN MOTION OF THE SOUL AND A SUDDEN SETTLING OF THE SOUL INTO ITS NORMAL CONDITION. WHATEVER TENDS TO PROMOTE THIS CONDITION IS PLEASANT, AND WHATEVER TENDS TO DESTROY IT IS PAINFUL.

LET us define pleasure as a certain motion of the soul and a sudden and perceptible settling of the soul into its normal condition, and let us define pain as the opposite. Now if pleasure is such as I have described, it is clear that whatever is productive of the condition described is pleasant, and that whatever tends to destroy it or to produce the opposite condition is painful.

It follows, therefore, of necessity that to return to a natural condition is generally pleasant, and especially when the processes of nature have attained their natural development. Habits also are pleasant, for that which is habitual soon becomes, as it were, natural. Habit is a kind of second nature. 'Often' is akin to 'always'.

Nature claims the word 'always' and habit the word 'often' That also which is not compulsory is pleasant Compulsion is a violation of nature, hence compulsion is painful, and the saying is quite true

'Compulsion ever is a thing of pain'

Acts of attention and effort and concentration are painful, for they inevitably involve compulsion unless they have become habits Thus, habit creates pleasure But the opposites of these are pleasant, therefore, conditions of ease, of inactivity, of inattention, of amusement, of recreation, and of sleep are pleasant, as none of these are compulsory Everything which we instinctively desire is pleasant, for desire is an impulse to pleasure Some desires are rational and some irrational I define as irrational all those desires which men conceive from no mental idea These desires are described as natural, for example, bodily desires, such as hunger and thirst, the desire for food, and so on, or the desires of taste and sexual love, and in fact, all objects of touch, or of smell and hearing and sight Those are rational which spring from conviction, for there are many objects which we desire to see and to possess from hearing of them and from conviction ✓

Now, since pleasure consists in the perception of some emotion, and since imagination is a kind of faint perception, memory and hope are attended by a kind of imagination of the object of the memory and hope If this is so, it is clear that, since there is perception, pleasure also accompanies our memories and hopes It follows, therefore, that pleasure consists always either in perception, in reference to present time, or in memory, in reference to past time, or in hope, in reference to future time, for we perceive what is present, we remember what is past, and we hope for what is in the

future Now, the objects of memory are pleasant, not only when they were pleasant at the moment when they actually occurred, but sometimes if they were not pleasant, when they are followed by that which is noble and good Hence comes the saying

‘It is pleasant, when safe, to remember past ills’
and

‘After the trouble is ended, a man in his trouble
rejoices,
When he remembers the toils and the labours which
once he endured’

The reason of this is that there is a pleasure in the absence of evil The objects of hope are also pleasant, when by their presence they appear either to be a source of great delight or of great benefit, if that benefit be unaccompanied by pain In a word, whatever delights us by its presence, delights us mostly either through hope or through memory Hence there is pleasure also in being angry, as Homer wrote about anger

‘Since far sweeter it is than honey which flows as
a river’

For no one is angry with one who is already out of reach of revenge, or who is clearly his own superior in power, or if we are angry with them our anger is lessened Further, most desires have some attendant pleasure, for men feel a certain pleasure either from memory of the past or from hope of the future For example, fever patients experience pleasure from their thirst both by remembering past draughts, and by hoping for them in the future, and lovers take delight both in conversing and in writing, and in constantly composing poetry

about the object of their love, for in all such cases memory seems like actual sensation of the loved one. This is always the first symptom of love, to take pleasure not only in someone's presence, but in remembering him in his absence. Therefore, when his absence causes you pain, a kind of pleasure arises in your sorrow and lamentation, for though pain is felt at the separation, yet there is pleasure in remembering him and in almost seeing him and his actions and the kind of person he was. The following words are, therefore, appropriate:

'Such were his words and he roused the desire of tears in his hearers'

There is pleasure also in revenge, for where it is painful to fail, it is pleasant to succeed. Angry men are pained beyond measure in failing to be avenged, but they gain pleasure by the hope of it. Victory, too, is pleasant, not only to the contentious but to all men. The reason is that there arises an idea of superiority, which all men desire in a less or greater degree. Since victory is pleasant, all games must be pleasant whether they are contests of strength or of wit, as many opportunities of victory are provided in them—games of chess and tennis and dice and draughts. The same is true of serious amusements. Some become pleasant through habit, and others are pleasant from the first, as, for example, hunting, and every kind of field sport, for where there is rivalry, there is also a possible victory. For this reason debates in the law courts and in the schools are agreeable to those who have experience and skill.

Honour and good repute are most pleasant because an impression arises that one is a good kind of person. This is especially so when the speakers are considered truthful men. Such men are near neighbours rather

than those who live at a distance, and friends and fellow-citizens rather than strangers, and contemporaries rather than posterity, and wise men rather than fools, and many rather than few. Such men are more likely to speak the truth than their opposite. However, no one pays any attention to the respect or the opinion of those whom he regards with contempt, as, for example, children or animals, at least so far as their opinion is concerned, unless there is some further reason to do so.

A friend also affords pleasure. It is pleasant to love—no one, for example, is a wine-lover unless he delights in wine—and it is a pleasure to be loved. Here, too, an impression arises that one is a good man, a character which all men of perception desire. To be loved is to be esteemed for one's own sake.

Again, it is pleasant to be admired for the very sake of being held in honour.

Again, there is pleasure in being flattered and in flattering, for the flatterer is an apparent admirer and an apparent friend. There is pleasure also in constantly repeating the same actions, for habit is pleasant. Change also is pleasant, for change is a return to nature, constant uniformity produces an excess of the ordinary state. Hence, it is said 'Change is ever agreeable'. For this reason occasional visitors and occasional events are pleasant. It is a change from monotony, and that which occurs at intervals is rare. Learning, too, and admiration are generally pleasant. Admiration implies a desire to learn, so that the object of our admiration is desirable. Learning involves a settling into the course of nature. It is pleasant also to confer benefits and to receive them. To receive benefits means that we attain our desires, to confer benefits implies possession and superiority, both of which are

objects of desire. Because it is pleasant to confer benefits, it is also pleasant to set our neighbours up again and to make good deficiencies. Because learning and admiration are pleasant, it follows that the imitative arts are also pleasant, as, for example, painting, sculpture, and poetry, in fact, anything that is successfully imitated, even if the object which we imitate is not in itself pleasant. It is not the object which creates our enjoyment, but the inference from the copy to the original, and the result of this is that we learn. Catastrophes in drama and narrow escape from danger are pleasant, for these all excite admiration.

Further, since what is natural is pleasant and things that are related are naturally united, all things that are akin and alike are generally pleasant to each other, as, for example, man to man, horse to horse, and youth to youth. Hence arise the proverbs 'Fellows in age, delight', and 'Like to like', and 'Beast knows beast', and 'Birds of a feather flock together', and such like. As things which are alike and related are always pleasant to each other, and every man stands in this relation particularly to himself, it follows that all men are more or less lovers of self, for all these conditions exist supremely in reference to oneself. Since all men are self-lovers, they necessarily find pleasure in their own possessions—for example, their works and sayings. Therefore most men love flattery and affection and honour and their children, their children are their own works. It is pleasant also to supply the deficiencies of others, for then the work becomes our own.

Since there is great pleasure in ruling, the appearance of wisdom is also pleasant, for prudence is an attribute of rule, and wisdom is the knowledge of many marvels. Further, since we are almost all ambitious, it follows that there is pleasure in censuring others, and in dwelling

that point in which one appears to excel beyond measure, according to the words of Euripides

‘To that he presses on,
Thereto devoting each day’s greatest share,
Wherein himself he seems most excellent ’

Similarly, since amusement and relaxation and humour are pleasant, it follows that what is humorous is pleasant, whether persons or words or deeds. However, I have given a separate exposition of humour in my *Poetics*

BOOK II CHAPTER XII

THE PASSIONS AND HABITS OF THE YOUNG

LET us now describe the different varieties of character which depend on the emotions, the habits, the ages, and the fortunes of men By 'emotions' I mean anger, desire and the like, of which I have already spoken By 'habits' I mean virtues and vices These, too, I have discussed, and the objects at which they severally aim and the results which they produce By 'ages' I mean youth, middle age, and old age, and by 'fortune' I mean noble birth, wealth, and power, and the opposites of these, and indeed prosperity and adversity in general

The young are in character prone to desire and are apt to put their desires into practice Of bodily desires, they are most disposed to give way to those of love, and in this they are unrestrained They are fickle and fastidious in their desires, they are as impetuous as they are changeable in these Their wishes are keen but short-lived, like the hunger and thirst of the sick They are passionate, quick to anger, and apt to be guided by impulse They are slaves of their anger, for their ambition prevents them from enduring a slight, but they burst into resentment if they think that they are injured They are fond of honour, but still more fond of victory Youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority They are fonder both of honour and victory than of money They do not care about money because they have not yet experienced need,

as the saying of Pittacus about Amphiaraus expresses it. They are not censorious, but charitable, because they have not yet experienced much wickedness. They are credulous because they have not yet been often deceived. They are also sanguine, for they are heated by nature like drunken men—and furthermore, they have not yet often experienced failure. They live most in hope, for hope refers to the future and memory to the past, but for the young the future is long and the past is short. On the first day, memory does not exist, but hope is supreme. For the same reason they are easily deceived, for they are very ready to hope. They are also courageous, for they are passionate and sanguine, and the former quality forbids fear, and the latter encourages confidence, for no one is afraid when angry, and the hope of something good inspires confidence. They are also diffident, for they have as yet no independent idea of honour, but have always been trained in the school of convention. They are also high-minded, for they have never yet been humiliated by experience of life, but are inexperienced of constraint, and to have a great idea of one's own merits is high-mindedness. In action they prefer honour to expediency, for their life is guided by habit rather than by calculation, calculation deals with what is expedient, and virtue with what is honourable. The young, more than any, are devoted to friends, relatives, and companions, because they rejoice in being sociable and have not yet learnt to judge anything in relation to expediency, and apply this habit to their friends also. All their failings err on the side of excess and exaggeration, in spite of Chilon's maxim (*μηδὲν ἄγαν*), for they do everything in excess. They are excessive in their affections and dislikes and everything else. They think that they know everything and are emphatic in their statements, thus

is the reason why they do everything in excess Their offences take the form of insolence rather than malice They are compassionate, because they imagine all men to be good, or at any rate better than they are, for they measure their neighbours by their own guilelessness, and so they regard them as suffering evils which they do not deserve They are fond of laughter, and therefore witty, for wit is disciplined wantonness Such, then, is the character of the young

BOOK II CHAPTER XIII

THE PASSIONS AND HABITS OF THE AGED

ELDER men and those who have passed their prime have dispositions mostly composed of the opposite characteristics As they have lived for many years, and have often suffered from deception and error, and human affairs are often full of frailty, they are never positive in their assertions, and are apt to err on the side of deficiency They always 'suppose' and never 'know', and when they debate they always modify their statements with 'perhaps' and 'may-be', and always express themselves in this way and never positively They are also uncharitable, for want of charity is always to take the worst view of everything They are also suspicious from distrust, and their distrust is the result of experience For this reason they have no strong loves or hatreds, but according to the precept of Bias, they love as though about to hate, and hate as though about to love They are petty-minded because they have been humiliated by life, for their desires are set on nothing

great or striking, but only on the necessities of life. They are also ungenerous, for property is one of the necessities of life, and they have learnt from experience how hard it is to acquire it and how easy to lose it. They are cowardly and always apprehensive, for their disposition is the opposite of that of youth, since they have been chilled by years, but the young are fervent, so that old age has paved the way for cowardice, for fear is a chilling process. They are also fond of life, and especially so on their last day, since men desire what is absent and especially that which they lack most. They are also extremely selfish, for selfishness is a form of pettiness. A result of their selfishness is that they aim unduly at expediency rather than honour, for expediency is what is good to the individual, and honour is good in an absolute sense. They are shameless rather than susceptible to shame, since they care less for honour than expediency and despise appearances. They are lespondent from experience for most events in life are disappointing, at any rate, results rarely correspond to expectations, this fault is also partly due to cowardice. Their life is based on memory rather than on hope, for what remains of life is short and what has passed is long, and hope refers to the future, while memory is concerned with the past. This also explains their garrulity, for they are constantly reciting past events, and they rejoice in reminiscences. Their fits of anger are keen but impotent, and their desires have either passed away or grown feeble, so that they are neither subject to desire nor guided in their actions by it, but are influenced by gain. For this reason men of this age appear to be guided by self-control, for their passions have relaxed and they are slaves of gain. Their lives, too, are regulated by calculation rather than character, for calculation concerns itself with expediency, but character with

BOOK III CHAPTER X

ELEGANCIES AND BEAUTY OF STYLE

HAVING determined these points, I must consider the source of elegancies and beauties of style. The creation of them is the work of natural gifts or of training, but the present treatise is concerned with explaining them. Let me describe and enumerate them, and begin as follows.

To learn without trouble is naturally pleasant to all men, and as words have a certain significance, those which impart instruction to us are the most pleasant. Now obscure words are unintelligible, ordinary words we know already, but the metaphor is especially instructive. When the poet calls old age 'sere', he imparts instruction and knowledge by the use of a common genus, since both old age and a sere leaf are past their prime. Poetical similes produce the same effect, and a simile, if well constructed, has an appearance of elegance. As I have already stated, a simile is an extended metaphor, and therefore less attractive because it is less concise. It does not say that this is that, and therefore the mind does not dwell upon the point of comparison.

It follows also that enthymemes are elegant in style, if they convey to us rapid instruction. Therefore superficial enthymemes are not held in high esteem. By superficial enthymemes I mean those which are obvious at a glance and provoke no thought. Nor again are those esteemed highly which are obscure, but only those

which are understood at the moment of delivery, even if no previous knowledge of them existed, or where comprehension follows immediately. In this case a kind of instruction is imparted, but in the case of superficial enthymemes there is no instruction.

So far as the meaning is concerned, these are the kind of enthymemes which are held in esteem, in relation to style they are esteemed for their structure, if the sentence is expressed in the form of an antithesis—for example, 'Regarding the general peace of the world as a war against their own private interests'. The antithesis here is between war and peace. Again, they are esteemed for the words, if they contain a metaphor which is neither far-fetched (which is hard to follow) nor hackneyed (which produces no effect at all). Further, they should give a vivid impression, for the things described should be seen as actually occurring, not as unlikely to occur. We must therefore aim at three qualities: metaphor, antithesis, and vivid description.

Metaphors are of four kinds, but those esteemed most highly are founded on analogy, as when Pericles said that 'the removal of the youth who had perished in the war was like robbing the year of the spring'. So spoke Leptines about Sparta, that 'the Athenians must not stand by and see Hellas robbed of one of her eyes'. And when Chares was eager to have his accounts audited in the Olynthiac war, Cephisodotus said indignantly that he 'was throttling the people while endeavouring to present his audit'. Again, when on another occasion he was exhorting the Athenians, he bade them 'go to Euboea, taking as their commissariat the decree of Miltiades'. Again, Iphicrates showed his anger at the truce made by Athens with Epidaurus and the maritime states, by saying that they had 'stripped themselves of war's journey-money'. Peitholaus, too,

called the state-galley 'the people's cudgel', and Sestos 'the corn-chest of the Peiraeus'. And Pericles bade his countrymen remove Aegina 'the eye-sore of the Peiraeus'. And Moerocles said he was no worse a rogue than a certain respectable citizen whom he mentioned, as the other got thirty-three and a third per cent interest on his roguery, while he himself only secured ten per cent. There is also the iambic verse of Anaxandridas on certain daughters who were a long time in finding husbands.

'The maidens' marriage-date is overdue'

Polyeuctes, too, remarked about the paralytic Speusippus that 'he could not keep quiet though bound by fortune in the pillory of his disease'. Cephisodotus, too, used to call the trieremes 'painted millstones', and Diogenes the Cynic called the taverns the 'Attic mess-tables'. Aescion complained that the Athenians had 'emptied their city into Sicily' (which is a metaphor of a vivid character), 'so that Hellas cried aloud' (which also might be called a vivid metaphor). Cephisodotus also urged the Athenians 'not to convert their numerous mob-meetings into assemblies'. Similarly, Isocrates spoke of those who 'flock in masses at the public festivals'. There is another instance in the *Funeral Oration* (of Lysias), that 'there was good reason for Hellas to shear her hair over the graves of those who fell at Salamis, since her liberty lay buried with their valour'. If he had simply said that 'there was good reason to weep for the valour that lay buried with them', it would have been a vivid metaphor, but the combination of 'liberty' and 'valour' conveys a kind of antithesis. When Iphicrates said, 'The path of my argument leads through the very heart of the conduct of Chares', the metaphor involves an analogy, and the expression 'through the heart' brings the idea vividly

before us. Again, the phrase 'to invite dangers to come to the rescue of dangers' is a vivid metaphor. Similarly, Lycoleon said, when pleading the cause of Chabrias, 'not even awed by his bronze statue, the symbol of his supplication'. The metaphor applied to the needs of the moment, but was not permanent, though it was vivid enough. In the hour of his trial, the statue assumed a suppliant character, the inanimate object was endowed with life to call to mind the services he had rendered to the state. Again, 'making it their supreme study to be mean in spirit', is a metaphor, for study implies development. So is the saying that 'God kindled the mind to serve as the light of the soul'. Mind and light alike illuminate. Again, 'we are not composing but postponing our wars' is metaphorical. Both postponement, and the kind of peace referred to, are forms of delay. So also is the statement that 'the treaty is a far finer trophy than those won in the war'. The latter commemorate trifling and chance successes, but the former is a memorial of the whole war. Both are signals of victory. Finally, we may quote the statement that 'the cities pay a solemn account in the censure of the world'. For the 'account' or 'audit' is a legal damage.

DEMETRIUS ON STYLE

TRANSLATED BY T. A. MOXON

I

(1) As poetry is distinguished by metres, for example, the half-measure or the hexameter and so forth, so prose style is distinguished by what we call 'members'.¹ These 'members' might be said to give a rest to the speaker and his subject matter, they set constant bounds to his discourse, otherwise it would be tedious and boundless and would render him completely breathless.

(2) The function of these members is to mark the completion of an idea. Sometimes a member marks an idea as complete in itself, as, for example, when Hecataeus says at the beginning of his history 'Hecataeus of Miletus relates what follows'. A complete idea is comprised in a complete member, the two begin and end together. Sometimes a member does not comprehend a complete idea, but only a part of it, which is, however, complete in itself. As the arm is complete, and yet certain portions of it are also complete, for example, the fingers and forearm (for each of these parts has its own bounds and its own component parts), so a long idea, though complete, may contain a number of parts which are also complete themselves.

(3) For example, at the beginning of Xenophon's *Anabasis* the following instance appears 'Darius and Parysatis' down to the words 'but the younger was Cyrus' is all one idea. But its two members are each a

¹ 'Members', i.e. 'limbs', here 'clauses', whether they are short sentences or subdivisions of a complete sentence.

part of it, and each of them comprises an idea which is complete in itself. First 'Darius and Parysatis had sons'. The idea contained in this has a completeness of its own, namely, that sons were born to Darius and Parysatis. The same fact applies to the second member that 'the elder was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus'. The member, therefore, as I maintain, will comprise an idea which is either complete in itself or an essential part of a complete sentence.

(4) The members ought not to be made very long, in that case, the composition is lacking in symmetry or hard to follow. Even poetry does not exceed the measure of six feet, except on rare occasions. It is absurd that the metre should lack symmetry, and that when it ends we should forget when it began. Long members, then, are unfitting in prose because they lack symmetry, and short members are unfitting, as in that case the composition would be described as 'arid'. The following example is an illustration: 'Life is short, art is long, time is fleeting'. The composition seems curtailed and whittled down and unimpressive, because its component parts are brief.

(5) Sometimes a long member is not actually out of place, for example in sublime passages, as in the passage of Plato: 'As for this universe as a whole, God Himself in His course guides it and helps to make it revolve on its way'. The very language corresponds to the sublimity of the member. That is why the hexameter is called a heroic metre because of its length, and is suited to the story of heroes. Homer's *Iliad* would not be written fittingly in the brief measure of Archilochus, for example.

'Grief-stricken staff',

or

'Who led thy mind astray?'

nor in the measure of Anacreon, for example

、 'Bring me drink, bring wine, my page-boy'

Such a rhythm would be quite appropriate to a drunken old man, but not to a hero engaged in battle

(6) A long member might sometimes be appropriate, for the reasons mentioned. A short member might also be appropriate, as, for example, when our subject is small. Xenophon, in his description of the arrival of the Greeks at the river Teleboas, says 'This river was not great, but was beautiful'. The slightness and beauty of the river harmonized with the slightness and abruptness of the rhythm. If he had extended the idea thus 'This river fell short of the majority of rivers in size, but exceeded all in beauty', he would have failed in taste, and have been what is called 'frigid'. We must, however, speak about the frigid style later.

(7) Short members may also be used in a forceful style. A great idea comprised in a small compass is more forceful and vigorous. The Lacedemonians, therefore, are sparing of words because of their forcefulness. A command is concise and brief, and every master uses few words to a slave, but supplication and lamentation are lengthy. The Prayers are described in Homer as lame and wrinkled because of their slowness, that is their lengthiness, and old men are described as garrulous through weakness.

(8) An example of brevity in composition is seen in the message of the Lacedemonians to Philip 'Dionysius in Corinth'. The message appears much more forceful when thus briefly stated than if they had spoken at length and said 'Dionysius, who was once a great tyrant like yourself, now is living as a private citizen in Corinth'. When stated at length it resembles not a protest but a narrative, it suggests information, not intimidation.

Thus a spirited and vehement expression by being expanded is weakened. As wild beasts gather their limbs together for an attack, so language also should gather itself as it were into a coil to acquire force.

(9) Such brevity in composition is called a 'clause'. Clauses are defined as follows: 'A clause is that which is less than a member', for example, the words already quoted, 'Dionysius in Corinth', or the maxims of sages 'Know thyself', and 'Follow God'. Brevity is suitable to apophthegms and proverbs, and the contraction of a large idea into a small compass is a sign of superior wisdom, just as whole trees exist potentially in seeds. If a proverb were expanded, it would savour of instruction and rhetoric and be no more a proverb.

(10) From a combination of members and clauses such as these are formed what are called 'periods'. A period is a combination of members or clauses fitted together exactly to express the underlying idea, for example 'First because I thought it expedient for the State that the law should be cancelled, and secondly, for the sake of Chabrias' son, I complied with my clients' wish to plead their case to the best of my powers'. This period, which consists of three members, has a turning point and a concentration which keeps the end in view.

(11) Aristotle's definition of the period is as follows: 'A period is a mode of expression which has a beginning and an end'. This definition is good and appropriate. The term 'period' indicates that it began at a certain point and will finish at a certain point, and is hastening towards a definite goal, like runners who have started their race. In their case the goal is evident directly; they begin to run. Hence comes the term 'period', which is compared to journeys which are circular and move in an orbit. To speak generally, a period is

nothing but a certain combination of words. At any rate, if its circular form were removed and the order were changed, the subject-matter would remain unchanged, but the period would vanish. If, for example, you upset the period of Demosthenes which has been quoted, and paraphrase it thus 'I will support my clients, Athenians, Chabrias' son is dear to me, still more dear is the City, and it is only right for me to support it', the period ceases to exist any more.

(12) I will now describe the origin of the period. One kind of style is described as 'connected', as, for example, the style which is expressed by periods. It is seen in the style of the speeches of Isocrates and Gorgias and Alcidas. These speeches are expressed as completely by the medium of periods as Homer's poetry is by the medium of hexameters. The other style is called 'disconnected', and is resolved into members which are not clearly related, as, for example, the style of Hecataeus and the greater part of Herodotus, and all ancient writers in general. Here is an illustration. 'Hecataeus of Miletus tells his story thus. The events I describe are, as I think, true. The stories told by the Greeks appear to me to be numerous and ridiculous'. The members here seem to be flung upon one another in a heap and cast at random. They have neither connection nor mutual support nor do they help one another, like the members in periods.

(13) The members of periods are like stones which support and uphold vaulted ceilings, periods in the loose style are like stones which are merely flung in a heap and not fitted together.

(14) Therefore the style of the ancients possesses a quality of polish and compactness, like the early statues, the art of which seemed to consist of simplicity and plainness. The style of the later writers seems to

resemble the works of Pheidias, and possesses a combination of sublimity and accuracy

(15) I think that speech should neither consist wholly of a string of periods, like that of Gorgias, nor be wholly disconnected like that of the ancients, but should possess a combination of both qualities. Thus it will blend elaborateness with simplicity, and by this combination it will be pleasing, being neither too untrained nor too artificial. When men produce a series of periods, their heads begin to reel like drunken men, and their hearers are sickened by the unconvincing style, and then they anticipate the conclusions of the periods, and bawl them out before the speaker.

(16) Smaller periods consist of two members; the largest consist of four. Anything that exceeds four would go beyond the scope of the symmetry of a period.

(17) Some periods have three members, some have only one, and these are called 'simple periods'. When the member has length and is rounded off at the end, then it becomes a period with one member, as for example 'The following is the result of the inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus', or again 'Lucid utterance throws a flood of light on the minds of hearers'. The simple period possesses two properties, length and its final rounding. Without either of these it is not a period.

(18) In composite periods the last member should be longer than the others, and should, as it were, contain and include them all. Thus the period will be stately and impressive, ending with an impressive and long member. Otherwise it will seem abrupt and halting. The following is an example of this 'Nobility consists not in noble words, but in speaking first and then in translating one's words into action'.

(19) There are three kinds of periods, which belong to history, dialogue, and rhetoric. The historical

period is neither too artificial nor too careless, but a blend between the two. It must not appear rhetorical and unconvincing because of its artificial style, but be impressive and straightforward by reason of its simplicity as in the passage 'Darius and Parysatis' down to the words, 'but the younger was Cyrus'. The pause in the period suggests a stable and sure conclusion.

(20) The rhetorical period has a compact and well-ounded form, it requires a terse utterance, and a gesture that harmonizes with the rhythm. For example: 'First because I thought it expedient for the State that the law should be cancelled, and secondly, for the sake of Chabrias' son, I complied with my clients' wish to plead their case to the best of my power'. From the very opening such a period has something compact about it, something which shows that it will not finish tamely.

(21) The period of dialogue is one which is as yet unformed, and simpler than that of history. It hardly reveals the fact that it is a period. For example 'I went down yesterday to the Peiraeus', down to the words, 'since they were now celebrating it for the first time'. The members are flung at random one on another, as though the style were loose. On reaching the end, we scarcely realize that the passage was a period. The period of dialogue must be midway between the 'dis-connected' and 'connected' style and possess elements belonging to both. Such are the various kinds of periods.

(22) Periods are also found of antithetical members, which are either antithetical in matter, as, for example, 'Sailing over the mainland and marching over the sea', or both in language and in matter, of which the same period is an instance.

(23) There are also periods antithetical in words

alone, as in the contrast between Helen and Heracles 'The life of the one he filled with toil and hazard, the form of the other he rendered an object of admiration and contention' These sentences are contrasted, article to article, conjunction to conjunction, and like to like, in fact, the whole sentence is one long antithesis 'Filled' and 'rendered', 'toil' and 'admiration', 'hazard' and 'contention', are all opposed to each other, point to point, and like to like

(24) There are members which, though not antithetical, give an appearance of antithesis because of their antithetical form There is for example, the playful passage in the poet Epicharmus. 'At one time I was among them, at another time I was with them' The same idea is repeated without any change, but the form of the sentence which imitates antithesis appears to mislead He perhaps adopted this form in a humorous manner and to poke fun at rhetoricians

(25) Members are sometimes closely similar, this similarity may be at the beginning, as, for example 'Open to bribes they were and open to prayers uttered in words' It may be at the end of the clause, as is seen in the opening words of the *Panegyric* 'I have often wondered at the men who convened the assemblies and instituted the games' The similarity may take the form of equality of members, when the members contain an equal number of syllables, as in Thucydides 'Those who are asked do not disown the work, and those who inquire do not censure the task' This passage shows an equality of members

(26) The homoeoteleuton is used when sentences end in a similar way They may end with identical words,⁴ as in the passage 'In his lifetime you spoke of him disparagingly, now after his death you write of him disparagingly' They may, again, end with the same

syllable, as in the passage already quoted from the *Panegyric*

(27) The use of such members is beset with danger. Such a device is unsuitable to a forceful speaker. The artifice and elaboration spoils the vigour. Theopompus makes this clear to us. In accusing the friends of Philip, he says 'Men-slayers they were by nature, and men-defilers by habit. They were called companions, they were really courtesans'. The balance and antithesis of the members spoils the vigour through ill-applied artifice. Indignation does not require artifice, the style should be natural in such denunciations, and the words should be simple.

(28) Such a device is useless in a forceful passage, as I have shown, it is also useless in passionate argument and in character-sketches. Passion and character-study are essentially simple and natural. In Aristotle's treatise *On Justice* someone was bewailing the fate of Athens. If the speaker were to say 'What city did I ever capture from my enemies as great as my own city which they destroyed?' he would have spoken with tragedy and pathos. If, however, he balances his clauses and says 'What city of my foes have I won, like to my own which is undone?', believe me he will excite neither pathos nor pity, but only what is called 'laughter with tears'. To misapply artifice in this way in a pathetic passage is like the proverbial 'jest in a house of mourning'.

(29) The device is, however, useful on certain occasions as in the passage of Aristotle 'I came from Athens to Stageira because of the great king, and from Stageira to Athens because of the great storm'. If you remove the second 'great' you will at once lose the charm of the passage. Such members help to make the sentence impressive, as do also the many antithetical passages

of Gorgias and Isocrates This will do, then, for similarity of language

(30) An enthymeme differs from a period, because the period is a rounded composition, whence it derives its name, while the enthymeme contains its force and cohesion in the sense The period comprehends the enthymeme, as also it comprehends all other subject-matter, but the enthymeme is an idea expressed either controversially or as a logical sequence

(31) The following is an illustration If you resolve the structure of the enthymeme, you destroy the period, but the enthymeme remains intact If, for example, you were to resolve the following enthymeme of Demosthenes 'Had one of them been convicted, you would not have made these proposals If, therefore, you are now convicted, no one else will make such proposals'—if you resolve it thus 'Make no allowance for those who make unconstitutional proposals If they were continuously checked, the defendant would not now be making these proposals And in the future no one else will do so if he is now convicted', you discard the circular form of the period, but the enthymeme remains unchanged

(32) To speak generally, an enthymeme is a syllogism in a rhetorical form, but a period is not a syllogism, it is a mere combination of words Periods are found in every form of composition, for example, in introductions Enthymemes are not found everywhere The enthymeme is, as it were, an appendage, but the period is found anywhere The enthymeme is an informal syllogism, but the period has no syllogistic character, whether formal or informal 4

(33) The enthymeme, then, happens also to be a period, because its structure is that of a period, but a period is not an enthymeme For example, a building happens

to be white if that is its colour, but whiteness is not an essential characteristic of a building. This, then, will suffice for the difference between an enthymeme and a period.

(34) Aristotle defines a member thus 'A member is one of the two parts of a period'. He then adds the rider 'A period is sometimes simple'. By using the phrase 'one of the two parts' in his definition, he clearly wishes to confine a period to two members. Archdemus combined the definition of Aristotle and its rider and produced a clearer and more perfect definition 'A member is either a simple period or a part of a composite period'.

(35) A simple period has already been described. When he says that a member is part of a composite period, it is clear that he is not confining the period to two members, but will admit three or even more. I have treated of the measure of a period, and now ask leave to speak of the kinds of style.

II

(36) The simple kinds of style are four 'plain', 'stately', 'polished', and 'powerful', there are also those which combine these characteristics. They are not combined indiscriminately, but the 'polished' is combined with the 'plain' and the 'stately', the 'powerful' style with both alike. The plain and stately alone will not combine, but they are the opposites and contraries of one another. For this reason some maintain that these are the only two kinds of style, and that the rest lie midway between them, they regard the polished as nearer to the plain, and the powerful as nearer to the stately, they maintain that the polished

style contains something slight and smart, while the powerful style contains something massive and great

(37) Such an argument is absurd. Apart from the opposite kinds of style mentioned, we see all mingled together. For example, the epic verse of Homer and the prose of Plato and Xenophon and Herodotus and many other writers combine much stateliness with much power and grace. The number of kinds, then, will be such as I have described. Each one, however, will have an appropriate diction somewhat as follows.

(38) I will begin with stately style, which is now called erudite. Steliness requires three qualities: idea, expression, and suitable composition. Aristotle tells us that the paeonian rhythm produces a stately diction. The paeon has two forms, the one begins a sentence and its first syllable is long, and it ends with three short syllables, as, for example, 'prīmārily'. The closing paeon is opposite to the other, and it begins with three short syllables and ends with one long syllable, for example, *Ārābīā*.

(39) In the stately style, the members should begin with the opening paeon and the closing paeon should follow. The following passage of Thucydides will serve as an example.

ἡρξάτο δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐξ Ἀιθιοπίας

Why, then, did Aristotle advise this arrangement of syllables? It is because the member must have a stately opening and a stately ending. This will be so if we begin on a long syllable and end on a long syllable. Long syllables tend naturally to be stately. A long syllable at the beginning produces an explosive effect, and at the end it leaves the hearer on a stately note. At any rate, we all remember the opening and closing words particularly and are moved by them. This

applies in a less degree to the middle words which are, as it were, concealed and unobtrusive

(40) This fact can be seen in Thucydides Throughout it is almost always the long syllables in his rhythm that create his stately diction It may be said that this arrangement of words is the chief, if not the only factor, in producing the stateliness of language which prevails in his writings

(41) We must however realize that even if we cannot actually place the two kinds of paeon one at each end of the members, we shall be able at any rate to invest our composition with a paeonic character, as, for example, by beginning with long syllables and ending with long syllables This is what Aristotle actually seems to recommend, though for the sake of precision he has defined the two kinds of paeon So Theophrastus put forward the following member as an example of the stately style

τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἄξια φιλοσοφούντων.

This does not actually consist of paeons, but it has a paeonic character The paeon, however, should be introduced into prose, as it is a mixed rhythm and safer, it derives its stateliness from the long syllable, and its prose character from the short syllables

(42) Of other metres, the heroic is solemn and unsuitable for prose It is sonorous and unrhythmical, as the following quotation shows

ἦκων ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν χώραν

The repetition of long syllables goes beyond the prose rhythm

(43) The iambic is a weak metre and resembles ordinary conversation At any rate, people often talk unconsciously in iambs But the paeon strikes the

happy mean between the two and is, as it were, compounded of both. The paeonic rhythm may thus be adopted in stately passages.

(44) The length of members also creates grandeur, as in the passages. 'Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians,' and 'Herodotus of Halicarnassus thus gives the result of his inquiries.' Suddenly to pause on a short member diminishes the impressiveness of the passage, even though the underlying sentiment or the actual words be stately.

(45) Statelyness is also produced by adopting a rounded period, as is seen in Thucydides. 'The river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the land of the Agrianians and Amphilochians, and passes by the town Stratos and discharges into the sea close to Oeniadae, and surrounds the town with a marsh, makes it impossible to land an army against it in winter, because of the water.' The whole of the statelyness of this passage is due to its rounded period, and to the fact that it scarcely allows a pause either to the writer or to the reader.

(46) If you were to break up the passage and write it thus: 'The river Achelous flows from Mount Pindus. It discharges into the sea at Oeniadae. Before it empties, it makes a marsh of the plains of Oeniadae, with the result that the water forms a protection and defence against attacks of the enemy in winter'—if you were to paraphrase the passage thus, you would have many resting places in the narrative, but you would rob it of its impressiveness.

(47) As frequent inns make long journeys short, and lonely paths give an impression of length even on short roads, so the same effect can be seen in periods.

(48) Often roughness of composition produces stately-

ness, for example 'Ajax the mighty always was aiming at Hector the bronze-helmeted' It is true that the collision of letters is harsh to the ear, but still the very excess emphasizes the greatness of the hero Smoothness and softness of sound have not much place in stately fiction, except on rare occasions Thucydides everywhere avoids smoothness and evenness of composition He always resembles a man who is stumbling, like those who tread rugged paths, when, for example, he says 'The year, as was agreed, happened to be free from disease, so far as all other maladies were concerned' It could have been expressed more easily and more pleasantly as follows, that 'the year was free from disease, in respect of other maladies', but it would have lost its stately character

(49) As a rough word produces an impressive effect, so does the arrangement of the words Instances of rough words are 'bawling' for 'shouting', and 'bursting' for 'moving' Thucydides uses all these, approximating his language to his composition, and his composition to his language

(50) Words should be arranged thus First should come those words that are not very brilliant, second and last the more brilliant words In this way we shall hear the first word with an idea of brilliance, and what which follows as more brilliant still Otherwise we shall seem to have become tame, and, as it were, to have fallen from strength to weakness

(51) An example is found in Plato 'When you allow any one to play music and to flood your soul through your ears' The second phrase is far more arresting than the former Again, he says later 'When he never ceases to flood your soul with it, but charms you like a serpent, he then causes it to melt and waste away' The words 'melt' and 'waste away' are more expressive

and more like poetry. If he had reversed the order, the word 'melt' would have appeared weaker, coming afterwards.

(52) Homer, too, in the Cyclops passage, continually heightens his expression and seems to mount up, rung by rung, as for example. 'For he was not like to any man that lives by bread, but like a wooded peak', and the further phrase, 'or towering hill', and 'standing out above other hills'. The former words, impressive though they are, seem less and less important, as those which follow them are more impressive still.

(53) The connective particles should not correspond exactly, for example, the particles *μέν* and *δέ*. Such exactness is unimpressive. They should be used with a certain measure of looseness, as Antiphon somewhere says 'The island (*μέν*) which we own, is easily seen (*μέν*) even from a distance, for it is lofty and rugged. The parts of it which are useful (*μέν*) and arable are small, but its uncultivated (*δέ*) parts are many, in spite of its small size'. The particle *μέν* occurs three times, and is followed by a single *δέ*.

(54) It often happens, however, that connectives which follow in close succession make even small things great, as in Homer the names of Boeotian cities, trivial and unimportant though they are, acquire a majesty and a stateliness through a close succession of conjunctions, as in the passage 'Both Schoinos and Scolos and deep-spurred Eteonos'.

(55) Expletive particles must not be used as empty appendages, and as mere additions or excrescences, as people are apt to use the particles *δή* and *νυ* and *πρότερον*, in a pointless way—but only if they contribute something to the stateliness of the passage.

(56) So in Plato 'Lo (*μέν* *δή*) mighty Zeus in heaven', and in Homer 'But when (*δή*) at last they reached the

ford of the fair-flowing stream' The particle placed at the beginning and separating what follows from what precedes produces a stately effect To amplify the beginning produces something impressive If he had merely said, 'When they reached the ford of the river', he would have seemed unimpressive, as though he were simply describing a single incident

(57) This particle is also employed often in pathetic passages, as in the passage when Calypso says to Odysseus 'Son of Laertes, of the seed of Zeus, Odysseus of many devices, so is it indeed (87) thy wish to get thee home to thine own dear country' If you remove the particle, you will remove the pathos also To sum up, as Praxiphanes says, these particles were employed instead of lamentations and groans, such as 'ah me!' and 'alas!' and 'what is this!' As he himself says, the words *καί νύ κε* were appropriate to those uttering lamentations, and they suggest the idea of a groan

(58) Those, he says, who introduce these particles pointlessly are like actors who employ a word here or a word there without meaning, as, for example, if one were to say

'This country is Calydon in the land of Pelops

(Ah me!),

And its fertile plains are across the straits

(Alas!)

As here the words 'ah me!' and 'alas' are dragged in pointlessly, a similar effect is produced by an indiscriminate use of particles

(59) Well, then, the particles introduce a stately effect into the composition, as has been remarked, but the figures of speech are themselves also a form of composition To say the same words twice, whether by

repetition or by echoing or by paraphrasing, seems to be merely a matter of arrangement or composition. We must arrange suitable words for each character. For example, to the stately style, which is our present subject, we must assign the following.

(60) First of all, 'anthyphallage', as in Homer. 'Now the two rocks—one indeed reaches the broad heaven' Thus expressed, it is far more stately, with the case attracted, than if he had said 'Of the two rocks, one indeed reaches the broad heaven' That is the normal construction. Everything normal is unimpressive, and therefore fails to attract admiration.

(61) Nireus was unimportant and his following still more so, for it consisted of three ships and a few men. Yet Homer magnified him and multiplied his following by using a twofold figure of speech, combined from 'repetition' and 'disjunction'. He says 'Nireus brought three ships, Nireus the son of Aglaïa, Nireus who was the fairest of men'. The repetition of language leading to the same name Nireus and the disjunction of phrases, suggest a large number of followers, although his forces consist only of two or three ships.

(62) Though the name of Nireus is barely mentioned once in the poem, we remember him as well as we remember Achilles and Odysseus, although they are referred to in almost every line. The reason for this is the power of the figure of language. If he had said 'Nireus the son of Aglaïa brought three ships from Syme', he would appear to have passed over Nireus in silence. As in feasts, a few dishes arranged in a certain way seem many, in language the same result is seen.

(63) Often the opposite device to disjunction, namely, 'continuation', produces an impressive effect. For example 'The expedition was joined by Greeks and Carians and Lycians and Pamphylians and Phrygians'.

The repetition of the same conjunction suggests an unlimited force

(64) The expression 'arched, foam-crested' by reason of the omission of the conjunction 'and' causes a greater increase of dignity than if Homer had said, 'arched and foam-crested'

(65) Dignity in composition is obtained by a variation of case, as in Thucydides 'And he was the first to step on the gangway and he fainted away Having fallen in the ship's bows, etc.' This gives a much greater dignity of style than if he had adhered to the same case and said 'He fell on the ship's bows and lost his shield'

(66) Tautology also produces stateliness, as in Herodotus 'In some places in the Caucasus huge serpents were found—huge and many' The repetition of the word 'huge' lends majesty to the style

* (67) The figures used should not be numerous This shows lack of taste and an unevenness of style However, the early writers employed many figures in their compositions, and yet were more natural than those who avoid them altogether, because they introduce them in an artistic way

(68) With regard to hiatus of vowels, opinions differ Isocrates and his pupils avoided it Other writers introduce hiatus on all occasions and indiscriminately It is a mistake to produce a noisy sentence, by a careless and indiscriminate collision of vowels—such action suggests a jerky and disjointed style—nor is it right completely to avoid a sequence of vowels Perhaps the composition will thus be smoother, but it will be lacking in taste, and altogether dull, when deprived of the distinct musical quality which is produced by hiatus

(69) We must consider first that constant usage brings vowels together in words, although it aims, above all,

at a musical effect, as in *Αἰακός* and *χίων*. Many words are actually composed of vowels alone, as *Αἰαίη* and *Εὖιος*, and yet these are no more unpleasing than any others, but perhaps are even more melodious.

(70) Poetical words such as *ἥελιος*, where the division and the hiatus are intentional, and *ὀρέων*, are more musical than *ἥλιος* and *ὀρών*. The division and hiatus produce an effect of singing. Many other expressions when united by elision are unmelodious, but when divided by a hiatus are more melodious—as, for example, *πάντα μὲν τὰ νέα καὶ καλὰ ἐστίν*. But if you elide the vowel and say *καλᾶσιν*, the effect is less melodious and more commonplace.

(71) In Egypt the priests sing hymns to the gods by employing the seven vowels and uttering them in succession, the sound of these letters produces a musical effect on the hearer which serves instead of flute and lyre. To remove the hiatus would be to remove entirely the melody and harmony of the language. But it is not the right time now, perhaps, to enlarge on this theme.

(72) In the stately style an effective hiatus can be produced by a conjunction of long vowels, as *λᾶν ἄνω ὤθεσκε* ('he heaved the rock upwards'). The line is lengthened by the hiatus, and suggests the mighty heaving of the stone. The same applies to the expression of Thucydides, *μὴ ἥπειρος εἶναι* ('so as not to be joined to the mainland'). Diphthongs, also, may be united to diphthongs *ταύτην κατώκησαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστῆς δὲ ἐγένετο* ('The Corcyraeans colonized it—but its founder was').

(73) The conjunction, then, of the same long vowels and of the same diphthongs provides a stately effect. But the conjunction of different vowels also produces not only stateliness, but variety, through a multiplicity of sound, for example, *ῥῶς*. Again, in the word

οἷν there is not only a difference of letters, but also of breathings, one being rough and the other smooth, so that there are many contrasts

(74) In songs, also, trills are formed from one and the same long vowel, as though songs were piled upon songs. Therefore, the conjunction of similar sounds will form a small part of a song, or a trill. So much, then, for hiatus and the way in which it can contribute to stateliness of style

(75) Stateliness is also derived from the subject-matter, should the theme be some eminent and famous land or sea battle, or deal with heaven or earth. He who hears some dignified theme is at once deceived into thinking that the narrator is using dignified language. But we shall not take into account the subject of the narrative so much as its character. It is possible, by describing eminent themes in an unimpressive way, to rob the subject of its dignity. Wherefore they say that certain powerful writers, like Theopompus, describe powerful subjects in a feeble manner

(76) The painter Nicias was wont to say that the chief feature of the painter's art was to choose some impressive subject for his picture, and not fritter away his art on minute objects like little birds or flowers. He should choose cavalry or naval battles, in which he could show horses in all their movements—some galloping, some rearing, some sinking to the ground, and many riders shooting and many falling to the ground. He was of the opinion that the very choice of subject was a feature of the painter's art, just as the selection of legends is a feature of the poet's art. Nor is this surprising if in literature also stateliness is derived from a choice of stately themes

(77) But in this style, the diction must be outstanding and uncommon and distinctive. Thus it will

acquire dignity, but the usual and familiar diction, though always clear, excites contempt

(78) In the first place, then, metaphors must be introduced. These impart a charm and dignity to the composition. They should not, however, be too numerous, in that case we shall find ourselves writing dithyrambic poetry and not prose. Nor should they be far fetched, but derived from similar ideas close at hand. For example, there is a resemblance between a general, a pilot, and a chariot-driver. These are all rulers. It will, then, be quite safe to describe the general as 'the city's pilot', and conversely to describe the pilot as 'the ship's ruler'

(79) However, not all metaphors are interchangeable, like those just mentioned. The poet was justified in calling the mountain-slope 'Ida's foot', but he would not be allowed to describe a man's foot as his 'mountain-slope'

(80) When the metaphor seems dangerous, let it be changed into a simile. This will be safer. A simile is an extended metaphor. For example, you may take the metaphor, 'The poet Python, pouring down on you in a flood', and amplify it by saying 'pouring down on you *like* a flood'. So the figure has been converted into a simile, and it is safer. The former version is a metaphor and more dangerous. For this reason Plato seems to incur a certain amount of risk in his preference for metaphors to similes. Xenophon, however, prefers similes.

(81) In Aristotle's opinion, the best form of metaphor is the so-called 'active' metaphor, when inanimate objects are introduced as active, and endowed with life, as, for example, the passage about the shaft 'The keen arrow leapt forth among the crowd on eager wings', and the passage, 'arched, foam-crested'. All such

expressions, as 'foam-crested' and 'on eager wings', suggest living activities

(82) Some ideas, however, are described in metaphors with greater clearness and exactness than if exact language had been used—as the phrase 'the battle shivered' No one, by paraphrasing this into exact language, could give a truer or clearer impression The clash of spears, and the subsequent gentle and continuous murmur, is described as the battle shivering At the same time the poet has, so to speak, utilized the active metaphor, mentioned above, when he described the battle as shivering like a living creature

(83) We must, however, remember that some metaphors conduce to paltriness rather than to dignity, although the metaphor is employed to add weight, as in the line

'All around, the great sky sounded a trumpet peal'

The poet should not have compared the sound of the sky to the sound of a trumpet, unless you defend him by saying that the great sky resounded as if the whole sky was one great trumpet

(84) Let us consider another kind of metaphor which conduces rather to paltriness than dignity In our metaphors we must compare small objects to greater ones and not the opposite Xenophon says, for example 'When a portion of the company surged out, on the march' He compared a deviation from the ranks to a surging sea, and so applied his metaphor If, on the contrary, he had spoken of the sea as 'deviating from its ranks', the metaphor would be, perhaps, inappropriate, ~~it~~ would certainly be utterly paltry

(85) Some writers secure their metaphors by the addition of epithets, when they seem dangerous, Theognis, for example, applies the expression, 'a chordless lyre', to a bow when he describes someone shooting

The term 'lyre' seemed a dangerous metaphor to describe a bow, and so it was rendered secure by the epithet 'chordless'

(86) Custom, which teaches us all else, is especially a teacher of metaphors. It applies metaphors almost universally, and yet it escapes notice by using safe metaphors. It speaks of a 'silvery' voice and a 'keen man, and a 'rough' nature, and a 'lengthy' orator, and so forth. These metaphors are applied with such good taste that they seem to be literally true.

(87) I lay down the criterion for the use of metaphors in composition, viz 'art, or nature, established by custom'. Custom describes some ideas so well by metaphor, that we no longer need literal words, the metaphor remains, usurping the place of the original word—as, for example, 'the eye of the vine' and other similar expressions.

(88) The parts of the body are called σφόνδυλος (spine), κλείς (collar-bone), and κτένες (fingers). These are not metaphors, but similes, because they resemble, respectively, a spindle, a key, and a comb.

(89) When we convert a metaphor into a simile, in the manner described, we must aim at conciseness and at adding nothing but the word 'like', otherwise it would not be a simile, but a poetical comparison. Xenophon, for example, says 'Like a noble dog which bounds recklessly upon a boar', or 'Like a horse, free from control, which gallops and prances over the plain'. These have no longer any resemblance to similes, but rather to poetical comparisons.

(90) We must not lightly introduce these comparisons into prose, nor without great care. So much, then, for our sketch of the metaphor.

(91) We must also introduce compound words, but must not coin them after the fashion of dithyrambic

poets, such as, 'God-portented wanderings', or 'the fire-speared host of the stars' We must use words which resemble those composed by established custom To give a general rule, I make custom the criterion of all word-coming This gives us 'law-makers' and 'master-builders', and is a sure guide in framing many other such words

(92) However, the compound word will possess a distinction and dignity from its formation, and at the same time a kind of conciseness A word will be substituted for the whole phrase, as if, for example, you speak of 'food-convoy' instead of the convoy of food It is much better thus Perhaps also, conversely, dignity may be attained by resolving the word into a phrase, as if you substitute 'the convoy of food' for 'food-convoy'

(93) A word is substituted for a phrase when, for example, Xenophon says that it was impossible to catch a wild ass unless the horses stood at intervals and hunted it by relays The word used for 'by relays' suggests that those behind were pursuing, while the others rode in front to meet them, so that the ass was caught between the two parties We must, however, be careful to avoid making many compound words This practice travels beyond the scope of prose composition

(94) We define words which are coined, as those which are spoken in imitation of some emotion or action, as, for example, 'hiss' or 'lapping'

(95) These create an impression of stateliness because they resemble the sound, and especially by their novel character

† The writer does not use existing words, but words which are coming into existence while he writes At the same time, the creation of a new word, as though it were already familiar, seems a sign of poetic inspiration

As a word-maker the poet seems to resemble those who first gave names to objects

(96) We must aim first at clearness and familiarity in the coining of words, next at similarity with words already existing, so that we may not seem to introduce Phrygian or Scythian terms into a Greek vocabulary

(97) We must either coin words for objects that have no names, like the man who described kettledrums and all other effeminate instruments as *κιναιδίαι*, and, like Aristotle, who invented the term 'elephant-driver', or when a writer invents words on the analogy of existing words, like the man who described someone sculling a boat as a 'sculler', or Aristotle, who described a man who was alone as a 'solitary' (*αὐτλήτης*)

(98) Xenophon says that the army 'bravoed', indicating by the word the cry 'bravo', which the army kept on raising. However, the practice of coining words is dangerous, as I said, even for the poets themselves. The compound word may be described as a kind of coined word. Everything which is compounded is undoubtedly formed from some existing matter

(99) Allegory is also an example of sublime language, this particularly applies to threats, as when Dionysius said that 'the cicadas shall sing to them from the ground'

(100) If he had spoken plainly and said that he was about to ravage Locris, he would have appeared more irritable and less impressive. As it was he used the allegory to veil his language. Anything spoken in a riddle is more alarming, and different people interpret it in different ways. What is clear and evident is apt to excite contempt, just like men who have stripped themselves naked.

(101) For this reason the mysteries are veiled in allegories in order to inspire awe and horror, and to

suggest darkness and night In fact, the allegory suggests darkness and night

(102) But in this figure, too, we must beware of excess, in order that our language may not become a riddle, as in the description of the doctor's cupping-glass 'I saw a man welding with fire brass upon a man' The Lacedaemonians often used allegorical language to inspire fear, like the message to Philip, 'Dionysius in Corinth', and many other similar sayings

(103) Conciseness in some cases has a stately effect, and above all, aposiopesis Some ideas seem more impressive when not uttered but merely hinted at In some cases, on the other hand, it has a feeble effect Repetition is impressive, as when Xenophon said 'The chariots were borne on their way, some through the very ranks of their friends, and some through the very ranks of their enemies' This is much more effective than if he had said, 'through the ranks both of their friends and of their enemies'

(104) Often an indirect expression is more effective than a straightforward sentence For example 'Their idea was that of driving into the ranks of the Greeks and cutting their way through', instead of saying, 'They intended to drive and cut their way'

(105) Assurance and apparent harshness of sound is also helpful Harshness often adds dignity, as in the line 'Ajax the mighty always against Hector' The conjunction of the two words *Aἶας* and *αἰέν* does much more to indicate the greatness of Ajax than does his shield of seven hides

(106) The so-called 'epiphonema' can be defined as 'diction that embellishes' It is the most dignified figure in compositions Diction sometimes helps the idea, and sometimes embellishes it In the following instances it helps it 'Even like the hyacinth which on

the mountains shepherds tread underfoot' The expression which follows, adds embellishment 'And on the ground the purple flower lies' In this there is a clear addition to the preceding lines of grace and beauty

(107) Homer's poetry, too, is full of these figures for example 'Out of the smoke have I laid them by since they are no longer like those which Odysseus left behind him of old, when he went to Troy Moreover, some God hath put into my heart this other and greater care, lest perchance when ye are heated with wine, ye set a quarrel between you and wound one the other' Then he adds the epiphonema 'For iron of itself draws a man thereto'

(108) To speak generally, the epiphonema is like the embellishments of wealthy men, cornices, triglyphs, and broad purple bands It is, as it were, itself a sign of wealth in language

(109) The enthymeme, too, might seem to be a kind of epiphonema, but really it is not It is introduced, not to add grace, but to convince, it is, however, appended like an epiphonema

(110) Similarly, a proverb resembles an epiphonema, which is added to a previous statement, but it is not the same figure In fact, it often comes first, but it may take the last place like an epiphonema

(111) The line 'Fool that he was, he was not destined to escape the evil fates', is not an epiphonema either It is not added at the end, nor does it add grace, nor does it resemble an epiphonema in any respect, but rather an address or a taunt

(112) Poetical language in prose lends sublimity, as is clear even to a blind man However, some introduce a bold imitation of the poets, or rather they do not imitate them, but borrow from them, like Herodotus

(113) Thucydides, however, even if he transfers a

phrase from a poet, treats it in an individual way and makes what he has borrowed his own. For example, the poet, in speaking of Crete, said 'There is a land called Crete in the midst of the wine-dark sea, a fair land and a rich and sea-begirt'. He used the word 'sea-begirt' in reference to its size. Thucydides, however, thinks it a fine ideal for the Sicilian Greeks to live in harmony, since they inhabit one land and that 'sea-begirt'. Although he uses exactly the same terms, 'land' for 'island' and 'sea-begirt', nevertheless his language seems different, because he did not apply these words to the size of the island, but to its unity. This, then, is enough on the stately style.

(114) As there are base qualities which correspond to noble qualities—for example, recklessness corresponds to courage and shame to awe—so the forms of style have certain perverted forms which correspond to them. First I will speak of a style which borders on the stately. Its name is 'frigid', and Theophrastus defines it thus: 'A frigid style is that which transcends the appropriate language', as, for example, 'An unbased cup is not entabled', by which the writer means that 'a cup without a base is not set upon the table'. The triviality of the object does not admit of so extravagant a style.

(115) Frigidity, like stateliness, rests on three qualities. One of these is the idea, as in describing the Cyclops throwing a stone at the ship of Odysseus, a certain writer said that while the stone was hurtling through the air, there were goats grazing on it. The frigidity arises from the exaggeration and the impossibility of the idea.

(116) Aristotle says that frigidity arises in diction from four causes, namely [in the use of rare words, and in the misuse of epithets] as when Alcidas speaks of 'damp sweat', or in the use of compound words, when

the combination of expressions is formed in a dithyrambic way, as when someone coined the word 'lonely-wandering', or any other such extravagant phrase. Frigidity is also found in metaphors, as 'His condition was trembling and pallid'. These, then, are the four errors of diction which cause frigidity.

(117) Composition is frigid when it has a bad rhythm or none, and when it consists wholly of long syllables, like the following *ἦκων ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν χώραν, πάσης ἡμῶν ὀρθῆς οὔσης*. The passage is lacking in prose-value and in security through its succession of long syllables.

(118) Frigidity also results from introducing continuous metrical passages, as some writers do, when their constant succession brings them to notice. Poetry out of place is just as frigid as verse which does not scan.

(119) To speak generally, frigidity is somewhat akin to boastfulness. The braggart claims qualities as his own which do not belong to him, and the writer who uses exaggerated language over trifles is like one who boasts about trifles. The proverbial 'embossed pestle' suggests the literary style which expresses trivial matters in exaggerated terms.

(120) Still, there are those who claim that it is right to use a grand style for small themes, and claim that this is a sign of surpassing power. I, for my part, agree with the orator Polycrates who eulogized [Thersites] as he might have done Agamemnon by the use of antithesis, metaphor, and all the adjuncts of eulogy. He was writing in jest and not in earnest, the very exaggeration of style is a form of jest. Let him have his jest, I say, but we must always preserve propriety, by this I mean that style must be appropriate to its subject—a modest style to a modest subject, and a grand style to a grand subject.

(121) Xenophon is an example when he speaks of

the lovely little river Teleboas 'This river was not great, but was beautiful' By the conciseness of his sentence and by the position of the conjunction $\delta\epsilon$ he almost brought its smallness before our eyes Another writer, when writing of a river similar to the Teleboas, said 'It finds its source in the hills of Laurium and discharges into the sea', as though he were describing the cataracts of the Nile or the estuary of the Danube All such passages are described as frigid

(122) Small subjects are magnified in another way, not by inappropriate language, but sometimes from sheer necessity, for example, when we wish to extol a general who has had some trifling success, as though he had performed some brilliant achievement, or when we justify the ephor at Sparta who scourged a man for playing ball in an elegant way instead of the local way Though the offence sounds but trifling, we invest it with a tragic importance We say that those who pass over small misdeeds are opening the door to graver crimes, and that the right principle is to inflict severe punishment on little misdemeanours, and not wait for graver ones We shall add the proverb, 'The beginning is half the deed', or say that this is suitable to a small crime, and in fact, that no crime is small

(123) In this way it may be regarded as lawful to magnify some trifling success, but not in an unbecoming manner As what is great can often be usefully belittled, so some small achievement can be extolled

(124) Hyperbole is the most frigid of all figures of speech It takes three forms It may be expressed in the form of a comparison, as in the phrase 'swift as the winds in running', it may claim superiority, as 'whiter than the snow', or it may claim the impossible, as 'She smote the sky with her head'

(125) Every hyperbole is impossible Nothing could

be whiter than snow, and nothing could run as fast as the winds. This third hyperbole, however, is specially described as 'impossible'. Therefore, every hyperbole seems to be an example of frigidity because it seems impossible.

(126) The reason why comic poets make a frequent use of this figure, is that they introduce laughter from an impossible situation. For example, a comic poet, in describing the voracity of the Persians, said, in exaggerated terms 'They voided whole plains', and 'they carried oxen in their jaws'.

(127) To the same class of language belongs the phrase 'balder than a cloudless sky', and 'healthier than a pumpkin'. The expression of Sappho, 'more golden than gold', is hyperbolical and impossible, but it possesses charm by its very impossibility and is not frigid. In fact, the most admirable quality of the divine Sappho is that she makes use of language which is naturally dangerous and intractable, and produces an effect of charm. This, then, will suffice for frigidity and hyperbole. I will now proceed to speak of the polished style.

III

(128) The polished style possesses grace and brightness. Some ornaments of language, those of the poets, are somewhat stately and impressive, others are more commonplace and amusing, resembling jests, like those of Aristotle, Sophron, and Lysias. The following witticisms 'It would be easier to count her teeth than her fingers'—referring to an old woman, and 'For every blow he deserved, he received instead a shilling'—these and such as these are practically gibes, and differ little from comedy.

(129) But the passages from Homer 'And the Nymphs too sport at her side, and Leto rejoices in her heart', and 'Easy to distinguish is she, and yet all of them are fair'—these passages are ornaments, which are described as impressive and stately

(130) Homer uses them sometimes to make a passage telling and effective. When he is playful he is the more awe-inspiring, and he seems to have been the first to invent graces of languages that inspire awe. For example, in dealing with that very repulsive person the Cyclops, he says 'Noman I will eat last, the rest I will eat first'. This is the guest-present of the Cyclops. By no other detail does he depict him in such a horrible light, neither when he devours the two companions, nor by his cave-door, nor by his club, as he does by this witticism.

(131) Xenophon also uses a similar device, and he derives startling effects from ornaments of style, for example, in the passage about the armed dancing-girl. When one of his characters was asked by the Paphlagonian whether women also shared in their warfare, he replied 'Yes, for they actually put the great king to flight'. The startling effect produced by this expression is twofold. First, they were not accompanied by mere women, but by Amazons. The second was at the expense of the great king, who was so feeble as to be routed by women.

(132) The ornaments of style, then, have such varieties and such characteristics. Sometimes they are derived from the subject-matter, for example, the gardens of the Nymphs, wedding lays, love stories—in fact, the whole of Sappho's poetry. Such themes, even on the lips of a Hipponax, possess a charm, and the subject itself has a brightness of its own. No one could sing a wedding-lay when overcome with anger, no trick of

style could transform Love into a Fury or a Giant, or convert laughter into tears

(133) There is, then, a kind of ornament in the subject-matter, sometimes the style, too, adds further grace, as, for example. 'Even as when the daughter of Pandareus, the brown-bright nightingale, sings sweet in the first season of the spring' In this passage we have the charming little bird, the nightingale, and the charming season of spring But the idea has been embellished greatly by the style, and acquires an additional charm by the application of the words 'brown-bright' and 'daughter of Pandareus', to a bird These additions belong to the poet

(134) Often the subject-matter is naturally unattractive and even repulsive, but a touch of brightness is added by the writer This invention, it seems, was due first to Xenophon He took the unattractive and repulsive person of Aglaidas, the Persian, and derived from him an amusing jest 'It is easier', he said, 'to extract fire than laughter from you'

(135) This is the most striking ornament, and it depends entirely on the writer The subject-matter was naturally repulsive and opposed to charm, namely Aglaidas But he shows that humour can be extracted from even such material as this, that one can, so to speak, be cooled by heat and warmed by cold

(136) Now that we have pointed out the different kinds of ornaments of style, what they are, and where they are found, it remains to state the sources from which they are derived They consist, as we have seen, partly in diction, and partly in subject-matter We will now show the sources of each, and will begin with diction

(137) At once we find that the first ornament is due to conciseness, when the same theme treated at length

lacks grace A rapid touch lends charm, as in Xenophon 'This fellow really has no connection with Hellas, for I saw him with both his ears pierced, like a Lydian And so it was' The closing words 'And so it was', impart charm from their conciseness If the passage had been expanded thus, 'What he said was true It was clear that his ears had been pierced', it would have been a bald narrative and no ornament of style

(138) Often, also, two ideas are expressed in one to produce a graceful effect, as, for example, in reference to the sleeping Amazon, a writer said 'Her bow lay strung, and her quiver full, her shield beneath her head Their girdles they loose not' Herein is expressed both the custom about the girdle, and the fact that she did not loose her girdle Two facts are conveyed in one expression This conciseness gives a certain amount of polish

□ (139) A second source comes from the order The same words when placed first or in the middle lack charm, but at the end they are graceful For example, Xenophon says of Cyrus 'He presents him with gifts, a horse, a robe, a necklet, and a promise that his land shall be no more ravaged' In this list, the last is the one that creates its charm, the promise that his land shall be no more ravaged The gift is strange and unique The position of the clause constitutes the charm If it had been placed first, it would have possessed less charm—if, for example, he had said 'He presents him with gifts, a promise that his land shall be no more ravaged, and a horse, a robe, and a necklet' As it is, he begins with the usual gifts, and adds last the strange and unusual gift, and it is from these facts that the charm is derived

(140) The ornaments derived from figures of speech are clear and seen most frequently in Sappho, an

instance of this is 'redoubling' A bride somewhere is addressing her maidenhood, and says 'Maidenhood, Maidenhood, whither dost thou go and desert me?' And the Maidenhood uses the same figure in her reply 'No more will I come to thee, no more will I come' A greater charm is conveyed than if the words had been spoken once and the figure had not been used And yet the repetition seems to have been invented to express power But Sappho uses the most powerful figures to impart grace

(141) Sometimes also she imparts grace by 'anaphora', as in the passage on the evening star 'Evening star, thou bringest all things, thou bringest the sheep, thou bringest the goat, thou bringest the child to his mother' Here, too, the grace is derived from the word 'bringest', which is repeated with the same application

(142) Many other instances of graceful sentences could be quoted They are derived from diction or from metaphor, as in the passage about the cicada. 'From beneath its wings it pours forth a clear strain, to whatever fiery height it soars and warbles'

(143) They are derived also from compound words of the dithyrambic style

'Pluto, lord of black-pinioned creatures,
Do this strange deed, before their wings'

These are playful expressions, suitable to comedy and satyric drama

(144) Another source of ornament is derived from unusual words, as when Aristotle says 'The more lonesome I am, the more I become a myth-lover' Coined words are another source, Aristotle says in the same passage 'The more selfful and lonesome I am, the more I become a lover of fables' The word 'lonesome' is of a rather

unusual nature, and the word 'selfful' is coined from 'self'

(145) Many words derive their charm from being applied to a particular thing. For example 'This bird is a flatterer and a knave'. Here the charm is due to chiding the bird as if it were a man, and the fact that unusual terms were applied to the bird. Such ornaments of style are due simply to the diction.

(146) Another source of literary polish comes from the use of comparison, as, for example, when Sappho is speaking of a leading man, and says 'He was distinguished like the Lesbian bard amid aliens'. Here, grace rather than stateliness is derived from the comparison. She might have said, 'distinguished like the morn as compared with the stars', or 'as the sun excels in brilliance', or any other more poetical expressions.

(147) Sophron, too, uses the same device when he says 'Behold, all the leaves and twigs wherewith the children are pelting the man, 'tis, my dear, even as they say the Trojans pelted Ajax with mud'. Here the comparison possesses grace, and playfully suggests that the Trojans were children.

(148) Sappho derives a charm of her own from recantation, when she says something and recants and, as it were, repents. For example 'Ye builders, raise the hall on high. A bridegroom is entering like unto Ares—far taller than a man of high stature'. She checks herself, as it were, as she had used an impossible exaggeration. No man is as tall as Ares.

(149) Similar is the passage in the story of Telemachus 'Two hounds were chained before the portal. I would tell you even the names of the hounds. But what, pray, would these names mean?' The writer here cleverly changed his mind and suppressed the names.

(150) Charm is derived from quoting another writer, as when Aristophanes twits Zeus for not striking the

wicked with thunder, and says· 'His own temple he strikes, and "Sunium the headland of Athens"! ' It seems that it is no longer Zeus who is exposed to ridicule, but Homer and the line of Homer By this device the charm is heightened.

(151) Some allegories have also a touch of the commonplace, as, for example 'Delphians, your bitch is bearing a child' Also Sophron's reference to the aged men· 'Here I too, among you, whose hair is white like mine, wait to put out to sea till the voyage be fair, yea since for such as us the anchors are already weighed' He makes other similar allegories about women, on the matter of fish 'Razor-fish and shell-fish whose flavour is sweet, delicacies dear to widows' Such writings savour of low comedy and are in bad taste

(152) Charm comes also from the unexpected—like the saying of the Cyclops, 'Noman will I eat last' Such a guest-gift was wholly unexpected, both by⁷⁰ Odysseus and by the reader Aristophanes, also, in reference to Socrates, says 'He melted the wax and then took a compass, and from the wrestling-school he stole a coat'

(153) Here the charm is derived from two sources Not only was the closing idea quite unexpected, but it had no connection in sense with what preceded Such a lack of sequence bears the name 'griphos', and an illustration is seen in Boulias, the prater in the play of Sophron All his remarks are wholly unconnected Menander's prologue to his play *Messenia* gives another instance

(154) Often a similarity of members adds polish, as in the saying of Aristotle 'I came from Athens to Stageira, because of the great king, and from Stageira to Athens, because of the great storm' By closing both the members on the same word he adds a polish

to his style If you remove the word 'great' from each member, you will also remove the polish

(155) Sometimes veiled reproaches have an appearance of grace, for example, in Xenophon, Heracleides, who was in company with Seuthes, went up to his fellow-guests and persuaded them each to offer to Seuthes whatever gift he had This passage shows a kind of grace, and veiled reproaches as well

(156) I have described the polish which is connected with the style, and also the sources whence it is derived Subject-matter also creates polish—for example, by the use of proverbs A proverb possesses a natural charm Sophron speaks of 'Epioles who strangled his father' Elsewhere he says 'He painted the lion from the claw He polished the ladle He divided the cummin'¹ He uses two or three proverbs in succession, that his writings may overflow with charm In fact, it is almost possible to make a complete collection of all proverbs from his dramas

(157) The timely introduction of a fable adds grace It may be a well-known fable, as when Aristotle says of the eagle 'It dies of hunger because its beak grows bent It suffers such a fate because once when human it injured a guest' Here he uses a well-established and familiar fable

(158) We also invent many appropriate fables which have a bearing on our subject A certain writer quotes the legend 'The cat pines and grows with the waning and waxing of the moon' He then adds the following, from his own invention 'Hence arises the fable that the moon gave birth to the cat' There will not only be found charm in the art of invention, but the fable itself suggests a pleasing idea that a cat is the moon's child

¹ Proverbial expression implying (a) large conclusions from slender premises, (b) wasted labour, (c) nigardliness

(159) Charm often arises from a groundless fear, as when someone is filled with needless terror at a strap, mistaking it for a serpent, or a baking-pan, which he imagines to be a chasm in the ground. Such situations belong rather to comedy.

(160) Similes, too, possess charm, as when you compare the cock to a Persian, because he has an upright crest, or to the great king, because he is clad in purple, or because we leap up at the note of the cock, as we would leap in alarm at the voice of the king.

(161) Exaggeration possesses a charm, especially in comedies. Every exaggeration expresses an impossibility, as when Aristophanes, describing the voracity of the Persians, says 'They baked oxen in bread-pans, instead of loaves'. Another refers to the Thracians, and says 'Their king Medoces carried a whole ox in his jaws'.

(162) The following expressions belong to the same class 'healthier than a pumpkin', and 'balder than the blue sky', and the words of Sappho, 'more melodious than a shepherd's pipe, more golden than gold'. Ornaments of style like these are derived from exaggeration.

(163) The ridiculous differs from the graceful, first in its subject-matter. Gardens of nymphs, loves, are the material that supplies grace, but they do not provoke mirth. They will differ as much as Thersites and Eros.

(164) They differ also in the very language. Graceful language is accompanied by ornament, and is expressed by the medium of beautiful words, which do most to add charm, for example 'The myriad-garlanded earth is brodered like a robe', and the 'brown-bright nightingale'. The ridiculous is composed of ordinary commonplace language, like the sentence. 'The more selfful and lonesome I am, the more I become a lover of fables'.

(165) Again, the ridiculous loses its character when adorned by style and becomes impressive instead. However, the graces of style must be used with moderation. To embellish the ridiculous is like beautifying an ape.

(166) Therefore, when Sappho sings of beauty she chooses beautiful and sweet words—she does the same when she sings of loves and of spring and of kingfishers. Every lovely word is woven into the fabric of her poetry, some words too she created herself.

(167) Very different is the way in which she jeers at the uncouth bridegroom and the porter at the wedding. She uses everyday language, and the diction of prose rather than of poetry, so that these poems are more suitable to recite than to sing. They will not accommodate themselves to the chorus or the lyre, unless you could find a conversational chorus.

(168) They differ most in their purpose. The graceful writer and the provoker of mirth have wholly different aims. The one wishes to gladden, and the other to be laughed at. They differ also in their results, which are in the latter case, laughter, and in the former, praise.

(169) They differ also in province. It is true that the arts of ridicule and charm are found combined in the satyric drama and in comedy. Tragedy, however, often calls in the aid of grace, but mirth is repugnant to tragedy. No one could imagine tragedy indulging in jest. He who does so will be a writer of satyric drama and not tragedy.

(170) Even sensible men will sometimes use jests in season, for example, at feasts and drinking-parties, and in reprimanding those given to luxurious living. The phrase, 'far-shining meal-bag' may be used of the poetry of Crates, or you might read 'A eulogy of

lentils' at a gathering of prodigals This method is rather that of the Cynics Such jests as these assume the role of *maxims* and *proverbs*

(171) An indication of character is seen in a man's jests—if they be playful or scurrilous Someone once stopped the spilling of wine with a remark about 'Peles instead of Omeus' (i.e. mud instead of wine) However, a laboured punning on names indicates an ill-bred and undisciplined nature

(172) In nicknames a kind of comparison is suggested To play on names requires a ready wit Men will use the following kind of comparisons. 'Egyptian clematis' for a tall, dark man, 'a marine sheep' for a fool on a voyage They may indulge in such expressions as these, but for the most part, we had better shun such gibes as we would vulgar abuse

(173) So-called 'beautiful words' create a graceful style Theophrastus defined them thus 'A word is beautiful if it suggests some agreeable sound or sight, or inspires some noble thought'.

(174) Such words as these suggest agreeable sights 'rose-tinted', 'flower-laden hue' Sights which bring pleasure to the eye, are beautiful also to the ear The following are agreeable in sound 'Callistratos, Annoon' The double 'l' and the double 'n' have an attractive sound

(175) To speak generally, it is for the sake of euphony that the Attic writers add an 'n' to the accusatives of Demosthenes and Socrates. There are words which suggest some ennobling thought, such as 'the ancients', which has a finer ring than 'the men of old'. The word implies a higher esteem.

(176) Musicians speak of a smooth word, a rough word, a compact word, and a heavy word A smooth word is composed either wholly or principally of vowels,

for example, *Αἶας* An example of a rough word is *βέβρωκεν* The very roughness is due to the fact that the sound imitates the action A compact word is a blend of the two, and in it vowels and consonants are squally combined

(177) Weight consists of three qualities breadth, length, and formation *βροντά*, for example, is substituted for *βροντή* The first syllable gives it roughness, the second gives it length, because of the long vowel, and breadth because of the Doric vowel The Dorians always broaden their vowels, and therefore no one wrote comedies in Dorian dialect, but only in keen Attic The Attic dialect has something concise and popular and suitable to such pleasantries

(178) This digression must be forgiven Of the words mentioned we may use only those which are smooth as possessing polish

° (179) Polish is derived also from the composition It is not easy to describe how this is attained None of the former writers have treated of polish in composition Still, I must try to describe it as best I can

(180) No doubt a pleasant and graceful effect will be produced if we adapt a metrical system wholly or partially to our composition This should not be done in such a way that the actual metres may be apparent when the sentences are joined, but if they were dissected and analysed, then we ought to be able to detect the existence of metre

(181) If there be but a suggestion of metre, it will produce the same pleasing effect Imperceptibly the charm of such a pleasant practice steals into our mind Such a system is used mostly by the Peripatetics and by Plato and Xenophon and Herodotus, perhaps also Demosthenes uses it in places, but Thucydides never

(182) An example can be quoted from Dichaearchus, who says 'In Elia on Italian soil, an aged man advanced in years' The close of each of the members has a metrical cadence, but the metre is disguised by the way in which the phrases are joined and linked, yet a very pleasing effect is produced

(183) Plato often acquires polish by his very rhythm, which is somehow different, and has neither weight nor length The former suits the plain and powerful style, the latter belongs to the stately style His members produce a gliding effect, they are neither wholly metrical nor unmetrical, as, for example, in his description of music, opening with the words. 'A moment ago I was saying'

(184) Again, 'In warbling and beneath the spell of music's charm he wholly spends his life', and again, 'First if he had any spirited vein in his soul, like steel he tempers it' Such a passage has polish and a clear element of music Should you alter the order and say, 'he tempers it as if it were steel', or 'he spends the whole of his life', you rob the passage of its grace, which consists in the very rhythm It certainly consists neither in the sentiment nor in the language

(185) In speaking, too, of musical instruments, again he blends his words in a graceful fashion He says in the context 'The lyre is left to you in your state' If you invert the order and say 'in your state it is left', you will be practically altering the rhythm He adds 'And further in the fields the shepherds would have some manner of pipe' By extending and lengthening his sentence, he produces a very pleasing imitation of the note of the pipe You will see this clearly if you invert the order of this passage also and then recite it

(186) I have said enough about the appearance of polish, when due to the order of the words,

for the subject is difficult I have spoken, too, of the features of the polished style, and shown on what it depends and whence it is derived As there was a frigid style which corresponded to the stately style, so also there is a similar perversion corresponding to the polished style I apply to this the popular name of 'affectation' This, too, like the rest, falls into three headings

(187) First it depends on the sense, as when a writer described the centaur as 'riding on his own back', and when Alexander was meditating on competing in the races at Olympia, someone said 'Alexander, race along thy mother's name' (i.e. Olympias)

(188) Secondly, it may be found in the words, as 'the fragrant-hued rose was smiling' The metaphor of 'smiling' is applied most unsuitably, and the compound word 'fragrant-hued' would not be used even in poetry by a writer of sound judgment Again, a writer said 'The pine was piping softly to the gentle breezes' This will suffice, then, for diction

(189) Thirdly, it is found in an anapaestic rhythm, which most nearly resembles broken and undignified metres, like those of Sotades, with their effeminate ring The following are examples 'Having dried it with heat, let it lie', and 'As he brandishes ashes of Pelion upwards his shoulder above', instead of 'Brandishing the Pelion ash over his shoulder' The line seems to be transformed, like those people in fable who are changed from men to women So much, then, on the subject of affectation

IV

(190) In treating of the plain style we might, perhaps, introduce certain commonplace themes which are well adapted to this style—for example, the passage in *Lysias* 'I have a little two-storied cottage, in which the upper story exactly matches the lower'

The style must be wholly normal and familiar. The more commonplace the theme, the more familiar is the style. Unfamiliar and far-fetched diction belong to the stately style.

(191) Compound words are out of place. These, too, belong to the opposite style, so are coined words, in fact all which produce stately language. Above all, the language must be clear. Clearness depends on a number of qualities.

(192) First it requires normal words, and secondly, a use of conjunctions. Asyndeton and loose connection is always lacking in clearness. It is uncertain where each member begins because of the loose connection. This is seen in *Heracleitus*. His loose style is the principal cause of his obscurity.

(193) Unconnected style is, perhaps, more suitable for oratory, it is also called theatrical, because loose sentences encourage acting. A literary style, on the other hand, is agreeable to read. This style is connected and secured by conjunctions. For this reason actors prefer *Menander*, because his style is often disjointed, while *Philemon* appeals to readers.

(194) A single example will serve to show that looseness of style suits the stage. 'I received thee, I bore thee, I nurse thee, my child'. The sentence thus disconnected will compel you to act the passage, whether you will or no, because of its broken character. If you

join the sentences and say, 'I received thee and I bore thee and I nurse thee', you will lose much feeling by the conjunctions. Any passage devoid of feeling is unsuited to the stage.

(195) There are also other dramatic factors. For example, in Euripides, Ion seizes the bow and threatens the swan which was bespattering the statues. Many movements are suggested to the actor by Ion dashing for the bow, and turning his face up to the sky while he reasons with the swan. In fact, the whole character of the scene is constructed to meet the actor's needs. However, we are not now discussing drama.

(196) Clear writing must avoid ambiguity, it should adopt a figure known as 'epanalepsis' or repetition. 'Epanalepsis' consists of repeating the same conjunction in the course of a long passage, for example 'All the deeds that Philip did, and how he subdued Thrace and took the Chersonese and besieged Byzantium, and refused to restore Amphipolis—this I will pass over'. The repetition of the conjunction goes a long way to remind us of the opening, and recalls us back to the beginning of the paragraph.

(197) For the sake of lucidity we must often repeat ourselves. What conciseness gains by being attractive it loses by being obscure. As men running past us often pass unrecognized, so language, too, is not taken in if its movement is rapid.

(198) We must avoid also oblique cases. This, too, causes obscurity, as is shown by the style of Philistus, though it may be less diffuse. An example of the oblique style, which is on this account obscure, is seen in Xenophon. 'He was told that triremes were sailing from Ionia to Cilicia, with Tamos on board—the triremes, which belonged to the Lacedaemonians and to Cyrus himself'. This sentence could be expressed in straight-

forward language as follows 'Many Lacedaemonian vessels were expected to arrive at Cilicia, and many Persian vessels also, which had been built by Cyrus for this very purpose They were sailing from Ionia, and Tamos the Egyptian was the admiral in command of them' Stated thus the passage is perhaps longer, but it is clearer

(199) To speak generally, we must use the natural order of the words, for example 'Epidamnus is a city on your right hand as you sail into the Ionian gulf' First in the order comes the subject, secondly the predicate—that it is a city, the other facts then follow

(200) The order might be reversed, for example 'There is a city Ephyre' We do not approve of this order for every occasion, nor do we reject the former, as we are simply putting forward the natural form of the order of words

(201) In narrative passages we ought either to begin with the nominative, 'Epidamnus is a city', or with the accusative, 'It is said that the city Epidamnus' All other cases will tend to obscurity, and will puzzle both the speaker and the hearer

(202) We must try not to prolong our periods unduly, as in the following 'The river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus passing by the town Stratos, discharges into the sea' It would be better here to give a pause and a rest to the ear, and say 'The Achelous flows from Mount Pindus, and discharges into the sea' So expressed it is much clearer, like roads which have many sign-posts and many halting-places Sign-posts are like guides A monotonous road without sign-posts, however short it is, seems hard to follow

(203) This, then, will suffice on the subject of clearness, though much more might be said Clearness is the principal requisite in the plain style

(204) In composition of this kind we must first avoid long members Length is always a mark of stateliness, just as in metres the hexameter, because of its length, is called 'heroic' and is suitable to heroes, the New Comedy, on the other hand, adopts the shorter trimeter

(205) We shall commonly use trimeter members and sometimes short clauses, as in Plato's opening 'I went down yesterday to the Peiraeus with Glaucon' This sentence contains a number of pauses and rests Aeschines, too, says 'We were sitting on the benches in the Lyceum, where the stewards arrange the contest'

(206) The ends of the members should have a definite rest and basis, as in the examples quoted Prolonged endings are marks of the stately style, as in Thucydides 'The river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus, etc'

(207) We must avoid also, in this style, the union of long vowels and of diphthongs There is always something pompous in length We must either join short vowels with short, as *πάντα μὲν τὰ νέα καλὰ ἐστίν*, or short with long, as *ἡέλιος*, or somehow or other express ourselves with short vowels To speak generally, such a form of diction is apt to seem unimpressive and commonplace, and it is composed with this end in view

(208) Pedantic figures must also be avoided Anything that is conspicuous is unusual and unnatural This style will be marked principally by lucidity and persuasiveness We will speak, then, of lucidity and persuasiveness

(209) We will deal first with lucidity This quality is derived first from accuracy, and from not omitting or cutting out any idea For example, take the simile in Homer which begins with the words, 'And as a man makes a conduit, etc' Its lucidity is due to the fact that every little incident is expressed and nothing is omitted

(210) Take again the chariot-race in memory of Patroclus, in which the words occur 'The back of Eumelus was warm with their breath', and 'They seemed ever on the point of springing on to (*αἰεὶ . . . ἐπιβησομένοισιν ἔϊκρην*) the chariot' The whole of the passage is lucid, because no possible or actual occurrence is omitted

(211) A passage often becomes more lucid when a word is repeated, for example 'In his lifetime you spoke of him disparagingly, now after his death you write of him disparagingly' The repetition of the word 'disparagingly' adds lucidity to the attack

(212) They accuse Ctesias of prolixity, because of his repetitions It may be that the accusation is often justified, but in many passages his critics do not see how lucid he is The repetition of the same word often increases the emphasis

(213) Here is an example 'Stryangaeus, a Persian, unhorsed a Sacian woman Women among the Sacae engage in battle like Amazons When he saw the youthful beauty of the Sacian woman he allowed her to escape After this, when peace was made, he wooed the woman, but was rejected He then resolved to starve himself to death, but he first wrote a reproachful letter to the woman couched in the following terms "I saved your life, yes, you were saved through me Yet I have perished through you"'

(214) Here a critic who makes a merit of terseness might object to the useless repetition of 'I saved you', and 'You were saved through me', since the two expressions have the same meaning Yet if you remove either you will rob the passage of its lucidity and consequent pathos The expression which follows, 'I have perished' instead of 'I am perishing', adds to the lucidity by the use of a past tense What has taken place is more impressive than what is about to take place

(215) Generally speaking, this poet—and Ctesias well deserves the title of poet—is a master of lucidity in all his writings

(216) Another example may be added. It is right not to announce an event abruptly, but by degrees, keeping the hearer in suspense and compelling him to share our anxiety. This is what Ctesias does in announcing Cyrus's death. The messenger comes to Parysatis and does not at once tell her that Cyrus is dead. This would be what is called barbaric brutality. First he announces his victory, and she is glad and full of excitement. Then she asks how the king fares. He announces that he has escaped. She replies 'He has Tissaphernes to thank for this'. Again she asks 'Where is Cyrus now?' The messenger replies 'He is where all brave men should camp'. Little by little he proceeds, and by degrees he breaks the news. The writer thus gives an expressive and lucid picture of the messenger's reluctance to announce the disaster, and unites the mother and the reader in a common distress.

(217) Lucidity is obtained also by narrating circumstances connected with the story. For example, in describing a rustic's approach, a writer said 'From afar the clatter of his feet was heard, as he came near'. This sentence suggests a person not walking, but pounding the ground.

(218) Similar to this is Plato's description of Hippocrates. 'He blushed. Day was now dawning and it betrayed him'. Any one can see how lucid this passage is. The lucidity is caused by the thought bestowed on the narrative, and the reminder that Hippocrates' visit was at night.

(219) Harshness of sound is often used. For example, the passage in Homer, 'He smote them, and their

brains, etc ', and the passage, 'Upward and downward, etc ' By the harsh sound he suggests the uneven ground Imitation is always lucid

(220) Coined words are lucid as they are imitative For example, 'lapping' If Homer had said 'drinking', he would not have represented the drinking of dogs, and there would have been nothing lucid But the combination of the two words *λάπτοντες* (lapping) *γλώσσοισι* (with their tongues) gives a still greater lucidity This, then, will suffice for a brief sketch of lucidity

(221) The persuasive style requires two qualities clearness and simplicity If it is lacking in either of these it fails to persuade We must aim at a diction which is neither overladen nor ponderous if we wish to persuade, a diction, too, with a steady rhythm and no suggestion of metre

(222) These are the qualities needed for a persuasive style Theophrastus adds that every detail must not be described at length, but some points must be left to the intelligence and elaboration of the hearer When he thinks of the points which you have omitted, he becomes not only a hearer, but a witness and a very partial witness, too He thinks that he is clever, thanks to your action in giving him an opportunity to use his intelligence To press home every detail, as though your hearer were a fool, seems like casting a slur on his intelligence

(223) Since the epistolary style needs to be plain, I will also speak about this Artemon, who edited Aristotle's letters, says that dialogue and letters should be written in the same manner A letter, he says, is, as it were, the reverse side of a dialogue

(224) There is truth, it may be, in what he says, but not the whole truth A letter requires more elaboration

than a dialogue The dialogue aims at extemporizing, but the letter is sent as a kind of literary present

(225) Who would ever talk to a friend in the style in which Aristotle writes to Antipater on behalf of the aged exile? He says. 'If he is wandering in exile over the whole world, without hope of being recalled, no one surely will blame such men if they wish to descend to the kingdom of Hades' He who talks in this style suggests a man who is trying to show off and not one who is merely talking

(226) Frequent breaks are not suitable to letters The break in writing causes obscurity, and imitation is not so much a characteristic of writing as of oratory Compare the passage in the *Enthydemus*. 'Who was he, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday in the Lyceum? There was a great crowd round you and your friends' A little later, he adds 'I think that the man you were talking with was a stranger Tell me, who was he?' All such imitative style is suited to drama, but not to letters

(227) The letter should, to a large extent, be expressive of character, like the dialogue Every one in writing a letter is giving, as it were, a picture of his own soul Indeed, all literary composition enables the reader to see the character of the writer, but none does this so clearly as the letter

(228) The length of the letter, no less than its diction, requires regulation Excessively long letters and those, too, which are too ponderous in style, are in no true sense letters, but treatises with an epistolary heading and subscription added Such as these are many of Plato's letters and the one letter of Thucydides

(229) A letter should have a looser order It is ridiculous to write in periods, as if you were composing not a letter but the speech of a prosecuting counsel

It is not merely ridiculous to labour thus in letters, but unfriendly. Friendship expects us to 'call a spade a spade', as the proverb says

(230) We must realize that there is not only a certain diction, but certain matter which is appropriate to letters. At any rate, Aristotle, who seems more than any one to have been a master of the epistolary style, says 'I am not writing to you about this, it is no topic for a letter'

(231) If any one should use a letter to discuss tricks of logic, or natural history, he would be writing indeed, but not writing a letter. A letter is intended to be a brief display of kindness, it deals with simple topics, and is expressed in simple words

(232) Its beauty consists of kindly admonitions, with a frequent mixture of proverbs. This should be the only bit of philosophy it contains, because a proverb is a popular commonplace. But the composer of maxims or the preacher of sermons requires the assistance, not of a letter, but of a pulpit

(233) Aristotle, however, on occasions in his letters, uses logical proofs. For example, he tries to prove that it is right to show good treatment alike to large and small cities, and he says 'The Gods in both are equal. Therefore, since the Graces are Gods, you must find room for them equally in both'. His contention is quite epistolary in character, and so is his method of proof

(234) There are occasions when we address letters to states and to kings. Such letters as these may be allowed a somewhat elevated style. It is right to adapt ourselves to the person to whom we are writing. The elevation, however, should not go so far as to convert the letter into a treatise, like the letter of Aristotle to Alexander, or that of Plato to Dion's friends

(235) To sum up, a letter should in its style contain

a blend of these two qualities, the graceful and the plain I have spoken enough about the epistolary style and the plain style

(236) There is a perversion corresponding to the plain style, which is called arid. This, too, falls under three headings: first, the sense, as when a writer said of Xerxes 'Xerxes came to the coast with all his men'. Here he belittled the scene. He should have said, 'He came with the whole of Asia', but he said 'with all his men'.

(237) Secondly, aridity arises from the diction, when any one describes an important situation in feeble words, as when Theodorus of Gadara describes the battle of Salamis, and someone else said of the tyrant Phalaris 'In certain matters Phalaris annoyed the men of Acragas'. So fierce a conflict and so savage a tyrant ought not to have been described by the words 'certain matters' and 'annoyed', but in stately language appropriate to the subject-matter.

(238) Thirdly, aridity depends on the composition. This happens when there are numerous short phrases, as in the aphorisms 'Life is short, art is long, time is fleeting, effort is elusive'. It happens also when in an important theme the member is short and not continuous. An example of this is when someone was condemning Aristides for not taking part in the battle of Salamis, and said, 'Demeter came and fought with us, but Aristides, no!'. Such an abrupt ending is unseemly and ill-placed. It is legitimate, however, to use such abrupt clauses in other contexts.

(239) It often happens that the idea itself is frigid, and what we now call 'affected', while the composition is abrupt, and attempts to conceal the unattractiveness of the idea. For example, a certain writer, referring to the man who caressed his wife when she was dead,

said, 'He caresses her no more' The idea is clear, even to the blind, as the proverb says, but the concise diction hides to some extent the unattractiveness of the story, and produces a style now known as 'affected aridity', a fault compounded of two others, affectation which is due to the story, and aridity which is due to the style

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(240) We now come to the powerful style From what has been already said it will be clear that this style, like those that have been already described, depends upon three qualities Some events suggest power by their innate character, so that those who describe them seem powerful, even though there is no power in their language For example, Theopompus describes the flute-girls in the Peiraeus and the brothels, and those who pipe and sing and dance In spite of the feebleness of his description, he seems powerful

(241) In the matter of composition, this style would be produced by substituting short clauses for members Prolixity destroys vehemence, when much is expressed in a small compass, there is an increase of power An example is the message of the Lacedaemonians to Philip, 'Dionysius in Corinth' If they had expanded it and said, 'Dionysius has been banished from his throne and is earning a beggarly living in Corinth as a schoolmaster', the message would have been rather a narrative than a gibe

(242) In all their conversation the Lacedaemonians were naturally concise A brief authoritative statement is more powerful, lengthy utterance resembles entreaty and prayer

(243) Symbolic utterances are powerful, because they resemble short statements. From a short statement much can be inferred, and the same applies to symbolic remarks. For example, the allegorical saying 'The gacalas shall sing to you from the ground', is more powerful expressed in this way than if they had said simply 'Your trees shall be cut down'.

(244) The periods must be abridged at the end. The periodic style is powerful, but a loose style is indicative of simplicity and good nature, as the style of the ancients always was. The ancients were distinguished by simplicity.

(245) In the powerful style the old-fashioned pattern of character and rhythm must be avoided—especially if we aim at the powerful style which is now in vogue. In periods, cadences like the following, 'I complied with my clients' wish to plead their cause to the best of my powers', are most in keeping with the rhythm which I have described.

(246) Vehemence, too, creates a kind of power in composition. Roughness of sound also in many cases indicates power, like the effect of uneven words. An example is seen in the passage of Demosthenes 'He has robbed you of the power to give—you of your right'.

(247) Antithetical and parallel clauses in periods must be avoided. They are bombastic and not powerful, they often create frigidity instead of power, for example, when Theopompus was denouncing Philip's friends he weakened the power of his words by the following antithesis 'Men-slayers they were by nature and men-defilers by habit'. The listener finds his mind fixed on the artificial style, which is also bad art, and loses all sense of indignation.

(248) Often the very nature of the subject will compel

us to compose sentences which are both rounded and powerful. The following passage from Demosthenes is an example. 'If one of them had been convicted, you would not have made these proposals. If, therefore, you are now convicted, no one else will make such proposals.' The very subject-matter and order of the words without doubt gave rise to the structure which grew out of it, and no violence could easily have altered its construction. There are many facts which guide our composition, and we are impelled by our very subject, just like men racing down an incline.

(249) It conduces to power to place the strongest thought at the end, whatever is buried in the middle of the sentence loses its force. Antisthenes illustrates this. 'Oft will a man cause pain when out from brushwood he arises.'

If the order is changed and the passage runs thus, 'Oft arising from brushwood a man will cause pain', although the words are the same, the effect will be different.

(250) Antithesis, which I criticized in Theopompus, is no less out of place in Demosthenes, as, for example, when he says. 'You were initiating, I was the initiate. You were the master, I the scholar. You were acting a minor part, I was a spectator. You were driven off the stage, I was hissing.' This passage seems affected because of the contrasts, it is more like a jest than a denunciation.

(251) Powerful style is helped by a succession of periods, although this is not advisable in other styles. Periods succeeding one another will suggest lines of verse recited one after another—and powerful verse, too, like choliambics.

(252) However, these successive periods must also be short—consisting of about two members. If they

consist of many more they will make the passage beautiful rather than powerful

(253) For this reason conciseness helps this style, as aposiopesis will often add to the power, as when Demosthenes says 'For my part I—but I do not wish to say anything disagreeable My opponent has an advantage over me in his accusation' By such an eloquent pause the sentence is almost more powerful than anything he might have said

(254) And in truth ambiguity may often add strength An idea suggested is more weighty simplicity of statement excites contempt

(255) Sometimes harshness of language adds power, especially when the underlying theme requires it—as in Homer

Τρῶες δ' ἐρρίγησαν, ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν

↳ (The Trojans trembled when they saw the writhing snake)

He could have saved his metre, and at the same time have spoken more melodiously, by a slight change

Τρῶες δ' ἐρρίγησαν, ὅπως ὄφιν αἰόλον εἶδον

But then neither poet nor snake would have created so powerful an impression

(256) Following this example we may make many similar experimental changes in order Instead of πάντα ἄν ἔγραψεν, we may write ἔγραψεν ἄν, and for οὐ παρεγένετο we may substitute παρεγένετο οὐχί

(257) We may sometimes end a sentence with the conjunctions δέ or τε, although we are warned to avoid such an ending Yet it might be useful in many passages, for example 'He did not speak well of him, much though he deserved it, he insulted him, rather' (ἠτίμασε δέ), and in the expression, Σχοῦνόν τε Σκῶλόν τε In Homer stateliness is caused by ending with conjunctions

(258) Power would be sometimes added by composing the following type of sentence 'In his recklessness and impiety he overturned everything, sacred and profane alike' (τὰ ἱερὰ τε τὰ ὀσιὰ τε) Generally speaking, smoothness and euphony belong to the polished and not, to the powerful style, and these two styles are regarded as extreme opposites

(259) And yet it often happens that a mixture of playfulness gives an appearance of power—for example, in comedies and the usual style of the Cynics The line of Crates is also an instance 'A dwarfed land lies in the midst of the wine-dark vapour'

(260) There is also the remark of Diogenes at Olympia when, at the end of the hoplites' race, he ran up and proclaimed himself as victor at Olympia over all mankind—in personal character. His words evoke at once laughter and admiration There is a subtle pungency about the words

(261) There is also his remark to the handsome youth Diogenes was wrestling with a handsome boy and accidentally assumed an indecent position The boy was frightened and shrank back, but Diogenes said 'Don't be afraid, dear boy I am no match for you in *that*' The readiness of his reply causes laughter, and there was strength in the hidden emphasis To sum up, a speech of a Cynic always suggests a dog which bites while it wags its tail

(262) Orators will adopt this method on occasions, and have done so Such was Lysias' remark to the old woman's suitor 'It is easier to count her teeth than her fingers' He here depicts the old woman in the strongest and most amusing way Homer's sentence has already been quoted 'Noman I will eat last of all'

(263) I will now describe how power may be derived from the use of figures It comes from the figure which

is called 'passing over' For example 'Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia and thirty-two cities in Thrace I pass over' In this sentence he has actually said all he wanted, and he pretends to have passed them by as though he had more powerful accusations to make

(264) Aposiopesis, a figure already mentioned, partakes of the same character and adds strength to the expression

(265) There is a figure of thought which helps in strengthening the language It is called 'prospopoeia' Here is an example 'Imagine that your ancestors, or Hellas or your country, in the form of a woman, should reproach you in these words'

(266) This figure is used in Pericles' funeral oration, when he says 'My sons,—that ye are sprung from noble fathers, etc' He is not speaking in his own person, but in that of their fathers The argument comes with greater appeal and power by being thus personified. The whole passage assumes a dramatic character

(267) The forms of thought and figures of speech may be adopted as I have described them All my quotations will serve to illustrate them The more cleverly you choose the figures of speech, the more powerful you can make your language There is the figure of 'repetition' 'Thebes, Thebes, our near neighbour, has been plucked out from the midst of Hellas' The repetition of the name adds force

(268) There is also the figure called 'anaphora' For example 'Against thyself dost thou call him, against the laws dost thou call him, against the democracy dost thou call him' Here the figure used is threefold There is 'anaphora', as I have said, because the same word is repeated at the opening of each clause, there is 'asyndeton', because the sentence employs no conjunctions, and there is 'homoioteleuton', because the

phrase, 'dost thou call him', constantly appears at the end. Power comes from the combination of the three. If you paraphrase it thus 'Against thyself and the laws and the democracy dost thou call him', you will rob the passage alike of the figures and of its power.

(269) You must know that disjunction more than any figure produces power. For example 'He walks through the assembly, puffing out his cheeks, knitting his brows, keeping step with Pythocles'. If these sentences were joined by conjunctions, they would become tamer.

(270) We can use also the figure called 'climax'. Demosthenes says 'I did not speak without proposing it, I did not propose it without going on the embassy, I did not go on the embassy without persuading the Thebans'. The language may be compared to one mounting from height to height. If you spoke the sentence thus 'I spoke and made the proposal, and went on the embassy and persuaded the Thebans', you would make a bare narration devoid of all power.

(271) To sum up, the figures of style aid the speaker in delivery and debating power, in particular they produce an abrupt style which adds strength. Enough, then, has been said about the figures.

(272) We may adopt every form of diction that has been mentioned in reference to the stately style—only with a different end in view. Metaphorical expressions often add power, for example 'To Python waxing bold and rushing down on you in full stream'.

(273) The use of similes will serve the same purpose as in Demosthenes 'This decree caused the danger which then was threatening the state to pass by like a cloud'.

(274) Parabolic expressions are unsuited to the powerful style because of their length, for example 'Like a well-bred but untrained hound which heedlessly attacks a boar'. Such sentences show beauty and

precision, but strength requires something vigorous and terse, and is like boxers engaging in close contact

(275) Power is also gained by a compound word, as in those powerful words coined by usage, for example, 'earth-beaten' or 'sideway-stricken', and other similar words. The orators will furnish many such examples

(276) We must make an effort to adapt the words to the deeds. We say of one who acted with unprincipled violence, 'he forced his way through', of one who acted with undisguised and reckless violence, 'he hewed his way through, he brushed every obstacle aside', of one who acted in a crafty and furtive manner, 'he bored a way through, he wormed his way in'. Other words we apply that suit our matter

(277) The assumption of exalted language adds both stateliness and power, for example 'You ought not to¹ speak, Aeschines, without holding out your palm, but you ought to have gone as an ambassador without holding out your palm'

(278) So in the passage which begins 'But in annexing Euboea'. The elevation of language did not aim at investing the language with stateliness, but with power. This happens when at the height of our rhetoric we are denouncing an opponent. The former passage is a denunciation of Aeschines and the latter of Philip

(279) A sentence gains power when we ask our hearers questions and do not reveal the answer. 'But in annexing Euboea, and planning a base of attack against Attica, was he acting wrongly in so doing? was he violating the peace, or not?' He brings his hearer, as it were, into a quandary as though he were being cross-questioned and could not supply an answer. If the passage had been delivered thus 'He was acting

¹ An eloquent speaker holds out his hand as an oratorical gesture, an incorruptible ambassador keeps his hand hidden

wrongly and violating the peace', it would have resembled a plain statement, not a cross-examination

(280) The figure known as 'lingering' is a figure which exceeds the bare facts of the case, and it will greatly enhance the power of the sentence. An example occurs in Demosthenes 'Athenians, a terrible scourge has befallen Hellas'¹. The passage, thus shortened, would have lost power.

(281) The figure called 'euphemism' may, perhaps, belong to the powerful style, the figure, that is, which makes ill-omened words sound good-omened, and impious words sound pious. The citizen, for example, who advocated melting down the golden images of Victory and using the money for the war did not say bluntly 'Let us cut the statues to pieces for the war'. This would have sounded like an ill-omened proposal and blasphemous to the goddess. He used an expression of better omen, and said 'We will invoke the statues of Victory to help us in the war'. So expressed, it did not sound like cutting the statues to pieces, but enlisting them as allies.

(282) The sayings of Demades, too, possess power, although their expression sounds peculiar and unusual. Their power arises partly from their significance and partly from their allegorical form, and lastly from their exaggerated character.

(283) This is an example 'Alexander is not dead, Athenians. If he were, the whole world would smell the corpse'. The use of the word 'smell' for 'perceive' involves both allegory and exaggeration. The fact that the world perceived it signifies Alexander's strength, and at the same time the sentence has a startling effect,² which is due to a combination of three causes. Everything that startles is powerful, because it creates fear.

¹ Demosthenes *Falsa leg.* 259. The original passage elaborates the sentence. The elaboration forms the 'lingering'.

(284) To the same class belong these sayings 'It was not I who drafted this decree, but the war, using Alexander's spear as a pen', and 'The power of Macedon, now that it has lost Alexander, resembles the Cyclops when he had lost his eye'

(285) In another place he says 'A city—no longer the naval power that it was in the time of our ancestors, but an aged woman wearing slippers and supping gruel' The term 'aged woman' is allegorical, and is substituted for the epithets 'weak' or 'failing', at the same time it gives an exaggerated description of the city's listlessness The expression 'supping gruel' alludes to the fact that it was wasting its war funds at that time in feasts and banquets

(286) These quotations are enough to indicate the power of Demades' style And yet the style is dangerous and cannot be imitated closely It contains a poetical element, if allegory and hyperbole and significance are poetical But its poetry is mixed with comedy

(287) The so-called 'figured language' is employed by modern orators to an absurd degree, and at the same time it is combined with a base and suggestive significance The true 'figured language' is combined with tact and care

(288) An example of tact is seen when Plato wished to censure Aristippus and Cleombrotus who were feasting in Aegina, when Socrates had been lying in prison at Athens for a number of days, and who made no effort to release their friend and master, although they were scarcely more than twenty miles from Athens Plato does not state all these facts in so many words 'To do so would have been sheer abuse' Phaedo was asked for a list of those who were present with Socrates, and when he had given all the names, he was asked again whether Aristippus and Cleombrotus were there

He replied, 'No, they were in Aegina' The point of all that precedes is revealed in the words, 'they were in Aegina' The argument seems greatly strengthened as the facts themselves reveal the scandal, which is not stated in so many words Though it might, perhaps, have been quite safe to censure Aristippus and his friends openly, Plato preferred to do so in a figurative manner

(289) Often when we converse with a tyrant or any presumptuous person, and wish to reproach them, we are driven to use a figure of speech Demetrius of Phalerum, for example, was addressing the Macedonian Craterus, who was sitting on a raised golden throne and wearing a purple cloak, and was receiving the Greek embassies with an air of haughtiness, and he disguised his censure in figurative language 'We too once received these men as ambassadors, including Craterus yonder' By the pointed use of the word 'yonder', all the insolent behaviour of Craterus is clearly censured under a figure of language

(290) To the same class belongs the retort of Plato to Dionysius, who had both broken a promise and denied that he had made it 'I, Plato, never promised you anything, but you, by Heaven!' His falsehood is thus brought home to him, and at the same time the language is stately and careful

(291) Often, however, writers use ambiguities If any one wishes to follow this example and to convey censure, he will find an example in the passage of Aeschines which refers to Telauges Almost the whole of this narrative about Telauges will leave the reader wondering whether it is genuine admiration or mockery Such a type of language is ambiguous, and yet though not actual irony it still leaves a kind of ironical impression

(292) There are other occasions on which figures may be used Inasmuch as lords and ladies do not welcome

the recital of their own misdeeds, when we admonish them not to fall into error we shall not speak directly, but we shall perhaps criticize others who have committed like errors, for example, in addressing the tyrant Dionysius we shall denounce the tyrant Phalaris and his cruel deeds Or we shall praise others whose conduct has been of the opposite kind, for example, Gelo or Hiero, who were like fathers and instructors of Sicily By listening he is admonished without being censured, and he is led to imitate Gelo who wins such praise, and he aims at deserving it himself

(293) Often similar caution must be practised in the presence of tyrants For example, Philip, who had only one eye, resented any reference to Cyclops in his presence, or reference to an eye at all Hermeias, too, the ruler of Artaneus, whose rule is said to have been gentle in all respects, could not endure any one to refer to a knife, or to cutting or amputation, because he was a eunuch I mention these instances, because I want to indicate the character of tyrants, and to show that they particularly call for careful language, which is called 'figured language'

(294) And yet great and strong democracies often call for the same kind of language as tyrants For example, there was the democracy of Athens which was the ruler of Hellas and contained flatterers like a Cleon or a Cleophon To flatter is degrading, to censure is dangerous, the middle course is best, to adopt 'figured language'

(295) Sometimes we shall praise a man who falls into error, not for his errors, but for avoiding them, for example, we shall praise the quick-tempered man for winning praise yesterday for his leniency to such or such a man's offences, and for living a life among his fellow citizens which is a pattern to them Every man

finds pleasure in imitating his own qualities, and wishes to add praise to praise, or rather to acquire one consistent record of praise

(296) To sum up, as out of the same wax one man models a hound, another an ox, and another a horse, so different effects can be produced by the same subject-matter. One man speaks in open disapproval and says 'Men leave their money to their children, but with the money they do not leave knowledge how to use the legacy'. This kind of comment is called Aristippian. Another will put forward the same idea in the form of a suggestion, as Xenophon generally does 'It is right not only to leave money to one's children, but also knowledge how to use it.'

(297) There is also the so-called Socratic method, which Aeschines and Plato especially seem to imitate. This will transform the incident quoted into a question, much as follows 'My boy, how much money did your father leave you? Was it a large sum that could not easily be counted?'

'It was a large sum, Socrates.'

'Did he then also leave you knowledge how to use it?'

At one and the same time he artfully leads the boy into a quandary, and reminds him of his ignorance, and induces him to seek instruction. All this effect is produced with due regard to sound morals and good taste, and not, as they say, with Scythian brusqueness.

(298) Such discourses as these when first invented met with much success, or rather they startled people by their suggestive and lucid character and their impressive admonitions. Let this, then, suffice about models of style and figured language.

(299) Smoothness of composition, which is used chiefly by the pupils of Isocrates who avoided a combination of vowel sounds, is not very suitable to powerful

language Often a more powerful effect could be produced by their actual concurrence For example 'When the Phocian war was declared originally, in no sense through my agency, I indeed as yet had no share in public life' If the order of the sentence were changed 'When the Phocian war, through no fault of mine, was originally declared, for I had as yet no share in public life', a great deal of power would be lost, for often the very noise of clashing vowels will increase power

(300) An unpremeditated and spontaneous utterance will create a certain kind of power, especially when we represent ourselves as angry or the victims of injustice An elaborate smoothness and rhythmical style is not a sign of anger, but of playfulness and a desire to display our skill

(301) I have said that a loose style produces power, the same effect will be created by a generally loose diction An example can be seen in Hipponax When he wanted to abuse his enemies, he shattered his metre, and made his language halt instead of standing erect, and destroyed its rhythm He thereby produced a style which was strong and abusive A rhythmical and pleasing style would adapt itself better to eulogy than to denunciation This, then, will suffice for the collision of vowels

(302) Corresponding to the powerful style there is, as you would expect, a perverted style which is called 'disagreeable' It depends upon the subject-matter, when a speaker openly describes incidents which are degrading and should never be mentioned For example, the accuser of Timandra for her immoral life defiled the court with a description of her bowl and her appliances, and her rush mat, and many other objectionable details of a courtesan's life

(303) Composition seems disagreeable if it has a disjointed appearance, like the remark, 'Since such and such is the case, slay them,'—or when the members have no connection with one another, but are like broken fragments. Long continuous periods which take away the speaker's breath are not only wearisome but repellent.

(304) Often pleasing objects lose their charm by a wrong choice of words. When Cleitarchus was describing a wasp, a creature very like a bee, he said 'It ravages the hillside, it rushes into the hollow oaks.' He might have been describing a wild bull or the Erymanthian boar, instead of a kind of bee. His language, therefore, was both disagreeable and frigid. These two defects are in a way closely akin.

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